6 ideas
10163 | Propositional modal logic has been proved to be complete [Kripke, by Feferman/Feferman] |
Full Idea: At the age of 19 Saul Kripke published a completeness proof of propositional modal logic. | |
From: report of Saul A. Kripke (A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic [1959]) by Feferman / Feferman - Alfred Tarski: life and logic Int V |
10760 | With possible worlds, S4 and S5 are sound and complete, but S1-S3 are not even sound [Kripke, by Rossberg] |
Full Idea: Kripke gave a possible worlds semantics to a whole range of modal logics, and S4 and S5 turned out to be both sound and complete with this semantics. Hence more systems could be designed. S1-S3 failed in soundness, leading to 'impossible worlds'. | |
From: report of Saul A. Kripke (A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic [1959]) by Marcus Rossberg - First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness §4 |
16189 | The variable domain approach to quantified modal logic invalidates the Barcan Formula [Kripke, by Simchen] |
Full Idea: Kripke's variable domain approach to quantified modal logic famously invalidates the Barcan Formula. | |
From: report of Saul A. Kripke (A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic [1959]) by Ori Simchen - The Barcan Formula and Metaphysics §3 | |
A reaction: [p.9 and p.16] In a single combined domain all the possibilia must be present, but with variable domains objects in remote domains may not exist in your local domain. BF is committed to those possible objects. |
15132 | The Barcan formulas fail in models with varying domains [Kripke, by Williamson] |
Full Idea: Kripke showed that the Barcan formula ∀x□A⊃□∀xA and its converse fail in models which require varying domains. | |
From: report of Saul A. Kripke (A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic [1959]) by Timothy Williamson - Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula §1 | |
A reaction: I think this is why I reject the Barcan formulas for metaphysics - because the domain of metaphysics should be seen as varying, since some objects are possible in some contexts and not in others. Hmm… |
9382 | Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge] |
Full Idea: I call 'entitlement' (as opposed to justification) the epistemic rights or warrants that need not be understood by or even be accessible to the subject. | |
From: Tyler Burge (Content Preservation [1993]), quoted by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered §III | |
A reaction: I espouse a coherentism that has both internal and external components, and is mediated socially. In Burge's sense, animals will sometimes have 'entitlement'. I prefer, though, not to call this 'knowledge'. 'Entitled true belief' is good. |
2609 | If God's decrees are good, and this is not a mere tautology, then goodness is separate from God's decrees [Russell] |
Full Idea: Theologians have always taught that God's decrees are good, and that this is not a mere tautology: it follows that goodness is logically independent of God's decrees. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Human Society in Ethics and Politics [1954], p.48) |