18914
|
Davidson controversially proposed to quantify over events [Davidson, by Engelbretsen]
|
|
Full Idea:
An alternative, and still controversial, extension of first-order logic is due to Donald Davidson, who allows for quantification over events.
|
|
From:
report of Donald Davidson (The Individuation of Events [1969]) by George Engelbretsen - Trees, Terms and Truth 3
|
|
A reaction:
I'm suddenly thinking this is quite an attractive proposal. We need to quantify over facts, or states of affairs, or events, or some such thing, to talk about the world properly. Objects, predicates and sets/parts is too sparse. I like facts.
|
14004
|
We need events for action statements, causal statements, explanation, mind-and-body, and adverbs [Davidson, by Bourne]
|
|
Full Idea:
Davidson claims that we require the existence of events in order to make sense of a) action statements, b) causal statements, c) explanation, d) the mind-body problem, and e) the logic of adverbial modification.
|
|
From:
report of Donald Davidson (The Individuation of Events [1969], Intro IIb) by Craig Bourne - A Future for Presentism
|
|
A reaction:
Events are a nice shorthand, but I don't like them in a serious ontology. Prior says there objects and what happens to them; Kim reduces events to other things. Processes are more clearly individuated than events.
|
9382
|
Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge]
|
|
Full Idea:
I call 'entitlement' (as opposed to justification) the epistemic rights or warrants that need not be understood by or even be accessible to the subject.
|
|
From:
Tyler Burge (Content Preservation [1993]), quoted by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered §III
|
|
A reaction:
I espouse a coherentism that has both internal and external components, and is mediated socially. In Burge's sense, animals will sometimes have 'entitlement'. I prefer, though, not to call this 'knowledge'. 'Entitled true belief' is good.
|
1422
|
God's existence is either necessary or impossible, and no one has shown that the concept of God is contradictory [Malcolm]
|
|
Full Idea:
God's existence is either impossible or necessary. It can be the former only if the concept of such a being is self-contradictory or in some way logically absurd. Assuming that this is not so, it follows that He necessarily exists.
|
|
From:
Norman Malcolm (Anselm's Argument [1959], §2)
|
|
A reaction:
The concept of God suggests paradoxes of omniscience, omnipotence and free will, so self-contradiction seems possible. How should we respond if the argument suggests God is necessary, but evidence suggests God is highly unlikely?
|