3 ideas
| 22304 | Truth is conceivability, or the systematic coherence of a significant whole [Joachim] |
| Full Idea: Truth is in its essence conceivability or systematic coherence. ...[p.78] It is the systematic coherence which characterises a significant whole. | |
| From: Harold Joachim (The Nature of Truth [1906], p.68), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 35 'coh' | |
| A reaction: We obviously need to know when a whole becomes 'significant'. Potter says mystical idealists liked this because it contributed to their teleological view of the whole of reality. Presumably its roots are in Hegel. |
| 15716 | If axioms and their implications have no contradictions, they pass my criterion of truth and existence [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: If the arbitrarily given axioms do not contradict each other with all their consequences, then they are true and the things defined by the axioms exist. For me this is the criterion of truth and existence. | |
| From: David Hilbert (Letter to Frege 29.12.1899 [1899]), quoted by R Kaplan / E Kaplan - The Art of the Infinite 2 'Mind' | |
| A reaction: If an axiom says something equivalent to 'fairies exist, but they are totally undetectable', this would seem to avoid contradiction with anything, and hence be true. Hilbert's idea sounds crazy to me. He developed full Formalism later. |
| 9382 | Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge] |
| Full Idea: I call 'entitlement' (as opposed to justification) the epistemic rights or warrants that need not be understood by or even be accessible to the subject. | |
| From: Tyler Burge (Content Preservation [1993]), quoted by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered §III | |
| A reaction: I espouse a coherentism that has both internal and external components, and is mediated socially. In Burge's sense, animals will sometimes have 'entitlement'. I prefer, though, not to call this 'knowledge'. 'Entitled true belief' is good. |