Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness'', 'The Intrinsic Quality of Experience' and 'Commentary on Euclid's 'Elements''

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8 ideas

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations

13165	Geometrical proofs do not show causes, as when we prove a triangle contains two right angles [Proclus]
	Full Idea: Geometry does not ask 'why?' ..When from the exterior angle equalling two opposite interior angles it is shown that the interior angles make two right angles, this is not a causal demonstration. With no exterior angle they still equal two right angles.
	From: Proclus (Commentary on Euclid's 'Elements' [c.452], p.161-2), quoted by Paolo Mancosu - Explanation in Mathematics §5
	A reaction: A very nice example. It is hard to imagine how one might demonstrate the cause of the angles making two right angles. If you walk, turn left x°, then turn left y°, then turn left z°, and x+y+z=180°, you end up going in the original direction.

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness

9312	Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford]
	Full Idea: The two main competitors for reductive theories of consciousness are the representational theory (conscious if it represents in the right way), and higher-order monitoring (conscious if it is represented in the right way).
	From: U Kriegel / K Williford (Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' [2006], Intro)
	A reaction: Presumably there are also neuroscientists hunting for physical functions which might generate consciousness. The two mentioned here are rivals at one level of discourse. Both views may be simplistic, if complex teams of activities are involved.

9313	Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford]
	Full Idea: On the assumption that any environmental feature can be represented either consciously or unconsciously, it is unclear how the mere representation of such a feature can render the representing state conscious.
	From: U Kriegel / K Williford (Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' [2006], §1)
	A reaction: The authors are rejecting simple representation as the key, in favour of a distinctive sort of self-representation. I'm inclined to think that consciousness results from multiple co-ordinated layers of representation etc., which has no simple account.

9315	Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford]
	Full Idea: The self-representational theory of consciousness says that when one has a conscious experience as of a red tomato, one is in an internal state that represents both a red tomato and itself.
	From: U Kriegel / K Williford (Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' [2006], §1)
	A reaction: This seems to be avoiding the concept of 'higher-order', and yet that seems the only way to describe it - thought steps outside of itself, generating a level of meta-thought. I think that's the way to go. Philosophy is about-fifth level.

9316	How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford]
	Full Idea: The difficulties with a self-representational view of consciousness are how self-representation of mental states could be possible, whether it leads to an infinite regress, and whether it can capture the actual phenomenology of experience.
	From: U Kriegel / K Williford (Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' [2006], §3)
	A reaction: [compressed] All of these objections strike me as persuasive, especially the first one. I'm not sure I know what self-representation is. Mirrors externally represent, and they can't represent themselves. Two mirrors together achieve something..

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought

9314	Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford]
	Full Idea: A problem for explaining consciousness by higher-order representations is that, like their first-order counterparts, they can misrepresent; there could be a subjective impression of being in a conscious state without actually being in any conscious state.
	From: U Kriegel / K Williford (Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' [2006], §1)
	A reaction: It sounds plausible that this is a logical possibility, but how do you assess whether it is an actual or natural possibility? Are we saying that higher-order representations are judgments, which could be true or false? Hm.

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality

8130	Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge]
	Full Idea: Harman defended what came to be known as 'representationalism' - the view that qualitative aspects of experience are nothing other than representational aspects.
	From: report of Gilbert Harman (The Intrinsic Quality of Experience [1990]) by Tyler Burge - Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 p.459
	A reaction: Functionalists like Harman have a fairly intractable problem with the qualities of experience, and this may be clutching at straws. What does 'represent' mean? How is the representation achieved? Why that particular quale?

18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought

9569	The origin of geometry started in sensation, then moved to calculation, and then to reason [Proclus]
	Full Idea: It is unsurprising that geometry was discovered in the necessity of Nile land measurement, since everything in the world of generation goes from imperfection to perfection. They would naturally pass from sense-perception to calculation, and so to reason.
	From: Proclus (Commentary on Euclid's 'Elements' [c.452]), quoted by Charles Chihara - A Structural Account of Mathematics 9.12 n55
	A reaction: The last sentence is the core of my view on abstraction, that it proceeds by moving through levels of abstraction, approaching more and more general truths.