17 ideas
| 9358 | There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth [Lewis,CI] |
| Full Idea: The fact is that there are several logics, markedly different, each self-consistent in its own terms and such that whoever, using it, avoids false premises, will never reach a false conclusion. | |
| From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.366) | |
| A reaction: As the man who invented modal logic in five different versions, he speaks with some authority. Logicians now debate which version is the best, so how could that be decided? You could avoid false conclusions by never reasoning at all. |
| 9357 | Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience [Lewis,CI] |
| Full Idea: The law of excluded middle formulates our decision that whatever is not designated by a certain term shall be designated by its negative. It declares our purpose to make a complete dichotomy of experience, ..which is only our penchant for simplicity. | |
| From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.365) | |
| A reaction: I find this view quite appealing. 'Look, it's either F or it isn't!' is a dogmatic attitude which irritates a lot of people, and appears to be dispensible. Intuitionists in mathematics dispense with the principle, and vagueness threatens it. |
| 9364 | Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing [Lewis,CI] |
| Full Idea: A name must represent some uniformity in experience or it names nothing. | |
| From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.368) | |
| A reaction: I like this because, in the quintessentially linguistic debate about the exact logical role of names, it reminds us that names arise because of the way reality is; they are not sui generis private games for logicians. |
| 9362 | Necessary truths are those we will maintain no matter what [Lewis,CI] |
| Full Idea: Those laws and those laws only have necessary truth which we are prepared to maintain, no matter what. | |
| From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.367) | |
| A reaction: This bold and simple claim has famously been torpedoed by a well-known counterexample - that virtually every human being will cling on to the proposition "dogs have at some time existed" no matter what, but it clearly isn't a necessary truth. |
| 9365 | We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI] |
| Full Idea: The a priori contains principles which can be maintained in the face of all experience, representing the initiative of the mind. But they are subject to alteration on pragmatic grounds, if expanding experience shows their intellectual infelicity. | |
| From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.373) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] This simply IS Quine's famous 'web of belief' picture, showing how firmly Quine is in the pragmatist tradition. Lewis treats a priori principles as a pragmatic toolkit, which can be refined to be more effective. Not implausible... |
| 9382 | Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge] |
| Full Idea: I call 'entitlement' (as opposed to justification) the epistemic rights or warrants that need not be understood by or even be accessible to the subject. | |
| From: Tyler Burge (Content Preservation [1993]), quoted by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered §III | |
| A reaction: I espouse a coherentism that has both internal and external components, and is mediated socially. In Burge's sense, animals will sometimes have 'entitlement'. I prefer, though, not to call this 'knowledge'. 'Entitled true belief' is good. |
| 9361 | We have to separate the mathematical from physical phenomena by abstraction [Lewis,CI] |
| Full Idea: Physical processes present us with phenomena in which the purely mathematical has to be separated out by abstraction. | |
| From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.367) | |
| A reaction: This is the father of modal logic endorsing traditional abstractionism, it seems. He is also, though, endorsing the view that a priori knowledge is created by us, with pragmatic ends in view. |
| 23429 | The environment needs localised politics, with its care for the land [Dobson] |
| Full Idea: More localised politics helps to generate the disposition of care for the land which is a core feature of environmental politics. | |
| From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 4) | |
| A reaction: I currently live in a time when localised politics is hugely devalued, because centralisation and privatisation are cheaper. It seems obvious that many human needs require a commitment to a particular locality. |
| 23424 | An ideology judges things now, and offers an ideal, with a strategy for reaching it [Dobson] |
| Full Idea: An ideology generally has three components: a judgement (usually critical) of how things are, a picture of the ideology's ideal society, and a strategy for progressing towards the ideal. | |
| From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 2) | |
| A reaction: Conservatives tend to think we are already living in the ideal, and they reject most ideologies for being 'idealistic' (which presumably means delusional). I'm a fan of ideals, but combined with cool judgement. |
| 23426 | Ecologism is often non-liberal, by claiming to know other people's best interests [Dobson] |
| Full Idea: Liberals say that their preferences are their interests, and resist the idea that anyone could know their interests better than they can. …To this degree, ecologism might be regarded as 'non-liberal'. | |
| From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 2) | |
| A reaction: There are lots of other cases where liberal citizens may not realise their best interests, such as in the control of traffic, or of drugs. |
| 23427 | Socialism can be productive and centralised, or less productive and decentralised [Dobson] |
| Full Idea: Marx and his heirs promote a productivist socialism, but utopian socialists such as William Morris offer a less productivist and more decentralised form of socialism. | |
| From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 2) | |
| A reaction: Modern history teaches us to be very cautious about the centralised version. Presumably you could be decentralised but still value production highly, even if it is a bit less efficient. |
| 23428 | Difference feminists say women differ fundamentally from men [Dobson] |
| Full Idea: Difference feminists argue that men and women are fundamentally different. | |
| From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 2) | |
| A reaction: You can be significantly different without being 'fundamentally' different. Personally I don't see a huge difference, even though history may have greatly exaggerated and dramatised what differences there are. |
| 23422 | For the environment, affluence and technology matter as much as population size [Dobson] |
| Full Idea: Although bare population figures are important for environmental impact, the level of affluence and the technology are also crucial factors. | |
| From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 2) | |
| A reaction: It is worth noting that the technology can also have a good impact, though affluence is nearly always bad. |
| 23425 | Ecologism says growth must be reduced, and efficiency is not enough [Dobson] |
| Full Idea: A central belief of the ideology of ecologism is that aggregate growth must be reduced, and that this is very unlikely to be achieved by efficiency gains alone. | |
| From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 2) | |
| A reaction: He argues that efficiency gains invariably lead to increased production. Trickle down economics needs huge growth to deliver a good life for the poorest sector. Ecologism has to be fairly egalitarian about wealth. |
| 23430 | A million years is a proper unit of political time [Dobson] |
| Full Idea: We must acknowledge that a million years is a proper unit of political time. | |
| From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 5) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Colin Tudge] Such thinking is almost impossible, but owners of large aristocratic estates seem to have thought in centuries, because they were confident of continuity. The more we identify with all of humanity, the more this is possible. |
| 23423 | We currently value the present fourteen times more highly than the future [Dobson] |
| Full Idea: At current rates we seem to value present concerns as fourteen times more valuable than future concerns. | |
| From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 2) | |
| A reaction: A sobering figure, which sounds about right. This directly influences how much we spend on future concerns. One thought is that future generations may be much more affluent than us! |
| 9363 | Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions [Lewis,CI] |
| Full Idea: The scientific search is for such classification as will make it possible to correlate appearance and behaviour, to discover law, to penetrate to the "essential nature" of things in order that behaviour may become predictable. | |
| From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.368) | |
| A reaction: Modern scientific essentialists no longer invoke scare quotes, and I think we should talk of the search for the 'mechanisms' which explain behaviour, but Lewis seems to have been sixty years ahead of his time. |