Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Content Preservation', 'The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding' and 'Philosophy of Logics'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

4 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique

2572	Logical truth seems much less likely to 'correspond to the facts' than factual truth does [Haack]
	Full Idea: It is surely less plausible to suppose that logical truth consists in correspondence to the facts than that 'factual' truth does.
	From: Susan Haack (Philosophy of Logics [1978], 7.6)

3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition

2570	The same sentence could be true in one language and meaningless in another, so truth is language-relative [Haack]
	Full Idea: The definition of truth will have to be, Tarski argues, relative to a language, for one and the same sentence may be true in one language, and false or meaningless in another.
	From: Susan Haack (Philosophy of Logics [1978], 7.5)

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding

19261	Understanding is seeing coherent relationships in the relevant information [Kvanvig]
	Full Idea: What is distinctive about understanding (after truth is satisfied) is the internal seeing or appreciating of explanatory and other coherence-inducing relationships in a body of information that is crucial for understanding.
	From: Jonathan Kvanvig (The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding [2003], 198), quoted by Anand Vaidya - Understanding and Essence 'Distinction'
	A reaction: For me this ticks exactly the right boxes. Coherent explanations are what we want. The hardest part is the ensure their truth. Kvanvig claims this is internal, so we can understand even if, Gettier-style, our external connections are lucky.

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification

9382	Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge]
	Full Idea: I call 'entitlement' (as opposed to justification) the epistemic rights or warrants that need not be understood by or even be accessible to the subject.
	From: Tyler Burge (Content Preservation [1993]), quoted by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered §III
	A reaction: I espouse a coherentism that has both internal and external components, and is mediated socially. In Burge's sense, animals will sometimes have 'entitlement'. I prefer, though, not to call this 'knowledge'. 'Entitled true belief' is good.