Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Content Preservation', 'Episteme and Logos in later Plato' and 'Nominalism and Realism'

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4 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
17950 The logos enables us to track one particular among a network of objects [Nehamas]
     Full Idea: The logos (the definition) is a summary statement of the path within a network of objects that one will have to follow in order to locate a particular member of that network.
     From: Alexander Nehamas (Episteme and Logos in later Plato [1984], p.234)
     A reaction: I like this because it confirms that Plato (as well as Aristotle) was interested in the particulars rather than in the kinds (which I take to be general truths about particulars).
17951 A logos may be short, but it contains reference to the whole domain of the object [Nehamas]
     Full Idea: A thing's logos, apparently short as it may be, is implicitly a very rich statement since it ultimately involves familiarity with the whole domain to which that particular object belongs.
     From: Alexander Nehamas (Episteme and Logos in later Plato [1984], p.234)
     A reaction: He may be wrong that the logos is short, since Aristotle (Idea 12292) says a definition can contain many assertions.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
4032 The problem of universals is how many particulars can all be of the same 'type' [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: The problem of universals is the problem of how numerically different particulars can nevertheless be identical in nature, all be of the same 'type'.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Nominalism and Realism [1978], p.41), quoted by DH Mellor / A Oliver - Introduction to 'Properties' §7
     A reaction: A nice statement of the problem. As usual, the question is whether the 'sameness' is a feature of nature, or a product of human thought
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
9382 Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge]
     Full Idea: I call 'entitlement' (as opposed to justification) the epistemic rights or warrants that need not be understood by or even be accessible to the subject.
     From: Tyler Burge (Content Preservation [1993]), quoted by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered §III
     A reaction: I espouse a coherentism that has both internal and external components, and is mediated socially. In Burge's sense, animals will sometimes have 'entitlement'. I prefer, though, not to call this 'knowledge'. 'Entitled true belief' is good.