Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Content Preservation', 'Draft Statement of Human Obligations' and 'There are no ordinary things'

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14 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
Vague predicates lack application; there are no borderline cases; vague F is not F [Unger, by Keefe/Smith]
     Full Idea: In a slogan, Unger's thesis is that all vague predicates lack application ('nihilism', says Williamson). Classical logic can be retained in its entirety. There are no borderline cases: for vague F, everything is not F; nothing is either F or borderline F.
     From: report of Peter Unger (There are no ordinary things [1979]) by R Keefe / P Smith - Intro: Theories of Vagueness §1
     A reaction: Vague F could be translated as 'I'm quite tempted to apply F', in which case Unger is right. This would go with Russell's view. Logic and reason need precise concepts. The only strategy with vagueness is to reason hypothetically.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
There are no objects with proper parts; there are only mereological simples [Unger, by Wasserman]
     Full Idea: Eliminativism is often associated with Unger, who defends 'mereological nihilism', that there are no composite objects (objects with proper parts); there are only mereological simples (with no proper parts). The nihilist denies statues and ships.
     From: report of Peter Unger (There are no ordinary things [1979]) by Ryan Wasserman - Material Constitution 4
     A reaction: The puzzle here is that he has a very clear notion of identity for the simples, but somehow bars combinations from having identity. So identity is simplicity? 'Complex identity' doesn't sound like an oxymoron. We're stuck if there are no simples.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge]
     Full Idea: I call 'entitlement' (as opposed to justification) the epistemic rights or warrants that need not be understood by or even be accessible to the subject.
     From: Tyler Burge (Content Preservation [1993]), quoted by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered §III
     A reaction: I espouse a coherentism that has both internal and external components, and is mediated socially. In Burge's sense, animals will sometimes have 'entitlement'. I prefer, though, not to call this 'knowledge'. 'Entitled true belief' is good.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
Every human yearns for an unattainable transcendent good [Weil]
     Full Idea: There is a reality outside the world …outside any sphere that is accessible to human faculties. Corresponding to this reality, at the centre of the human heart, is the longing for an absolute good, which is always there and never appeased by this world.
     From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.221)
     A reaction: I don't believe in any sort of transcendent reality, but I can identify with this. Even if you have a highly naturalistic view of what is valuable (see late Philippa Foot), there is this indeterminate yearning for that value.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Where human needs are satisfied we find happiness, friendship and beauty [Weil]
     Full Idea: Any place where the needs of human beings are satisfied can be recognised by the fact that there is a flowering of fraternity, joy, beauty, and happiness.
     From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.230)
     A reaction: Weil writes a lengthy analysis of what she sees as the basic human needs, beyond the obvious food, water etc. An excellent place to start a line of political thought.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
We cannot equally respect what is unequal, so equal respect needs a shared ground [Weil]
     Full Idea: It is impossible to feel equal respect for things that are in fact unequal unless the respect is given to something that is identical in all of them. Men are all unequal in all their relations with things of this world.
     From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.223)
     A reaction: Weil votes for some link to transcendence in each of us, but I would prefer some more naturalistic proposal for what we all have in common. There are plenty of aspects which unite all human beings, which grounds this unconditional respect.
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Life needs risks to avoid sickly boredom [Weil]
     Full Idea: The boredom produced by a complete absence of risk is a sickness of the human soul.
     From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.229)
     A reaction: An unusual analysis of boredom. I think it is probably purposeful activity that we need, rather than actual risk, with all the stresses that involves. Risks are justified by their rewards.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
We all need to partipate in public tasks, and take some initiative [Weil]
     Full Idea: The human soul has need of disciplined participation in a common task of public value, and it has need of personal initiative within this participation.
     From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.229)
     A reaction: The intrusion of competitive capitalism into almost every area of modern life has more or less eliminated such activities. Only state employees now have such satisfactions, on the whole. I admire Weil's approach here.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
We need both equality (to attend to human needs) and hierarchy (as a scale of responsibilities) [Weil]
     Full Idea: The human soul has need of equality and of hierarchy. Equality is the public recognition …of the principal that an equal degree of attention is due to the needs of all human beings. Hierarchy is the scale of responsibilities.
     From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.228)
     A reaction: This is the conservative aspect of Weil's largely radical political thinking. Presumably what we respect in these people is their responsibilies, and not their mere rank. Idle members of the British House of Lords have no rank in this hierarchy.
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Deliberate public lying should be punished [Weil]
     Full Idea: Every avoidable material falsehood publicly asserted should become a punishable offence.
     From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.228)
     A reaction: Yes please! The early 21st century has become the time when truth lost all value in public life. Lying to the House of Commons in the UK required instant resignation 50 years ago. Now it is just a source of laughter. No freedom to lie!
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
We have liberty in the space between nature and accepted authority [Weil]
     Full Idea: Liberty is the power of choice within the latitude left between the direct constraint of natural forces and the authority accepted as legitimate.
     From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.228)
     A reaction: Accepting legitimate authority is a nicely softened version of the social contract. We often find that the office and rank are accepted as legitimate, but then are unable to accept the appalling individual who holds the office.
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
People need personal and collective property, and a social class lacking property is shameful [Weil]
     Full Idea: The human soul has need of both personal property and collective property. …The existence of a social class defined by the lack of personal and collective property is as shameful as slavery.
     From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.229)
     A reaction: Nice. Particularly the idea that we all need collective property, such as parks and beaches and public buildings.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / d. Reform of offenders
Crime should be punished, to bring the perpetrator freely back to morality [Weil]
     Full Idea: The human soul needs punishment and honour. A committer of crime has become exiled from good, and needs to be reintegrated with it through suffering. This aims to bring the soul to recognise freely some day that is infliction was just.
     From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.229)
     A reaction: The Scanlon contractualist approach to punishment - that the victim of it accepts its justice. Given her saintly character, Simone had a very tough view of this issue.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
Attention to a transcendent reality motivates a duty to foster the good of humanity [Weil]
     Full Idea: Anyone whose attention and love are directed towards the reality outside the world recognises that he is bound by the permanent obligation to remedy …all the privations of soul and body which are liable to destroy or damage any human being whatsoever.
     From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.225)
     A reaction: [abridged] An interesting attempt to articulate the religious motivation of morality. The Euthyphro question remains - of why this vision of a wholly good higher morality should motivate anyone, unless they already possess a desire for that good.