Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Content Preservation', 'On 'Insolubilia' and their solution' and 'works'

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5 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / c. Logical sets
21563 The 'no classes' theory says the propositions just refer to the members [Russell]
     Full Idea: The contention of the 'no classes' theory is that all significant propositions concerning classes can be regarded as propositions about all or some of their members.
     From: Bertrand Russell (On 'Insolubilia' and their solution [1906], p.200)
     A reaction: Apparently this theory has not found favour with later generations of theorists. I see it in terms of Russell trying to get ontology down to the minimum, in the spirit of Goodman and Quine.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / d. Richard's paradox
21565 Richard's puzzle uses the notion of 'definition' - but that cannot be defined [Russell]
     Full Idea: In Richard's puzzle, we use the notion of 'definition', and this, oddly enough, is not definable, and is indeed not a definite notion at all.
     From: Bertrand Russell (On 'Insolubilia' and their solution [1906], p.209)
     A reaction: The background for this claim is his type theory, which renders certain forms of circular reference meaningless.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
21564 Vicious Circle: what involves ALL must not be one of those ALL [Russell]
     Full Idea: The 'vicious-circle principle' says 'whatever involves an apparent variable must not be among the possible values of that variable', or (less exactly) 'whatever involves ALL must not be one of ALL which it involves.
     From: Bertrand Russell (On 'Insolubilia' and their solution [1906], p.204)
     A reaction: He offers this as a parallel to his 'no classes' principle. That referred to classes, but this refers to propositions, and specifically the Liar Paradox (which he calls the 'Epimenedes').
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
6587 It is always wrong to believe things on insufficient evidence [Clifford]
     Full Idea: It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.
     From: William K. Clifford (works [1870]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.4
     A reaction: This is a famous remark, but is in danger of being tautological unless one gives some account of what 'insufficient' means. If Clifford means the evidence must be conclusive, this is nonsense. 'Never believe if there is no evidence' is better.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
9382 Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge]
     Full Idea: I call 'entitlement' (as opposed to justification) the epistemic rights or warrants that need not be understood by or even be accessible to the subject.
     From: Tyler Burge (Content Preservation [1993]), quoted by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered §III
     A reaction: I espouse a coherentism that has both internal and external components, and is mediated socially. In Burge's sense, animals will sometimes have 'entitlement'. I prefer, though, not to call this 'knowledge'. 'Entitled true belief' is good.