3 ideas
16640 | Form is the principle that connects a thing's constitution (rather than being operative) [Hill,N] |
Full Idea: Form is the state and condition of a thing, a result of the connection among its material principles; it is a constituting principle, not an operative one. | |
From: Nicholas Hill (Philosophia Epicurea [1610], n 35) | |
A reaction: Pasnau presents this as a denial of form, but it looks to me like someone fishing for what form could be in a more scientific context. Aristotle would have approved of 'principles'. Hill seems to defend the categorical against the dispositional. |
12583 | Belief truth-conditions are normal circumstances where the belief is supposed to occur [Papineau] |
Full Idea: The truth condition of the belief is the 'normal' circumstances in which, given the learning process, it is biologically supposed to be present. | |
From: David Papineau (Reality and Representation [1987], p.67), quoted by Christopher Peacocke - A Study of Concepts 5.2 | |
A reaction: How do we account for a belief in ghosts in this story? The notion of 'normal' circumstances and what is 'biologically supposed' to happen don't seem very appropriate. This is the 'teleological' view of belief. |
9382 | Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge] |
Full Idea: I call 'entitlement' (as opposed to justification) the epistemic rights or warrants that need not be understood by or even be accessible to the subject. | |
From: Tyler Burge (Content Preservation [1993]), quoted by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered §III | |
A reaction: I espouse a coherentism that has both internal and external components, and is mediated socially. In Burge's sense, animals will sometimes have 'entitlement'. I prefer, though, not to call this 'knowledge'. 'Entitled true belief' is good. |