Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Content Preservation', 'Morality, Action, and Outcome' and 'fragments/reports'

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8 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification

9382	Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge]
	Full Idea: I call 'entitlement' (as opposed to justification) the epistemic rights or warrants that need not be understood by or even be accessible to the subject.
	From: Tyler Burge (Content Preservation [1993]), quoted by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered §III
	A reaction: I espouse a coherentism that has both internal and external components, and is mediated socially. In Burge's sense, animals will sometimes have 'entitlement'. I prefer, though, not to call this 'knowledge'. 'Entitled true belief' is good.

20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect

22465	We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen [Foot]
	Full Idea: We have an intuition that there is a morally relevant distinction between what we do and what we allow to happen.
	From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.88)
	A reaction: She says many deny this distinction, but she defends it. Presumably consequentialists deny the distinction. What is bad if I do it, but OK if I allow it to happen? Neglecting a victim to save others, she suggests.

22466	We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences [Foot]
	Full Idea: We have an intuition that there is a moral distinction between what we aim at and what we foresee as a result of what we do.
	From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.88)
	A reaction: Cf. Idea 22465. This seems to be the classic doctrine of double effect. It is hard to defend the claim that we are only responsible for what we aim at. A wide assessment of consequences is a moral duty. Well-meaning fools are bad.

22467	Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it [Foot]
	Full Idea: The difference between acts and omissions is irrelevant to any moral issue except in so far as it corresponds to the distinction between allowing something to happen and being the agent to whom the happening can be ascribed.
	From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.89)
	A reaction: The list of anyone's omissions is presumably infinite, but what they 'allow' must be in some way within their power. But what of something I can't now prevent, only because I failed to do some relevant task yesterday?

23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism

5954	All inventions of the mind aim at pleasure, and those that don't are worthless [Metrodorus of Lamp., by Plutarch]
	Full Idea: Metrodorus says that all the wonderful, ingenious and brilliant inventions of the mind have been contrived for the sake of pleasure of the flesh or for the sake of looking forward to it, and any accomplishment not leading to this end is worthless.
	From: report of Metrodorus (Lamp) (fragments/reports [c.291 BCE], Fr 6) by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes §1125
	A reaction: It is very hard to think of counterexamples! Would anyone bother to work out the theorems of number theory if they didn't enjoy doing it? Would any sensible person make great sacrifices if they didn't think that increased happiness would result?

23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism

22470	A good moral system benefits its participants, and so demands reciprocity [Foot]
	Full Idea: It has been suggested that one criterion for a good moral system is that it should be possible to demand reciprocity from every individual because of the good the system renders to him.
	From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.104)
	A reaction: Money seems to have this feature, that we mostly conform to the rules for its use, because we value the whole system. Foot accepts this, but says there are also other criteria, such as leaving freedom to live well (ie. not too puritanical).

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue

22468	Virtues can have aims, but good states of affairs are not among them [Foot]
	Full Idea: Some virtues do give us aims, but nothing from within morality suggests the kind of good state of affairs which it would seem always to be our duty to promote. And why indeed should there be any such thing?
	From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.101)
	A reaction: Isn't successful human functioning, such as heath, always to be desired? If honour is a worthy aim, doesn't that make being rightly honoured a desirable state of affairs? She is attacking consequentialism, but I'm not convinced here.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

22469	Some virtues imply rules, and others concern attachment [Foot]
	Full Idea: Virtues such as justice consist mainly in adherence to rules of conduct, while those such as benevolence we might call virtues of attachment.
	From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.101)
	A reaction: Not sure about 'attachment'. We should be benevolent towards people to whom we are not particularly attached. Courage doesn't fall into either group.