9316
|
How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford]
|
|
Full Idea:
The difficulties with a self-representational view of consciousness are how self-representation of mental states could be possible, whether it leads to an infinite regress, and whether it can capture the actual phenomenology of experience.
|
|
From:
U Kriegel / K Williford (Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' [2006], §3)
|
|
A reaction:
[compressed] All of these objections strike me as persuasive, especially the first one. I'm not sure I know what self-representation is. Mirrors externally represent, and they can't represent themselves. Two mirrors together achieve something..
|
9314
|
Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford]
|
|
Full Idea:
A problem for explaining consciousness by higher-order representations is that, like their first-order counterparts, they can misrepresent; there could be a subjective impression of being in a conscious state without actually being in any conscious state.
|
|
From:
U Kriegel / K Williford (Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' [2006], §1)
|
|
A reaction:
It sounds plausible that this is a logical possibility, but how do you assess whether it is an actual or natural possibility? Are we saying that higher-order representations are judgments, which could be true or false? Hm.
|
8412
|
A causal interaction is when two processes intersect, and correlated modifications persist afterwards [Salmon]
|
|
Full Idea:
When two processes intersect, and they undergo correlated modifications which persist after the intersection, I shall say that the intersection is a causal interaction. I take this as a fundamental causal concept.
|
|
From:
Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §4)
|
|
A reaction:
There may be a problem individuating processes, just as there is for events. I like this approach to causation, which is ontologically sparse, and fits in with the scientific worldview. Change of properties sounds precise, but isn't. Stick to processes.
|
8413
|
Cause must come first in propagations of causal interactions, but interactions are simultaneous [Salmon]
|
|
Full Idea:
In a typical cause-effect situation (a 'propagation') cause must precede effect, for propagation over a finite time interval is an essential feature. In an 'interaction', an intersection of processes resulting in change, we have simultaneity.
|
|
From:
Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §8)
|
|
A reaction:
This takes the direction of time as axiomatic, and quite right too. Salmon isn't addressing the real difficulty, though, which is that the resultant laws are usually held to be time-reversible, which is a bit of a puzzle.
|
8411
|
Instead of localised events, I take enduring and extended processes as basic to causation [Salmon]
|
|
Full Idea:
I propose to approach causality by taking processes rather than events as basic entities. Events are relatively localised in space and time, while processes have much greater temporal duration, and, in many cases, much greater spatial extent.
|
|
From:
Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §2)
|
|
A reaction:
This strikes me as an incredibly promising proposal, not just in our understanding of causation, but for our general metaphysics and understanding of nature. See Idea 4931, for example. Vague events and processes blend into one another.
|