41 ideas
3811 | Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle] |
Full Idea: We must distinguish between entailment and validity as logical relations on the one hand, and inferring as a voluntary human activity on the other. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II) |
3822 | Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle] |
Full Idea: Theoretical reason is typically a matter of accepting a conclusion or hypothesis on the basis of argument or evidence, and is thus a special case of practical reason. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.VII) |
3806 | Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression [Searle] |
Full Idea: Constraints of rationality are built into the structure of mind and language, specifically into the structure of intentionality and speech acts. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Int xiv) |
3812 | Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality [Searle] |
Full Idea: The constraints of rationality ought to be thought of adverbially; they are a matter of the way in which we coordinate our intentionality. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II) |
3809 | If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic [Searle] |
Full Idea: If you think you need a rule to infer q from 'p and (if p then q)', then you would also need a rule to infer p from p. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II) |
3810 | In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle] |
Full Idea: In real-life reasoning it is the semantic content that guarantees the validity of the inference, not the syntactical rule. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II) |
3841 | Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle] |
Full Idea: I am no fan of the concept of supervenience. Its uncritical use is a sign of philosophical confusion, because the concept oscillates between causal supervenience and constitutive supervenience. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.9 n5) | |
A reaction: I don't see why you shouldn't assert the supervenience of one thing on another, while saying that you are not sure whether it is causal or constitutive. The confusion seems to me to be in understandings of the causal version. |
3816 | Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle] |
Full Idea: The terminology of "propositional attitudes" is confused, because it suggests that a belief is an attitude towards a propositions, …but the proposition is the content, not the object, of my belief. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.2) |
3833 | A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle] |
Full Idea: A belief is a commitment to truth. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.4.III) |
3837 | We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle] |
Full Idea: If I lie and say "It is raining", my utterance is intelligible to me as a lie precisely because I understand that the utterance commits me to the truth of a proposition I do not believe to be true. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.6.II) |
3828 | Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" [Searle] |
Full Idea: We should not say "It thinks" in preference to "I think". If thinking is an active, voluntary process, there must be a self who thinks. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.IX) |
3831 | Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle] |
Full Idea: Both reasons and the things they are reasons for can be either facts in the world or intentional states such as beliefs, desires, and intentions. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.4.I) | |
A reaction: One might point out that beliefs, desires and intentions are facts in the world too. Implicit dualism. One can ask, what turns a fact into a reason? |
3830 | In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle] |
Full Idea: For a long time people had a reason not to smoke cigarettes, without knowing that they had such a reason. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: What does 'had' a reason mean here? If I wish you dead, there is a reason why you should be dead, but you don't 'have' the reason, and never will have. There's probably a reason why I should never have been born. |
3832 | Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle] |
Full Idea: Causes are typically events, reasons are never events. You can give a reason by stating a cause, but it does not follow that the reason and the cause are the same thing. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.4.I) | |
A reaction: This is against Davidson. I'm with Searle here; my having a reason to do something is not the cause of my doing it. I don't, unlike Searle, believe in free will, but doing something for a reason is not just the operation of the reason. |
9312 | Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford] |
Full Idea: The two main competitors for reductive theories of consciousness are the representational theory (conscious if it represents in the right way), and higher-order monitoring (conscious if it is represented in the right way). | |
From: U Kriegel / K Williford (Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' [2006], Intro) | |
A reaction: Presumably there are also neuroscientists hunting for physical functions which might generate consciousness. The two mentioned here are rivals at one level of discourse. Both views may be simplistic, if complex teams of activities are involved. |
9313 | Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford] |
Full Idea: On the assumption that any environmental feature can be represented either consciously or unconsciously, it is unclear how the mere representation of such a feature can render the representing state conscious. | |
From: U Kriegel / K Williford (Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' [2006], §1) | |
A reaction: The authors are rejecting simple representation as the key, in favour of a distinctive sort of self-representation. I'm inclined to think that consciousness results from multiple co-ordinated layers of representation etc., which has no simple account. |
9315 | Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford] |
Full Idea: The self-representational theory of consciousness says that when one has a conscious experience as of a red tomato, one is in an internal state that represents both a red tomato and itself. | |
From: U Kriegel / K Williford (Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' [2006], §1) | |
A reaction: This seems to be avoiding the concept of 'higher-order', and yet that seems the only way to describe it - thought steps outside of itself, generating a level of meta-thought. I think that's the way to go. Philosophy is about-fifth level. |
9316 | How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford] |
Full Idea: The difficulties with a self-representational view of consciousness are how self-representation of mental states could be possible, whether it leads to an infinite regress, and whether it can capture the actual phenomenology of experience. | |
From: U Kriegel / K Williford (Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' [2006], §3) | |
A reaction: [compressed] All of these objections strike me as persuasive, especially the first one. I'm not sure I know what self-representation is. Mirrors externally represent, and they can't represent themselves. Two mirrors together achieve something.. |
9314 | Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford] |
Full Idea: A problem for explaining consciousness by higher-order representations is that, like their first-order counterparts, they can misrepresent; there could be a subjective impression of being in a conscious state without actually being in any conscious state. | |
From: U Kriegel / K Williford (Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' [2006], §1) | |
A reaction: It sounds plausible that this is a logical possibility, but how do you assess whether it is an actual or natural possibility? Are we saying that higher-order representations are judgments, which could be true or false? Hm. |
3823 | Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity [Searle] |
Full Idea: I am held responsible now for things that I did in the distant past. But that only makes sense if there is some entity that is both the agent of the action in the past and me now. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.VII) | |
A reaction: A possible response, of course, is that you are held responsible for your past deeds, but you shouldn't be. The idea that you are the same as when you committed the crime is a convenient fiction for people who desire revenge. Responsibility fades. |
3821 | Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self [Searle] |
Full Idea: The requirement that I state reasons that I acted on requires a reference to the self. …Only for a self can something be a reason for an action. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.VII) | |
A reaction: Why can't we just say that this reason, given this desire and this belief, led to this action, and never mention the self? Admittedly leaving out 'I' is an odd circumlocution, but I don't find this particular argument very convincing. |
3824 | A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action [Searle] |
Full Idea: In order to be a self the entity that acts as an agent must also be capable of conscious reasoning about its actions. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.VIII) | |
A reaction: I can't accept this all-or-nothing account. A chimpanzee is some sort of 'agent', and there are bad chimpanzees you wouldn't want in your colony. Why does Searle want to cut us off in some special compound where our actions are totally different? |
3834 | An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self [Searle] |
Full Idea: Selfhood in my sense comes for free once you have a conscious intentional being capable of engaging in free actions on the basis of reasons. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.5.II) | |
A reaction: The concept of an 'action' is probably the thing that most clearly needs a self, because it implies co-ordination and purpose, and there must be some item which benefits. Personally I think you can drop 'free actions' and still have a self. |
3825 | Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't [Searle] |
Full Idea: It is a formal requirement on rational action that there must be a self who acts, in a way that it is not a formal requirement on perception that there be an agent or a self who perceives. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.IX) | |
A reaction: I don't find this persuasive. I don't see how we can rule out a priori the possibility of a set of desires and reasons within an organism which generate an action, without any intervening 'self' to add something. Ockham's Razor. |
3829 | Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle] |
Full Idea: A self is conscious, persists through time, operates with reasons, carries out free actions, and is responsible. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.X) | |
A reaction: Personally I would substitute 'makes decisions' for 'carries out free actions', but otherwise I agree, though he seems to miss a key aspect, which is that the self is in charge of the mind, and directs its focus and co-ordinates its inputs and outputs. |
3826 | A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle] |
Full Idea: The first condition on the self is that it should be capable of consciousness. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.IX) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a stipulative definition. It raises the question of whether it is possible that a lizard (say) is not actually conscious, but has some sort of propriotreptic awareness, and a 'central controller' for its decision-making. |
3827 | The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle] |
Full Idea: The self is not an experience, nor is it an object that is experienced. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.IX) | |
A reaction: A nice dichotomy, that draws attention to the unique position of the self. Thanks to Descartes for focusing our attention on it. Personally I would say that the self is an object, which cannot be experienced by itself, but can be inferred by others. |
3820 | The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle] |
Full Idea: Agency must be added to the bundle to account for how embodied bundles engage in free actions, and selfhood must be added to account for how agents can act rationally. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.VII) | |
A reaction: I don't buy much of this, but I am inclined to say that a will must be added to the bundle to explain why it acts consistently and coherently. It is certainly ridiculous to rest with the picture of a person as a completely unstructured bundle. |
3817 | Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle] |
Full Idea: The most dramatic manifestation of the free will gap is that when one has several reasons for performing an action, one may act on only one of them; one may select which reason one acts on. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.II) |
3808 | Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle] |
Full Idea: In order to engage in rational decision making we have to presuppose free will. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II) |
3818 | We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle] |
Full Idea: Where free rational action is concerned, all effective reasons are made effective by the agent. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.II) |
3814 | Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it [Searle] |
Full Idea: A well-ordered set of preferences is typically the result of successful deliberation, and is not its precondition. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II) |
3840 | We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle] |
Full Idea: If I desire to get rid of my flu symptoms, and believe the only way to do it is death, I am committed to desiring my death. …there is no plausible logic of practical reason. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.8.II) |
3815 | The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action [Searle] |
Full Idea: The single greatest difference between humans and other animals as far as rationality is concerned is our ability to create, recognise and act on desire-independent reasons for action. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II) |
3839 | Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act [Searle] |
Full Idea: Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.6 App) |
3835 | If it is true, you ought to believe it [Searle] |
Full Idea: To say that something is true is already to say that you ought to believe it. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.5.II) | |
A reaction: I'm sure what Einstein said is true, but I don't understand it. The truth is the thought of how things actually are, but why should I not prefer my private fantasies? I see the point, though. |
3836 | If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men [Searle] |
Full Idea: From the fact that an object is truly described as "a man", it follows that you ought to accept relevantly similar objects as men. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.5.IV) | |
A reaction: 'Similar' rather begs the question. Common speech distinguishes sharply between a man and a 'real man'. You only accept them as men if you see them as men, not as similar to something else. Interesting. |
6853 | Consequentialism wrongly assumes a clear line between an act and its consequences [Crisp,R] |
Full Idea: What is wrong with consequentialism is that it assumes that there is agreement about when an act ends and when its consequences begin. | |
From: Roger Crisp (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.31) | |
A reaction: I certainly agree that this is a mistake in consequentialism, which has a crude idea of what an action is, though I am not convinced that this is the key fault in the theory. The theory doesn't distinguish acts by people from those by machines. |
3838 | Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution [Searle] |
Full Idea: The obligation to keep a promise does not derive from the institution of promising, ..but from the fact that in promising I freely and voluntarily create a reason for myself. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.6.IV) |
3813 | 'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something [Searle] |
Full Idea: To say that someone 'ought' to do something is to imply that there is a reason for him to do it. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II) |
6854 | Does the environment have value in itself? [Crisp,R] |
Full Idea: The debate which dominates environmental ethics is whether the environment has value in itself. | |
From: Roger Crisp (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.37) | |
A reaction: I say the answer has to be 'yes'. If it only has value in relation to conscious or human life, it will be difficult to demonstrate that they have value. Pleasure and pain, or wisdom, can't imply value on their own; a bigger picture is needed. |