Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness'', 'Unconscious Cerebral Initiative' and 'fragments/reports'

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8 ideas

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness

9312	Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford]
	Full Idea: The two main competitors for reductive theories of consciousness are the representational theory (conscious if it represents in the right way), and higher-order monitoring (conscious if it is represented in the right way).
	From: U Kriegel / K Williford (Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' [2006], Intro)
	A reaction: Presumably there are also neuroscientists hunting for physical functions which might generate consciousness. The two mentioned here are rivals at one level of discourse. Both views may be simplistic, if complex teams of activities are involved.

9313	Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford]
	Full Idea: On the assumption that any environmental feature can be represented either consciously or unconsciously, it is unclear how the mere representation of such a feature can render the representing state conscious.
	From: U Kriegel / K Williford (Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' [2006], §1)
	A reaction: The authors are rejecting simple representation as the key, in favour of a distinctive sort of self-representation. I'm inclined to think that consciousness results from multiple co-ordinated layers of representation etc., which has no simple account.

9315	Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford]
	Full Idea: The self-representational theory of consciousness says that when one has a conscious experience as of a red tomato, one is in an internal state that represents both a red tomato and itself.
	From: U Kriegel / K Williford (Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' [2006], §1)
	A reaction: This seems to be avoiding the concept of 'higher-order', and yet that seems the only way to describe it - thought steps outside of itself, generating a level of meta-thought. I think that's the way to go. Philosophy is about-fifth level.

9316	How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford]
	Full Idea: The difficulties with a self-representational view of consciousness are how self-representation of mental states could be possible, whether it leads to an infinite regress, and whether it can capture the actual phenomenology of experience.
	From: U Kriegel / K Williford (Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' [2006], §3)
	A reaction: [compressed] All of these objections strike me as persuasive, especially the first one. I'm not sure I know what self-representation is. Mirrors externally represent, and they can't represent themselves. Two mirrors together achieve something..

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought

9314	Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford]
	Full Idea: A problem for explaining consciousness by higher-order representations is that, like their first-order counterparts, they can misrepresent; there could be a subjective impression of being in a conscious state without actually being in any conscious state.
	From: U Kriegel / K Williford (Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' [2006], §1)
	A reaction: It sounds plausible that this is a logical possibility, but how do you assess whether it is an actual or natural possibility? Are we saying that higher-order representations are judgments, which could be true or false? Hm.

20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act

7861	Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau]
	Full Idea: Libet himself points out that the conscious decisions still have the power to 'endorse' or 'cancel', so to speak, the processes initiated by the earlier cortical activity: no action will result if the action's execution is consciously countermanded.
	From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.4
	A reaction: This is why Libet's findings do not imply 'epiphenomenalism'. It seems that part of a decisive action is non-conscious, undermining the all-or-nothing view of consciousness. Searle tries to smuggle in free will at this point (Idea 3817).

6660	Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe]
	Full Idea: Libet found that a subject's conscious choice to move was about a fifth of a second before movement, and thus later than the onset of the brain's so-called 'readiness potential', which seems to imply that unconscious processes initiates action.
	From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9
	A reaction: Of great interest to philosophers! It seems to make conscious choices epiphenomenal. The key move, I think, is to give up the idea of consciousness as being all-or-nothing. My actions are still initiated by 'me', but 'me' shades off into unconsciousness.

28. God / A. Divine Nature / 1. God

6011	There is a remote first god (the Good), and a second god who organises the material world [Numenius, by O'Meara]
	Full Idea: Numenius argues that material reality depends on intelligible being, which depends on a first god - the Good - which is difficult to grasp, but which inspires a second god to imitate it, turning to matter and organizing it as the world.
	From: report of Numenius (fragments/reports [c.160]) by Dominic J. O'Meara - Numenius
	A reaction: The interaction problem comes either between the two gods, or between the second god and the world. The argument may have failed to catch on for long when people scented an infinite regress lurking in the middle of it.