25 ideas
14018 | Is Sufficient Reason self-refuting (no reason to accept it!), or is it a legitimate explanatory tool? [Bourne] |
Full Idea: Mackie (1983) dismisses the Principle of Sufficient Reason quickly, arguing that it is self-refuting: there is no sufficient reason to accept it. However, a principle is not invalidated by not applying to itself; it can be a powerful heuristic tool. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 6.VI) | |
A reaction: If God was entirely rational, and created everything, that would be a sufficient reason to accept the principle. You would never, though, get to the reason why God was entirely rational. Something will always elude the principle. |
15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
Full Idea: It is far from clear that a definition of truth can lead to a philosophically satisfactory theory of truth. Tarski's theorem on the undefinability of the truth predicate needs resources beyond those of the language for which it is being defined. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: The idea is that you need a 'metalanguage' for the definition. If I say 'p' is a true sentence in language 'L', I am not making that observation from within language L. The dream is a theory confined to the object language. |
15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
Full Idea: In semantic theories of truth (Tarski or Kripke), a truth predicate is defined for an object-language. This definition is carried out in a metalanguage, which is typically taken to include set theory or another strong theory or expressive language. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: Presumably the metalanguage includes set theory because that connects it with mathematics, and enables it to be formally rigorous. Tarski showed, in his undefinability theorem, that the meta-language must have increased resources. |
15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
Full Idea: If truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should not allow proof of new theorems not involving the truth predicate. It is hence said that axiomatic truth should be 'conservative' - not implying further sentences beyond what the axioms can prove. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1.3) | |
A reaction: [compressed] |
15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
Full Idea: If truth can be explicitly defined, it can be eliminated, whereas an axiomatized notion of truth may bring all kinds of commitments. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1.3) | |
A reaction: The general principle that anything which can be defined can be eliminated (in an abstract theory, presumably, not in nature!) raises interesting questions about how many true theories there are which are all equivalent to one another. |
15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
Full Idea: The axiomatic approach does not presuppose that truth can be defined. Instead, a formal language is expanded by a new primitive predicate of truth, and axioms for that predicate are then laid down. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: Idea 15647 explains why Halbach thinks the definition route is no good. |
15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
Full Idea: Axiomatic theories of truth can be presented within very weak logical frameworks which require very few resources, and avoid the need for a strong metalanguage and metatheory. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1) |
14008 | The redundancy theory conflates metalinguistic bivalence with object-language excluded middle [Bourne] |
Full Idea: The problem with the redundancy theory of truth is that it conflates the metalinguistic notion of bivalence with a theorem of the object language, namely the law of excluded middle. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 3.III Pr3) |
15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
Full Idea: According to many deflationists, truth serves merely the purpose of expressing infinite conjunctions. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1.3) | |
A reaction: That is, it asserts sentences that are too numerous to express individually. It also seems, on a deflationist view, to serve for anaphoric reference to sentences, such as 'what she just said is true'. |
15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
Full Idea: The consistency of set theory cannot be established without assumptions transcending set theory. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 2.1) |
15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
Full Idea: The reduction of 2nd-order theories (of properties or sets) to axiomatic theories of truth may be conceived as a form of reductive nominalism, replacing existence assumptions (for comprehension axioms) by ontologically innocent truth assumptions. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1.1) | |
A reaction: I like this very much, as weeding properties out of logic (without weeding them out of the world). So-called properties in logic are too abundant, so there is a misfit with their role in science. |
15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
Full Idea: Quantification over (certain) properties can be mimicked in a language with a truth predicate by quantifying over formulas. Instead of saying that Tom has the property of being a poor philosopher, we can say 'x is a poor philosopher' is true of Tom. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1.1) | |
A reaction: I love this, and think it is very important. He talks of 'mimicking' properties, but I see it as philosophers mistakenly attributing properties, when actually what they were doing is asserting truths involving certain predicates. |
14010 | All relations between spatio-temporal objects are either spatio-temporal, or causal [Bourne] |
Full Idea: If there are any genuine relations at all between spatio-temporal objects, then they are all either spatio-temporal or causal. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 3.III Pr4) | |
A reaction: This sounds too easy, but I have wracked my brains for counterexamples and failed to find any. How about qualitative relations? |
14009 | It is a necessary condition for the existence of relations that both of the relata exist [Bourne] |
Full Idea: It is widely held, and I think correctly so, that a necessary condition for the existence of relations is that both of the relata exist. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 3.III Pr4) | |
A reaction: This is either trivial or false. Relations in the actual world self-evidently relate components of it. But I seem able to revere Sherlock Holmes, and speculate about relations between possible entities. |
7810 | The 'Eumenides' of Aeschylus shows blood feuds replaced by law [Aeschylus, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: The 'Eumenides' of Aeschylus tells how the old rule of revenge and blood feud was replaced by a due process of law before a civil jury. | |
From: report of Aeschylus (The Eumenides [c.458 BCE]) by A.C. Grayling - What is Good? Ch.2 | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 1659, where this revolution is attributed to Protagoras (a little later than Aeschylus). I take the rule of law and of society to be above all the rule of reason, because the aim is calm objectivity instead of emotion. |
14016 | The idea of simultaneity in Special Relativity is full of verificationist assumptions [Bourne] |
Full Idea: Special Relativity, with its definition of simultaneity, is shot through with verificationist assumptions. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 6.IIc) | |
A reaction: [He credits Sklar with this] I love hearing such points made, because all my instincts have rebelled against Einstein's story, even after I have been repeatedly told how stupid I am, and how I should study more maths etc. |
14019 | Relativity denies simultaneity, so it needs past, present and future (unlike Presentism) [Bourne] |
Full Idea: Special Relativity denies absolute simultaneity, and therefore requires a past and a future, as well as a present. The Presentist, however, only requires the present. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 6.VII) | |
A reaction: It is nice to accuse Relativity of ontological extravagence. When it 'requires' past and future, that may not be a massive commitment, since the whole theory is fairly operationalist, according to Putnam. |
14013 | Special Relativity allows an absolute past, future, elsewhere and simultaneity [Bourne] |
Full Idea: There is in special relativity a notion of 'absolute past', and of 'absolute future', and of 'absolute elsewhere', and of 'absolute simultaneity' (of events occurring at their space-time conjunction). | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 5.III) | |
A reaction: [My summary of his paragraph] I am inclined to agree with Bourne that there is enough here to build some sort of notion of 'present' that will support the doctrine of Presentism. |
14015 | No-Futurists believe in past and present, but not future, and say the world grows as facts increase [Bourne] |
Full Idea: 'No-Futurists' believe in the real existence of the past and present but not the future, and hold that the world grows as more and more facts come into existence. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 6.IIb) | |
A reaction: [He cites Broad 1923 and Tooley 1997] My sympathies are with Presentism, but there seems not denying that past events fix truths in a way that future events don't. The unchangeability of past events seems to make them factual. |
14007 | How can presentists talk of 'earlier than', and distinguish past from future? [Bourne] |
Full Idea: Presentists have a difficulty with how they can help themselves to the notion of 'earlier than' without having to invoke real relata, and how presentism can distinguish the past from the future. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 2.IV) | |
A reaction: The obvious response is to infer the past from the present (fossils), and infer the future from the present (ticking bomb). But what is it that is being inferred, if the past and future are denied a priori? Tricky! |
14011 | Presentism seems to deny causation, because the cause and the effect can never coexist [Bourne] |
Full Idea: It seems that presentism cannot accommodate causation at all. In a true instance of 'c causes e', it seems to follow that both c and e exist, and it is widely accepted that c is earlier than e. But for presentists that means c and e can't coexist. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 4) | |
A reaction: A nice problem. Obviously if the flying ball smashed the window, we are left with only the effect existing - otherwise we could intercept the ball and prevent the disaster. To say this cause and this effect coexist would be even dafter than the problem. |
14017 | Since presentists treat the presentness of events as basic, simultaneity should be define by that means [Bourne] |
Full Idea: Since for presentism there is an ontologically significant and basic sense in which events are present, we should expect a definition of simultaneity in terms of presentness, rather than the other way round. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 6.IV) | |
A reaction: Love it. I don't see how you can even articulate questions about simultaneity if you don't already have a notion of presentness. What are the relata you are enquiring about? |
14003 | Time is tensed or tenseless; the latter says all times and objects are real, and there is no passage of time [Bourne] |
Full Idea: Theories of time are in two broad categories, the tenseless and the tensed theories. In tenseless theories, all times are equally real, as are all objects located at them, and there is no passage of time from future to present to past. It's the B-series. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], Intro IIa) | |
A reaction: It might solve a few of the problems, but is highly counterintuitive. Presumably it makes the passage of time an illusion, and gives no account of how events 'happen', or of their direction, and it leaves causation out on a limb. I'm afraid not. |
14005 | B-series objects relate to each other; A-series objects relate to the present [Bourne] |
Full Idea: Objects in the B-series are earlier than, later than, or simultaneous with each other, whereas objects in the A-series are earlier than, later than or simultaneous with the present. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], Intro IIb) | |
A reaction: Must we choose? Two past events relate to each other, but there is a further relation when 'now' falls between the events. If I must choose, I suppose I go for the A-series view. The B-series is a subsequent feat of imagination. McTaggart agreed. |
14006 | Time flows, past is fixed, future is open, future is feared but not past, we remember past, we plan future [Bourne] |
Full Idea: We say that time 'flows', that the past is 'fixed' but the future is 'open'; we only dread the future, but not the past; we remember the past but not the future; we plan for the future but not the past. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], Intro III) | |
A reaction: These seem pretty overwhelming reasons for accepting an asymmetry between the past and the future. If you reject that, you seem to be mired in a multitude of contradictions. Your error theory is going to be massive. |