Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Content Preservation', 'Perceptual Content and Monadic Truth' and 'On Copernicanism and Relativity of Motion'

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4 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth

13157	Choose the true hypothesis, which is the most intelligible one [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: One should choose the more intelligible hypothesis, and the truth is nothing but its intelligibility.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Copernicanism and Relativity of Motion [1689], p.91)
	A reaction: This apparently simple observation strikes me as being rather profound. Our picture of the world is shaped entirely by what is intelligible to us. An odd notion of truth, though. The age of reason. See Idea 13158.

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification

9382	Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge]
	Full Idea: I call 'entitlement' (as opposed to justification) the epistemic rights or warrants that need not be understood by or even be accessible to the subject.
	From: Tyler Burge (Content Preservation [1993]), quoted by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered §III
	A reaction: I espouse a coherentism that has both internal and external components, and is mediated socially. In Burge's sense, animals will sometimes have 'entitlement'. I prefer, though, not to call this 'knowledge'. 'Entitled true belief' is good.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation

13158	The Copernican theory is right because it is the only one offering a good explanation [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: The Copernican account is the truest theory, that is, the most intelligible theory and the only one capable of an explanation sufficient for a person of sound reason.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Copernicanism and Relativity of Motion [1689], p.92)
	A reaction: The word 'intelligible' here seems to be linked to the notion of a best explanation.

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought

18424	If two people can have phenomenally identical experiences, they can't involve the self [Brogaard]
	Full Idea: It is plausible that you and I can have perceptual experiences with the same phenomenology of two trees at different distances from us (perhaps at different times). ..So our perceptual experiences cannot contain you or me in the content of representation.
	From: Berit Brogaard (Perceptual Content and Monadic Truth [2009], p.223), quoted by Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh - The Inessential Indexical 08.2
	A reaction: If you accept the example, which seems reasonable, then that pretty conclusively shows that perception is not inherently indexical.