Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Content Preservation', 'Concepts of supervenience' and 'Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics'

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4 ideas

3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth

14713	Truth in a scenario is the negation in that scenario being a priori incoherent [Chalmers]
	Full Idea: The epistemic 1-intension for a sentence S is True at a scenario W iff (W and not-S) is a priori incoherent.
	From: David J.Chalmers (Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics [2004], p.180-4), quoted by Laura Schroeter - Two-Dimensional Semantics
	A reaction: See Two-Dimensional Semantics (in 'Language') and Chalmers for the background to this idea. I love the coherence view of justification, but get a bit nervous when people start defining truth in that way.

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience

3536	Supervenient properties must have matching base properties [Kim]
	Full Idea: Each supervenient property necessarily has a coextensive property in the base family.
	From: Jaegwon Kim (Concepts of supervenience [1984], §5)
	A reaction: This is presumably the minimum requirement for a situation of supervenience. How do you decide which property is the 'base' property? Do we just mean that the base causes the other, but not vice versa?

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities

14712	A sentence is a priori if no possible way the world might actually be could make it false [Chalmers]
	Full Idea: The Core Thesis for rationalist 2D semantics is that for any sentence S, S is apriori iff S has a necessary 1-intension. (That is, there is no possible way the world might be that, if it actually obtained, would make S false).
	From: David J.Chalmers (Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics [2004], p.165), quoted by Laura Schroeter - Two-Dimensional Semantics 2.3.2
	A reaction: [The parenthesis is by Schroeter] A '1-intension' is defined by a diagonal on a 2D semantic matrix. Chalmers defends conceivability as the guide to possibility. This is a very traditional view of the a priori, expressed in modern terms.

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification

9382	Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge]
	Full Idea: I call 'entitlement' (as opposed to justification) the epistemic rights or warrants that need not be understood by or even be accessible to the subject.
	From: Tyler Burge (Content Preservation [1993]), quoted by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered §III
	A reaction: I espouse a coherentism that has both internal and external components, and is mediated socially. In Burge's sense, animals will sometimes have 'entitlement'. I prefer, though, not to call this 'knowledge'. 'Entitled true belief' is good.