10 ideas
13949 | All models of Peano axioms are isomorphic, so the models all seem equally good for natural numbers [Cartwright,R on Peano] |
Full Idea: Peano's axioms are categorical (any two models are isomorphic). Some conclude that the concept of natural number is adequately represented by them, but we cannot identify natural numbers with one rather than another of the isomorphic models. | |
From: comment on Giuseppe Peano (Principles of Arithmetic, by a new method [1889], 11) by Richard Cartwright - Propositions 11 | |
A reaction: This is a striking anticipation of Benacerraf's famous point about different set theory accounts of numbers, where all models seem to work equally well. Cartwright is saying that others have pointed this out. |
18113 | PA concerns any entities which satisfy the axioms [Peano, by Bostock] |
Full Idea: Peano Arithmetic is about any system of entities that satisfies the Peano axioms. | |
From: report of Giuseppe Peano (Principles of Arithmetic, by a new method [1889], 6.3) by David Bostock - Philosophy of Mathematics 6.3 | |
A reaction: This doesn't sound like numbers in the fullest sense, since those should facilitate counting objects. '3' should mean that number of rose petals, and not just a position in a well-ordered series. |
17634 | Peano axioms not only support arithmetic, but are also fairly obvious [Peano, by Russell] |
Full Idea: Peano's premises are recommended not only by the fact that arithmetic follows from them, but also by their inherent obviousness. | |
From: report of Giuseppe Peano (Principles of Arithmetic, by a new method [1889], p.276) by Bertrand Russell - Regressive Method for Premises in Mathematics p.276 |
15653 | We can add Reflexion Principles to Peano Arithmetic, which assert its consistency or soundness [Halbach on Peano] |
Full Idea: Peano Arithmetic cannot derive its own consistency from within itself. But it can be strengthened by adding this consistency statement or by stronger axioms (particularly ones partially expressing soundness). These are known as Reflexion Principles. | |
From: comment on Giuseppe Peano (Principles of Arithmetic, by a new method [1889], 1.2) by Volker Halbach - Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) 1.2 |
17635 | Arithmetic can have even simpler logical premises than the Peano Axioms [Russell on Peano] |
Full Idea: Peano's premises are not the ultimate logical premises of arithmetic. Simpler premises and simpler primitive ideas are to be had by carrying our analysis on into symbolic logic. | |
From: comment on Giuseppe Peano (Principles of Arithmetic, by a new method [1889], p.276) by Bertrand Russell - Regressive Method for Premises in Mathematics p.276 |
8967 | Not all predicates can be properties - 'is non-self-exemplifying', for example [Lowe] |
Full Idea: We cannot assume that every meaningful predicate necessarily expresses a property that some entity could possess. The predicate 'is non-self-exemplifying' is meaningful, yet it would be contradictory for there to be any such property. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Individuation [2003]) | |
A reaction: This clinches what I would take to be a foregone conclusion - that you can't know what the world contains just by examining the predicates of the English language. However, I suppose predicates are needed to know properties. |
8965 | Neither mere matter nor pure form can individuate a sphere, so it must be a combination [Lowe] |
Full Idea: A sphere's matter could not be what makes it one sphere, since matter lacks intrinsic unity, ..and the form cannot make it that very sphere, since an identical sphere may exemplify that universal. So it is a combination of form and matter. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Individuation [2003], 5) | |
A reaction: But how do two aspects of the sphere, neither of which has the power to individuate, achieve individuation when they are combined? Like parents, I suppose. Two totally identical spheres can only be individuated by location. |
9382 | Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge] |
Full Idea: I call 'entitlement' (as opposed to justification) the epistemic rights or warrants that need not be understood by or even be accessible to the subject. | |
From: Tyler Burge (Content Preservation [1993]), quoted by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered §III | |
A reaction: I espouse a coherentism that has both internal and external components, and is mediated socially. In Burge's sense, animals will sometimes have 'entitlement'. I prefer, though, not to call this 'knowledge'. 'Entitled true belief' is good. |
8968 | If the flagpole causally explains the shadow, the shadow cannot explain the flagpole [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Two distinct entities cannot explain each other, in the same sense of 'explain'. If the height of the flagpole causally explains the length of the shadow, the shadow cannot explain the flagpole, though it may predict the latter. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Individuation [2003], 12) | |
A reaction: This seems related to the question of the direction of time/causation. Some explanations can be benignly circular, as when a married couple have a passion for chinese food. [S.Bromberger 1966 invented the flagpole case]. |
8966 | Properties are facets of objects, only discussable separately by an act of abstraction [Lowe] |
Full Idea: In no sense is a property a 'constituent' of an object: it is merely a 'facet' or 'aspect' of an object - something which we can talk about or think of separately from that object only by an act of abstraction. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Individuation [2003], 8) | |
A reaction: This appears to be in tune with traditional abstractionism, even though Lowe is committed to the reality of universals. To what do I refer when I say 'I like your car, apart from its colour'? |