Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Content Preservation', 'Aristotelian commentaries' and 'The Structure of Content'

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4 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification

16751	Unity by aggregation, order, inherence, composition, and simplicity [Conimbricense, by Pasnau]
	Full Idea: The Coimbrans have five degrees of unity: by aggregation (stones), by order (an army), per accidens (inherence), per se composite unity (connected), and per se unity of simple things.
	From: report of Collegium Conimbricense (Aristotelian commentaries [1595], Phys I.9.11.2) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.3
	A reaction: [my summary of Pasnau's summary] Take some stones, then order them, then glue them together, then melt them together. The unity of inherence is a different type of unity from these stages. This is a hylomorphic view.

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs

6171	Beliefs are states of the head that explain behaviour, and also items with referential truth-conditions [McGinn]
	Full Idea: We view beliefs both as states of the head explanatory of behaviour, and as items possessed of referential truth-conditions.
	From: Colin McGinn (The Structure of Content [1982]), quoted by Mark Rowlands - Externalism Ch.6
	A reaction: McGinn wants to build a two-part account of meaning on this point, which Rowlands resists. Hume just wanted to define belief by a feeling, but it seems obvious that truth must also be involved.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary

16720	Secondary qualities come from temperaments and proportions of primary qualities [Conimbricense]
	Full Idea: Colors, flavours, smells, and other secondary qualities arise from the various temperaments and proportions of the primary qualities.
	From: Collegium Conimbricense (Aristotelian commentaries [1595], I.10.4 Gen&C), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 21.2
	A reaction: This is a bit more subtle than merely mixing the primary qualities. What about the powers of the primary qualities? Presumably that is the 'temperaments'?

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification

9382	Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge]
	Full Idea: I call 'entitlement' (as opposed to justification) the epistemic rights or warrants that need not be understood by or even be accessible to the subject.
	From: Tyler Burge (Content Preservation [1993]), quoted by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered §III
	A reaction: I espouse a coherentism that has both internal and external components, and is mediated socially. In Burge's sense, animals will sometimes have 'entitlement'. I prefer, though, not to call this 'knowledge'. 'Entitled true belief' is good.