5 ideas
8249 | Class membership is not transitive, unlike being part of a part of the whole [Lesniewski, by George/Van Evra] |
Full Idea: Lesniewski distinguished the part-whole relationship from class membership. Membership is not transitive: if s is an element of t, and t of u, then s is not an element of u, whereas a part of a part is a part of the whole. | |
From: report of Stanislaw Lesniewski (works [1916]) by George / Van Evra - The Rise of Modern Logic 7 | |
A reaction: If I am a member of a sports club, and my club is a member of the league, I am not thereby a member of the league (so clubs are classes, not wholes). This distinction is clearly fairly crucial in ontology. |
9382 | Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge] |
Full Idea: I call 'entitlement' (as opposed to justification) the epistemic rights or warrants that need not be understood by or even be accessible to the subject. | |
From: Tyler Burge (Content Preservation [1993]), quoted by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered §III | |
A reaction: I espouse a coherentism that has both internal and external components, and is mediated socially. In Burge's sense, animals will sometimes have 'entitlement'. I prefer, though, not to call this 'knowledge'. 'Entitled true belief' is good. |
22371 | Determinism threatens free will if actions can be causally traced to external factors [Foot] |
Full Idea: The determinism which worries the defender of free will is that if human action is subject to a universal law of causation, there will be for any action a set of sufficient conditions which can be traced back to factors outside the control of the agent. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Free Will as Involving Determinism [1957], p.63) | |
A reaction: She draws on Russell for this, but neither of them mention whether the causation is physical. Free will seems to imply non-physical causation. |
22372 | Not all actions need motives, but it is irrational to perform troublesome actions with no motive [Foot] |
Full Idea: We do not expect that everything a rational man does should be done with a motive, ...but we do expect a man to have a motive for many things that he does, and would count anyone who constantly performed troublesome actions without a motive as irrational. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Free Will as Involving Determinism [1957], p.66) | |
A reaction: Interestng, because the assessment of whether someone is 'rational' therefore needs a criterion for when a motive seems required and when not. 'Significant' actions need a motive? |
22373 | People can act out of vanity without being vain, or even vain about this kind of thing [Foot] |
Full Idea: It makes sense to say that a man acts out of vanity on a particular occasion although he is not in general vain, or even vain about this kind of thing. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Free Will as Involving Determinism [1957], p.69) | |
A reaction: Aristotle tells us that virtues and vices are habits, and also have an intellectual component, implying that the person believes in that sort of behaviour. Anyone can have 'a little moment of vanity'. |