7 ideas
17435 | Objects do not naturally form countable units [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Objects do not by themselves naturally fall into countable units. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Isolation and Non-arbitrary Division [1997], 2.2) | |
A reaction: Hm. This seems to be modern Fregean orthodoxy. Why did the institution of counting ever get started if the things in the world didn't demand counting? Even birds are aware of the number of eggs in their nest (because they miss a stolen one). |
17433 | We can still count squares, even if they overlap [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: The fact that there is overlap does not seem to inhibit our ability to count squares. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Isolation and Non-arbitrary Division [1997], 2.2) | |
A reaction: She has a diagram of three squares overlapping slightly at their corners. Contrary to Frege, these seems to depend on a subliminal concept of the square that doesn't depend on language. |
17439 | There is no deep reason why we count carrots but not asparagus [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Why do speakers of English count carrots but not asparagus? There is no 'deep' reason. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Isolation and Non-arbitrary Division [1997]) | |
A reaction: Koslick is offering this to defend the Fregean conceptual view of counting, but what seems to matter is what is countable, and not whether we happen to count it. You don't need to know what carrots are to count them. Cooks count asparagus. |
17434 | We struggle to count branches and waves because our concepts lack clear boundaries [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: The reason we have a hard time counting the branches and the waves is because our concepts 'branches on the tree' and 'waves on the ocean' do not determine sufficiently precise boundaries: the concepts do not draw a clear invisible line around each thing. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Isolation and Non-arbitrary Division [1997], 2.2) | |
A reaction: This is the 'isolation' referred to in Frege. |
17436 | We talk of snow as what stays the same, when it is a heap or drift or expanse [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Talk of snow concerns what stays the same when some snow changes, as it might be, from a heap of snow to a drift, to an expanse. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Isolation and Non-arbitrary Division [1997], 2.2) | |
A reaction: The whiteness also stays the same, but isn't stuff. |
9382 | Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge] |
Full Idea: I call 'entitlement' (as opposed to justification) the epistemic rights or warrants that need not be understood by or even be accessible to the subject. | |
From: Tyler Burge (Content Preservation [1993]), quoted by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered §III | |
A reaction: I espouse a coherentism that has both internal and external components, and is mediated socially. In Burge's sense, animals will sometimes have 'entitlement'. I prefer, though, not to call this 'knowledge'. 'Entitled true belief' is good. |
1468 | If meaning is use, then religious sentences have meaning because they are used to assert an intention about how to live [Braithwaite, by PG] |
Full Idea: If the meaning of statements is their use (as Wittgenstein claims), then religious people use religious claims to assert an intention to follow a religious life and morality, and this intention gives their sentences meaning. | |
From: report of R.B. Braithwaite (Empiricist View of Religion [1955]) by PG - Db (ideas) |