Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Content Preservation', 'The Nature of Possibility' and 'On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians'

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7 ideas

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
The best version of reductionist actualism around is Armstrong's combinatorial account [Armstrong, by Read]
     Full Idea: Armstrong's combinatorial theory of possibility is perhaps the most sophisticated and best worked out reductionist version of actualism to date.
     From: report of David M. Armstrong (The Nature of Possibility [1986]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.4
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge]
     Full Idea: I call 'entitlement' (as opposed to justification) the epistemic rights or warrants that need not be understood by or even be accessible to the subject.
     From: Tyler Burge (Content Preservation [1993]), quoted by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered §III
     A reaction: I espouse a coherentism that has both internal and external components, and is mediated socially. In Burge's sense, animals will sometimes have 'entitlement'. I prefer, though, not to call this 'knowledge'. 'Entitled true belief' is good.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
To explain a house we must describe its use, as well as its parts [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: A house would be badly explained if we were to describe only the arrangement of its parts, but not its use.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.255)
     A reaction: This must partly fall under pragmatics (i.e. what the enquirer is interested in). But function plays a genuine role in artefacts, and also in evolved biological organs.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
Active force is not just potential for action, since it involves a real effort or striving [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Active force should not be thought of as the simple and common potential [potentia] or receptivity to action of the schools. Rather, active force involves an effort [conatus] or striving [tendentia] toward action.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.252)
     A reaction: This is why Leibniz is lured into making his active forces more and more animistic, till they end up like proto-minds (though never, remember, conscious and willing minds).
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
God's laws would be meaningless without internal powers for following them [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: To say that, in creation, God gave bodies a law for acting means nothing, unless, at the same time, he gave them something by means of which it could happen that the law is followed.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.253)
     A reaction: This is the beginning of the modern rebellion against the medieval view of laws as imposed from outside on passive matter. Unfortunately for Leibniz, once you have postulated active internal powers, the external laws become redundant.
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
All qualities of bodies reduce to forces [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: All qualities of bodies .....are in the end reduced [revoco] to forces.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.256)
     A reaction: The dots conceal a long qualification, but he is essentially standing by this simple remark. If you substitute the word 'powers' for 'forces', I think that is just about right.
Power is passive force, which is mass, and active force, which is entelechy or form [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The dynamicon or power [potentia] in bodies is twofold, passive and active. Passive force [vis] constitutes matter or mass [massa], and active force constitutes entelechy or form.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.252)
     A reaction: This is explicitly equating the innate force understood in physics with Aristotelian form. The passive force is to explain the resistance of bodies. I like the equation of force with power. He says the entelechy is 'analogous' to a soul.