30 ideas
3969 | There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson] |
Full Idea: It makes no sense to speak of comparing or agreeing on ultimate standards of rationality, since it is our own standards in each case to which we must turn in interpreting others. This is not a failure of objectivity, but where 'questions come to an end'. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.232) | |
A reaction: This seems wrong, given the commitment to truth and charity in interpretation. He could have said the same about perception, but I doubt if he would. |
3972 | Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The basis on which the concepts of truth and objectivity depend for application is a community of understanding, agreement among speakers on how each is to be understood. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.233) | |
A reaction: Obviously all understanding is, in practice, an interpretation by a community, but that isn't what 'truth' means. We mean 'true independently of any community'. |
15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
Full Idea: It is far from clear that a definition of truth can lead to a philosophically satisfactory theory of truth. Tarski's theorem on the undefinability of the truth predicate needs resources beyond those of the language for which it is being defined. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: The idea is that you need a 'metalanguage' for the definition. If I say 'p' is a true sentence in language 'L', I am not making that observation from within language L. The dream is a theory confined to the object language. |
15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
Full Idea: In semantic theories of truth (Tarski or Kripke), a truth predicate is defined for an object-language. This definition is carried out in a metalanguage, which is typically taken to include set theory or another strong theory or expressive language. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: Presumably the metalanguage includes set theory because that connects it with mathematics, and enables it to be formally rigorous. Tarski showed, in his undefinability theorem, that the meta-language must have increased resources. |
15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
Full Idea: If truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should not allow proof of new theorems not involving the truth predicate. It is hence said that axiomatic truth should be 'conservative' - not implying further sentences beyond what the axioms can prove. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1.3) | |
A reaction: [compressed] |
15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
Full Idea: If truth can be explicitly defined, it can be eliminated, whereas an axiomatized notion of truth may bring all kinds of commitments. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1.3) | |
A reaction: The general principle that anything which can be defined can be eliminated (in an abstract theory, presumably, not in nature!) raises interesting questions about how many true theories there are which are all equivalent to one another. |
15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
Full Idea: The axiomatic approach does not presuppose that truth can be defined. Instead, a formal language is expanded by a new primitive predicate of truth, and axioms for that predicate are then laid down. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: Idea 15647 explains why Halbach thinks the definition route is no good. |
15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
Full Idea: Axiomatic theories of truth can be presented within very weak logical frameworks which require very few resources, and avoid the need for a strong metalanguage and metatheory. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1) |
15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
Full Idea: According to many deflationists, truth serves merely the purpose of expressing infinite conjunctions. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1.3) | |
A reaction: That is, it asserts sentences that are too numerous to express individually. It also seems, on a deflationist view, to serve for anaphoric reference to sentences, such as 'what she just said is true'. |
15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
Full Idea: The consistency of set theory cannot be established without assumptions transcending set theory. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 2.1) |
15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
Full Idea: The reduction of 2nd-order theories (of properties or sets) to axiomatic theories of truth may be conceived as a form of reductive nominalism, replacing existence assumptions (for comprehension axioms) by ontologically innocent truth assumptions. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1.1) | |
A reaction: I like this very much, as weeding properties out of logic (without weeding them out of the world). So-called properties in logic are too abundant, so there is a misfit with their role in science. |
15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
Full Idea: Quantification over (certain) properties can be mimicked in a language with a truth predicate by quantifying over formulas. Instead of saying that Tom has the property of being a poor philosopher, we can say 'x is a poor philosopher' is true of Tom. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1.1) | |
A reaction: I love this, and think it is very important. He talks of 'mimicking' properties, but I see it as philosophers mistakenly attributing properties, when actually what they were doing is asserting truths involving certain predicates. |
3296 | Sense-data are a false objectification of what is essentially subjective [Nagel] |
Full Idea: The private object or sense datum view is an instance of the false objectification of what is essentially subjective. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Subjective and Objective [1979], p.207) |
3295 | Inner v outer brings astonishment that we are a particular person [Nagel] |
Full Idea: The problem of reconciling the objective and subjective points of view takes its purest form in a sense of incredulity that one should be anyone in particular. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Subjective and Objective [1979], p.206) | |
A reaction: Nice observation. This idea has always struck me forcibly, and seems to be one of those basic intuitions which motivates philosophy, and yet the subject has almost nothing to say about it. Of course you are you, or you wouldn't be amazed by it… |
3960 | There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson] |
Full Idea: There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231) | |
A reaction: I think this is right. It fits with Searle's notion of consciousness as a property, like the liquidity of water. I don't panic if I think "I have no mind, but I have extraordinary properties". |
3293 | If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me [Nagel] |
Full Idea: The metaphysical ego, if it is a continuing individual with its identity over time, is just one more thing about which the same problem can be raised - will that ego still be me? | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Subjective and Objective [1979], p.200) | |
A reaction: You can worry too much about some philosophical questions. If it is me now, and it has continuing individual identity over time, I'm not going to lose sleep over the possibility that it might nevertheless somehow cease to be me. I'm overrated. |
3292 | The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is [Nagel] |
Full Idea: The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Subjective and Objective [1979], p.198) |
3964 | If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson] |
Full Idea: If there are no strict psychophysical laws, this rules out reductionism, either by definition of mental predicates in physical terms, or by way of bridging laws. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231) | |
A reaction: But it is by no means clear that there are no psycho-physical laws. How could this be known a priori? |
3963 | There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson] |
Full Idea: There are no strict psychophysical laws (that is, laws connecting mental events under their mental descriptions with physical events under their physical descriptions). | |
From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231) | |
A reaction: This is clearly open to question. It may be just that no human mind could ever grasp such laws, given their probable complexity. |
3965 | Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231) | |
A reaction: This seems to me clearly true, however we propose to characterise mental events. |
3961 | Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson] |
Full Idea: All mental events are causally related to physical events. ..This seems obvious. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231) | |
A reaction: All mental events are physically caused. Some bodily physical events result from mental events. Probably all mental events have some effect of other mental events (all of which are in some sense physical). |
3966 | The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson] |
Full Idea: My basic premises lead to the conclusion of ontological monism coupled with conceptual dualism (like Spinoza, except that he denied mental causation). | |
From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231) | |
A reaction: 'Conceptual dualism' implies no real difference, but 'property dualism' is better, suggesting different properties when viewed from different angles. |
3967 | Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson] |
Full Idea: To imagine a totally irrational animal is to imagine an animal without thought. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.232) | |
A reaction: This wouldn't be so clear without the theory of evolution, which suggests that only the finders of truth last long enough to breed. |
3974 | Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson] |
Full Idea: What we mean by what we say is partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.235) | |
A reaction: There is 'strict and literal meaning', which is fixed by the words, even if I don't know what I am saying. But 'speaker's meaning' is surely a pure matter of a state of mind? |
3968 | Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The idea of a proposition is unhelpful, until it is explained how exactly the words in the contained sentence manage to name or describe a proposition (which even Frege failed to achieve). | |
From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.232) | |
A reaction: It seems obvious to me that there are brain events best labelled as propositions, even if their fit with language is puzzling. |
3970 | Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson] |
Full Idea: We would have no fully-fledge thoughts if we were not in communication with others. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.233) | |
A reaction: This seems a plausible empirical observation, though I would doubt any a priori proof of it. If animals could speak, they would become intellectuals? |
3971 | There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The 'principle of charity' is a misleading term, since there is no alternative if we want to make sense of the attitudes and actions of the agents around us. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.233) | |
A reaction: I suppose so, but only with a background of evolutionary theory. I would necessarily assume charity if a robot spoke to me. |
3294 | As far as possible we should become instruments to realise what is best from an eternal point of view [Nagel] |
Full Idea: The right thing to do is to turn oneself as far as possible into an instrument for the realisation of what is best 'sub specie aeternitatis'. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Subjective and Objective [1979], p.204) |
3973 | Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Without a 'teacher', nothing would give content to the idea that there is a difference between getting things right and getting them wrong. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.234) | |
A reaction: Seems right. A group of speculators with no one in the role of 'teacher' would seem to be paralysed with uncertain (except where judgements are very obvious). |
3962 | Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson] |
Full Idea: If two events are related as cause and effect, there is a strict law under which they may be subsumed. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231) | |
A reaction: Davidson admits that this is open to challenge (though Hume and Kant supported it). It does seem to be central to our understanding of nature. |