10 ideas
| 9382 | Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge] |
| Full Idea: I call 'entitlement' (as opposed to justification) the epistemic rights or warrants that need not be understood by or even be accessible to the subject. | |
| From: Tyler Burge (Content Preservation [1993]), quoted by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered §III | |
| A reaction: I espouse a coherentism that has both internal and external components, and is mediated socially. In Burge's sense, animals will sometimes have 'entitlement'. I prefer, though, not to call this 'knowledge'. 'Entitled true belief' is good. |
| 22371 | Determinism threatens free will if actions can be causally traced to external factors [Foot] |
| Full Idea: The determinism which worries the defender of free will is that if human action is subject to a universal law of causation, there will be for any action a set of sufficient conditions which can be traced back to factors outside the control of the agent. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Free Will as Involving Determinism [1957], p.63) | |
| A reaction: She draws on Russell for this, but neither of them mention whether the causation is physical. Free will seems to imply non-physical causation. |
| 23146 | Motives produce intentions, which lead to actions [Driver] |
| Full Idea: Motives will cause persons for form intentions; it is intentions which more directly guide actions. | |
| From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 3) | |
| A reaction: This is invites the question of whether there is a sharp distinction between the motive and the action. Detectives look for motives, but law courts look for intentions. |
| 22372 | Not all actions need motives, but it is irrational to perform troublesome actions with no motive [Foot] |
| Full Idea: We do not expect that everything a rational man does should be done with a motive, ...but we do expect a man to have a motive for many things that he does, and would count anyone who constantly performed troublesome actions without a motive as irrational. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Free Will as Involving Determinism [1957], p.66) | |
| A reaction: Interestng, because the assessment of whether someone is 'rational' therefore needs a criterion for when a motive seems required and when not. 'Significant' actions need a motive? |
| 23147 | Good intentions are not necessary for virtue [Driver] |
| Full Idea: I deny the claim that good intentions are necessary for virtue. | |
| From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 3) | |
| A reaction: Presumably one could continually do the right thing, because it was your duty or your job, without actually being well motivated for it. |
| 23144 | Virtue should be defined by consequences, not by states of mind [Driver] |
| Full Idea: The behavioural aspects of virtue are more important than its phenomenology, because virtue is best defined along consequentialist lines. | |
| From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This is the thesis of her paper. Quite persuasive. Consequences are, of course, important in all moral theories (even Kant's). She doesn't rely on human nature. The social virtues vary according to the circumstances, such as gossiping in wartime. |
| 23148 | Virtues are character traits or dispositions which produce good consequences for others [Driver] |
| Full Idea: A moral virtue is a character trait (a disposition or cluster of dispositions) which, generally speaking, produces good consequences for others. | |
| From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 3) | |
| A reaction: There are self-directed virtues, such as keeping fit and healthy. There are virtues for ways to receive the kindness of others. That said, I like this idea. |
| 23150 | Control of pregnancy and knowledge of paternity have downgraded chastity [Driver] |
| Full Idea: Women now have more control over becoming pregnant. Men can now be more certain of paternity, without the constraint of female chastity. Hence chastity is no longer considered a moral virtue. | |
| From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 5) | |
| A reaction: A persuasive argument that virtues are defined by their consequences (to which I add my example of gossiping in wartime). Different social situations and crises promote or relegate the status of certain virtues (such as food hoarding). |
| 22373 | People can act out of vanity without being vain, or even vain about this kind of thing [Foot] |
| Full Idea: It makes sense to say that a man acts out of vanity on a particular occasion although he is not in general vain, or even vain about this kind of thing. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Free Will as Involving Determinism [1957], p.69) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle tells us that virtues and vices are habits, and also have an intellectual component, implying that the person believes in that sort of behaviour. Anyone can have 'a little moment of vanity'. |
| 23149 | If generosity systematically turned recipients into parasites, it wouldn't be a virtue [Driver] |
| Full Idea: If generosity towards the needy in the long run produced [social] parasites, and if generosity did this systematically, then it would not be a moral virtue. | |
| From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 5) | |
| A reaction: A very persuasive example. Hume has similar views - that we encourage those emotions which have good social outcomes. |