26 ideas
7578 | I conceived it my task to create difficulties everywhere [Kierkegaard] |
Full Idea: I conceived it my task to create difficulties everywhere. | |
From: Søren Kierkegaard (Concluding Unscientific Postscript [1846], 'Author') | |
A reaction: Nice. It is like Socrates's image of himself as the 'gadfly' of Athens. The interesting question is always to see what the rest of society makes of having someone in their midst who sees it as their social role to 'create difficulties'. |
22047 | Wherever there is painless contradiction there is also comedy [Kierkegaard] |
Full Idea: Wherever there is contradiction, the comical is also present. ...The tragic is the suffering contradiction, the comical is the painless contradiction. | |
From: Søren Kierkegaard (Concluding Unscientific Postscript [1846], p.459), quoted by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 13 | |
A reaction: He is not saying that this is the only source of comedy. I once heard an adult say that there is one thing that is always funny, and that is a fart. |
22092 | Kierkegaard's truth draws on authenticity, fidelity and honesty [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle] |
Full Idea: Kierkegaard offers a different interpretation of truth, which draws on the notions of authenticity, fidelity and honesty. | |
From: report of Søren Kierkegaard (Concluding Unscientific Postscript [1846]) by Clare Carlisle - Kierkegaard: a guide for the perplexed 4 | |
A reaction: This notion of truth, meaning 'the real thing' (as in 'she was a true scholar'), seems to begin with Hegel. I suggest we use the word 'genuine' for that, and save 'truth' for its traditional role. It is disastrous to blur the simple concept of truth. |
15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
Full Idea: It is far from clear that a definition of truth can lead to a philosophically satisfactory theory of truth. Tarski's theorem on the undefinability of the truth predicate needs resources beyond those of the language for which it is being defined. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: The idea is that you need a 'metalanguage' for the definition. If I say 'p' is a true sentence in language 'L', I am not making that observation from within language L. The dream is a theory confined to the object language. |
15999 | Pure truth is for infinite beings only; I prefer endless striving for truth [Kierkegaard] |
Full Idea: If God held all truth enclosed in his right hand, and in his left hand the ever-striving drive for truth, even if erring forever, and he were to say Choose! I would humbly fall at his left hand and say Father, give! Pure truth is for infinite beings only. | |
From: Søren Kierkegaard (Concluding Unscientific Postscript [1846], p.106) | |
A reaction: A sobering realistic thought of our own limitations; Kierkegaard allows that there is no limit to how far we can strive for truth. Just that truth is comprehended by infinite beings (if any), not by mere mortals. [SY] |
20313 | The highest truth we can get is uncertainty held fast by an inward passion [Kierkegaard] |
Full Idea: An objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation-process of the most passionate inwardness is the truth, the highest truth available for an existing individual. | |
From: Søren Kierkegaard (Concluding Unscientific Postscript [1846]) | |
A reaction: [Bk 711] Offered as a definition of truth, knowing how strange and paradoxical it sounds. If we view all life as subjectivity, then there can of course be nothing more to truth than passionate conviction. Personally I think thought can be objective. |
15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
Full Idea: In semantic theories of truth (Tarski or Kripke), a truth predicate is defined for an object-language. This definition is carried out in a metalanguage, which is typically taken to include set theory or another strong theory or expressive language. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: Presumably the metalanguage includes set theory because that connects it with mathematics, and enables it to be formally rigorous. Tarski showed, in his undefinability theorem, that the meta-language must have increased resources. |
15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
Full Idea: If truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should not allow proof of new theorems not involving the truth predicate. It is hence said that axiomatic truth should be 'conservative' - not implying further sentences beyond what the axioms can prove. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1.3) | |
A reaction: [compressed] |
15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
Full Idea: If truth can be explicitly defined, it can be eliminated, whereas an axiomatized notion of truth may bring all kinds of commitments. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1.3) | |
A reaction: The general principle that anything which can be defined can be eliminated (in an abstract theory, presumably, not in nature!) raises interesting questions about how many true theories there are which are all equivalent to one another. |
15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
Full Idea: The axiomatic approach does not presuppose that truth can be defined. Instead, a formal language is expanded by a new primitive predicate of truth, and axioms for that predicate are then laid down. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: Idea 15647 explains why Halbach thinks the definition route is no good. |
15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
Full Idea: Axiomatic theories of truth can be presented within very weak logical frameworks which require very few resources, and avoid the need for a strong metalanguage and metatheory. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1) |
15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
Full Idea: According to many deflationists, truth serves merely the purpose of expressing infinite conjunctions. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1.3) | |
A reaction: That is, it asserts sentences that are too numerous to express individually. It also seems, on a deflationist view, to serve for anaphoric reference to sentences, such as 'what she just said is true'. |
15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
Full Idea: The consistency of set theory cannot be established without assumptions transcending set theory. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 2.1) |
15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
Full Idea: The reduction of 2nd-order theories (of properties or sets) to axiomatic theories of truth may be conceived as a form of reductive nominalism, replacing existence assumptions (for comprehension axioms) by ontologically innocent truth assumptions. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1.1) | |
A reaction: I like this very much, as weeding properties out of logic (without weeding them out of the world). So-called properties in logic are too abundant, so there is a misfit with their role in science. |
15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
Full Idea: Quantification over (certain) properties can be mimicked in a language with a truth predicate by quantifying over formulas. Instead of saying that Tom has the property of being a poor philosopher, we can say 'x is a poor philosopher' is true of Tom. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1.1) | |
A reaction: I love this, and think it is very important. He talks of 'mimicking' properties, but I see it as philosophers mistakenly attributing properties, when actually what they were doing is asserting truths involving certain predicates. |
20742 | The real subject is ethical, not cognitive [Kierkegaard] |
Full Idea: The real subject is not the cognitive subject …the real subject is the ethically existing subject. | |
From: Søren Kierkegaard (Concluding Unscientific Postscript [1846], p.281), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 2 'Subjective' | |
A reaction: Perhaps we should say the essence of the self is its drive to live, not its drive to know. Just getting through the day is top priority, and ethics don’t figure much for the solitary person. But each activity, such as cooking, has its virtues. |
9762 | We should focus less on subjects of experience, and more on the experiences themselves [Parfit] |
Full Idea: It becomes more plausible, when thinking morally, to focus less upon the person, the subject of experiences, and instead to focus more upon the experiences themselves. | |
From: Derek Parfit (Reasons and Persons [1984], §116) | |
A reaction: This pinpoints how Parfit moves from a view of persons in terms of continuity of consciousness to a utilitarian morality. It brings out nicely what is wrong with utilitarianism - the reductio of a great ball of nice experiences, with no one having them. |
7579 | While big metaphysics is complete without ethics, personal philosophy emphasises ethics [Kierkegaard] |
Full Idea: While the Hegelian philosophy goes on and is finished without having an Ethics, the more simple philosophy which is propounded by an existing individual for existing individuals, will more especially emphasis the ethical. | |
From: Søren Kierkegaard (Concluding Unscientific Postscript [1846], 'Lessing') | |
A reaction: This is reminiscent of the Socratic revolution, which shifted philosophy from the study of nature to the study of personal virtue. However, if we look for ethical teachings in existentialism, there often seems to be a black hole in the middle. |
7581 | Speculative philosophy loses the individual in a vast vision of humanity [Kierkegaard] |
Full Idea: Being an individual man is a thing that has been abolished, and every speculative philosopher confuses himself with humanity at large, whereby he becomes infinitely great - and at the same time nothing at all. | |
From: Søren Kierkegaard (Concluding Unscientific Postscript [1846], 'Lessing') | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 4840. This is a beautiful statement of the motivation for existentialism. The sort of philosophers who love mathematics (Plato, Descartes, Leibniz, Russell) love losing themselves in abstractions. This is the rebellion. |
20314 | People want to lose themselves in movements and history, instead of being individuals [Kierkegaard] |
Full Idea: Everything must attach itself so as to be part of some movement; men are determined to lose themselves in the totality of things, in world-history, fascinated and deceived by a magic witchery; no one wants to be an individual human being. | |
From: Søren Kierkegaard (Concluding Unscientific Postscript [1846]) | |
A reaction: [Bk 711] I presume 'world-history' refers to the exhilerating ideas of Hegel. Right now [2017] I would say we have far too much of people only wanting to be individuals, with insufficient attention to our social nature. |
7582 | Becoming what one is is a huge difficulty, because we strongly aspire to be something else [Kierkegaard] |
Full Idea: Striving to become what one already is is a very difficult task, the most difficult of all, because every human being has a strong natural bent and passion to become something more and different. | |
From: Søren Kierkegaard (Concluding Unscientific Postscript [1846], 'Subjective') | |
A reaction: Presumably most people continually drift between vanity and low self-esteem, and between unattainable daydreams and powerless immediate reality. That creates the stage on which Kierkegaard's interesting battle would have to be fought. |
7586 | God does not think or exist; God creates, and is eternal [Kierkegaard] |
Full Idea: God does not think, He creates; God does not exist, he is eternal. | |
From: Søren Kierkegaard (Concluding Unscientific Postscript [1846], 'Thinker') | |
A reaction: The sort of nicely challenging remarks we pay philosophers to come up with. I don't understand the second claim, but the first one certainly avoids all paradoxes that arise if God experiences all the intrinsic problems of thinking. |
20312 | God cannot be demonstrated objectively, because God is a subject, only existing inwardly [Kierkegaard] |
Full Idea: Choosing the objective way enters upon the entire approximation-process by which it is proposed to bring God to light objectively. But this is in all eternity impossible, because God is a subject, and therefore exist only for subjectivity in inwardness. | |
From: Søren Kierkegaard (Concluding Unscientific Postscript [1846]) | |
A reaction: [pg in 711] This seems to have something like Wittgenstein's problem with a private language - that with no external peer-review it is unclear what the commitment is. |
7580 | Pantheism destroys the distinction between good and evil [Kierkegaard] |
Full Idea: So called pantheistic systems have often been characterised and challenged by the assertion that they abrogate the distinction between good and evil. | |
From: Søren Kierkegaard (Concluding Unscientific Postscript [1846], 'Lessing') | |
A reaction: He will have Spinoza in mind. Interesting. Obviously this criticism would come from someone who thought that the traditional deity was the only source of goodness. Good/evil isn't all-or-nothing. A monistic system could contain them. |
7584 | Without risk there is no faith [Kierkegaard] |
Full Idea: Without risk there is no faith. | |
From: Søren Kierkegaard (Concluding Unscientific Postscript [1846], 'Inwardness') | |
A reaction: Remarks like this make you realise that Kierkegaard is just as much of a romantic as most of the other nineteenth century philosophers. Plunge into the dark unknown of the human psyche, in order to intensify and heighten human life. |
7583 | Faith is the highest passion in the sphere of human subjectivity [Kierkegaard] |
Full Idea: Faith is the highest passion in the sphere of human subjectivity. | |
From: Søren Kierkegaard (Concluding Unscientific Postscript [1846], 'Subjective') | |
A reaction: The word 'highest' should always ring alarm bells. The worst sort of religious fanatics seem to be in the grip of this 'high' passion. The early twenty-first century is an echo of eighteenth century England, with its dislike of religious 'enthusiasm'. |