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All the ideas for 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)', 'The Theodicy' and 'Being and Time'

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63 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology
Being-in-the-world is projection to possibilities, thrownness among them, and fallenness within them [Heidegger, by Caputo]
     Full Idea: Being-in-the-world is a phenomenon of 'care' with a tripartite structure: a) projection towards its possibilities, b) thrownness among those possibilities, so Dasein is not free, and c) fallenness among worldly possibilities, to neglect of its own.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by John D. Caputo - Heidegger p.227
     A reaction: Sounds a bit Californian to me. Just living among the world's possibilities is evidently a bad thing, because you could be concentrating on yourself and your own development instead?
Pheomenology seeks things themselves, without empty theories, problems and concepts [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: 'Phenomenology' can be formulated as 'To the things themselves!' It is opposed to all free-floating constructions and accidental findings, and to conceptions which only seem to have been demonstrated. It is opposed to traditiona' pseudo-problems.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], Intro II.07)
     A reaction: It sounds as if we are invited to look at the world the way a dog might look at it. I am not at all clear what it to be gained from this approach.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
'Logos' really means 'making something manifest' [Heidegger, by Polt]
     Full Idea: Heidegger concludes that 'logos' essentially means 'making something manifest'.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], 56/33) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§7
     A reaction: It would at least seem to involve revealing the truth of something, though truth doesn't seem to be central to Heidegger's thought. 'Logos' is often translated as 'an account', as well as a 'reason', so Heidegger may be right.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
Reasonings have a natural ordering in God's understanding, but only a temporal order in ours [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: All reasonings are eminent in God, and they preserve an order among themselves in his understanding as well as in ours; but for him this is just an order and a priority of nature, whereas for us there is a priority of time.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.192), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.III
     A reaction: This view is found in Frege, and seems to be the hallmark of rationalist philosophy. There is an apriori assumption that reality has a rational order, so that pure reason is a tool for grasping it. Lewis's 'mosaic' of experiences has no order.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
     Full Idea: It is far from clear that a definition of truth can lead to a philosophically satisfactory theory of truth. Tarski's theorem on the undefinability of the truth predicate needs resources beyond those of the language for which it is being defined.
     From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1)
     A reaction: The idea is that you need a 'metalanguage' for the definition. If I say 'p' is a true sentence in language 'L', I am not making that observation from within language L. The dream is a theory confined to the object language.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
Heidegger says truth is historical, and never absolute [Heidegger, by Polt]
     Full Idea: Heidegger is a relentless enemy of ahistorical, absolutist concepts of truth.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 1
     A reaction: I presume that if truth is not absolute then it must be relative, but Polt is a little coy about saying so. For me, anyone who says truth is relative doesn't understand the concept, and is talking about something else.
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
     Full Idea: In semantic theories of truth (Tarski or Kripke), a truth predicate is defined for an object-language. This definition is carried out in a metalanguage, which is typically taken to include set theory or another strong theory or expressive language.
     From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1)
     A reaction: Presumably the metalanguage includes set theory because that connects it with mathematics, and enables it to be formally rigorous. Tarski showed, in his undefinability theorem, that the meta-language must have increased resources.
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
     Full Idea: If truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should not allow proof of new theorems not involving the truth predicate. It is hence said that axiomatic truth should be 'conservative' - not implying further sentences beyond what the axioms can prove.
     From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1.3)
     A reaction: [compressed]
If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
     Full Idea: If truth can be explicitly defined, it can be eliminated, whereas an axiomatized notion of truth may bring all kinds of commitments.
     From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1.3)
     A reaction: The general principle that anything which can be defined can be eliminated (in an abstract theory, presumably, not in nature!) raises interesting questions about how many true theories there are which are all equivalent to one another.
Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
     Full Idea: Axiomatic theories of truth can be presented within very weak logical frameworks which require very few resources, and avoid the need for a strong metalanguage and metatheory.
     From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1)
Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
     Full Idea: The axiomatic approach does not presuppose that truth can be defined. Instead, a formal language is expanded by a new primitive predicate of truth, and axioms for that predicate are then laid down.
     From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1)
     A reaction: Idea 15647 explains why Halbach thinks the definition route is no good.
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
     Full Idea: According to many deflationists, truth serves merely the purpose of expressing infinite conjunctions.
     From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1.3)
     A reaction: That is, it asserts sentences that are too numerous to express individually. It also seems, on a deflationist view, to serve for anaphoric reference to sentences, such as 'what she just said is true'.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach]
     Full Idea: The consistency of set theory cannot be established without assumptions transcending set theory.
     From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 2.1)
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
     Full Idea: The reduction of 2nd-order theories (of properties or sets) to axiomatic theories of truth may be conceived as a form of reductive nominalism, replacing existence assumptions (for comprehension axioms) by ontologically innocent truth assumptions.
     From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1.1)
     A reaction: I like this very much, as weeding properties out of logic (without weeding them out of the world). So-called properties in logic are too abundant, so there is a misfit with their role in science.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
     Full Idea: Quantification over (certain) properties can be mimicked in a language with a truth predicate by quantifying over formulas. Instead of saying that Tom has the property of being a poor philosopher, we can say 'x is a poor philosopher' is true of Tom.
     From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1.1)
     A reaction: I love this, and think it is very important. He talks of 'mimicking' properties, but I see it as philosophers mistakenly attributing properties, when actually what they were doing is asserting truths involving certain predicates.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Reducing being to the study of beings too readily accepts the modern scientific view [Heidegger, by May]
     Full Idea: Continental philosophers, following Heidegger, see in the attempt to reduce the question of being to that of beings a symptom of an age that is too ready to accept the terms in which science conceives the world.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Todd May - Gilles Deleuze 1.04
     A reaction: Interesting. I take the idea that this is a failing of the modern age to be ridiculous, since I take it to be the key metaphysical move made by Aristotle. Neverthless, Aristotle is closely in tune with modern science. For 'beings', read 'objects'.
For us, Being is constituted by awareness of other sorts of Being [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: We are Dasein - the entity who possesses - as constitutive for its understanding of existence - an understanding of the Being of all entities of a character other than its own.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], 34/13), quoted by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§4
     A reaction: This seems to connect to the emerging 'externalist' view of mind that comes with the external view of content coming from Purnam's Twin Earth idea.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
Heidegger turns to 'Being' to affirm the uniqueness of humans in the world [Heidegger, by Gray]
     Full Idea: Heidegger turns to 'Being' for the same reason that Christians turn to God - to affirm the unique place of humans in the world.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by John Gray - Straw Dogs 2.4
     A reaction: This is the first remark I have encountered that makes sense of Heidegger's Being to me! It places Heidegger as a modernist philosopher, trying to grapple with the decline of religion. I'll stick with Bertrand Russell on that.
Dasein is a mode of Being distinguished by concern for its own Being [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], Intro I.04)
     A reaction: How do you distinguish the Being of normal humans from the Being of someone in a deep coma, who has no existential issues? Has that Dasein ceased to be? Why does angst create a new mode of Being, but flying doesn't?
Dasein is ahead of itself in the world, and alongside encountered entities [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: The formal existential totality of Dasein's ontological structural whole is: the Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world).
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.6 41)
     A reaction: If you find that thought really illuminating, you are probably on the wrong website. However, the thought that we exist 'ahead of ourselves' might be a fruitful line for existentialists to explore.
In company with others one's Dasein dissolves, and even the others themselves dissolve [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: This being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein completely into the kind of being of 'the others', in such a way, indeed, that the others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.164), quoted by Mark Wrathall - Heidegger: how to read 5
     A reaction: He seems to be describing the psychology of someone who joins a small crowd which gradually increases in size. I take this relation to others to be the basic existential dilemma, of retaining individual authenticity within a community.
'Dasein' expresses not 'what' the entity is, but its being [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: When we designate this entity with the term 'Dasein' we are expressing not its 'what' (as if it were a table, house, or tree) but its being.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.297), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 2 'Phenomenology'
     A reaction: Presumably analytic discussions of persons try to be too objective. Heidegger is trying to capture the thought at the heart of Kierkegaard's existentialism. Objectivity and subjectivity are never in conflict. Is there really a different mode of existence?
The word 'dasein' is used to mean 'the manner of Being which man possesses', and also the human creature [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE]
     Full Idea: Heidegger borrows a common German word 'dasein', meaning 'being' or 'existence', to refer both to 'the manner of Being which... man... possesses', and to the creature which possesses it.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.32) by David E. Cooper - Heidegger Ch.3
     A reaction: This just strikes me as an elementary ontological mistake. Because something has startling properties it doesn't follow that we have a different type of Being. Magnets don't have a different type of being from ordinary iron.
'Dasein' is Being which is laid claim to, and which matters to its owner [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE]
     Full Idea: We each of us not only have Dasein (our kind of Being), but we can lay claim to it. Also the Dasein of a thing 'is an issue for it' - we care about the kinds of creatures we can make ourselves into.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.67) by David E. Cooper - Heidegger Ch.3
     A reaction: Heidegger says other more puzzling things about Dasein. The second half of the idea is what makes Heidegger an existentialist, and an inspiration for Sartre.
Dasein is being which can understand itself, and possess itself in a way allowing authenticity [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: Dasein is an entity which, in its very being, comports itself understandingly towards that being. ...Mineness belongs to an existent Dasein, and belongs to it as the condition which makes authenticity and inauthenticity possible.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.78), quoted by Mark Wrathall - Heidegger: how to read 1
     A reaction: He might eventually persuade me that Dasein is so different from mere material being that it deserves a category of its own. But a reductive account of mind is also a reductive account of being.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Ontology is possible only as phenomenology [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: Ontology is possible only as phenomenology.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.31), quoted by Dale Jacquette - Ontology Ch.1
     A reaction: Jacquette argues against this claim. The idea seems to be the ultimate extension of Kant, and it is not a big move to say that the only real phenomenology we can discuss is our semantics. Wrong, wrong, wrong.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Readiness-to-hand defines things in themselves ontologically [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: Readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they are 'in themselves' are defined ontologico-categorially.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.3.15)
     A reaction: I assume this is a direct reference to the problem idealists had with the thing-in-itself. It seems that the reality of a thing consists of the strengthened relationship it has with Dasein, which sounds fairly idealist to me.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Heidegger seeks a non-traditional concept of essence as 'essential unfolding' [Heidegger, by Polt]
     Full Idea: Heidegger tries to develop a non-traditional concept of essence as 'essential unfolding' ('wesen' as a verb).
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.4.27) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§25-7
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Propositions don't provide understanding, because the understanding must come first [Heidegger, by Polt]
     Full Idea: Propositions are not a good clue to the essence of understanding, because we must already understand things before we formulate propositions about them.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.5.31) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§31-3
     A reaction: I like this, because I think the most important aspects of our thought and understanding are entirely non-verbal - even in cases where they seem to be highly specific and verbal. We don't understand ourselves at all!
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
If we posit 'I' as the starting point, we miss the mind's phenomenal content [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: One of our first tasks will be to prove that if we posit an 'I' or subject as that which is proximally given, we shall completely miss the phenomenal content of Dasein.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.1.10)
     A reaction: Descartes had thrown doubt on the informativeness of the phenomena, so presumably your phenomenologist is not interested in whether they reveal any truth. So why are unreliable phenomena of any interest?
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
Our relationship to a hammer strengthens when we use [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: The less we stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become. ...The kind of Being which equipment possesses... we call 'readiness-to-hand' [Zuhandenheit].
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.3.15)
     A reaction: This example would be well at home in the writings of the pragmatists. It is also an important example for existentialists. In analytic philosophy we might say the experience combines perception with direct exerience of causation.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
There are no raw sense-data - our experiences are of the sound or colour of something [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: We always take a noise as the sound of something; we always take a hue as the color of something. We simply do not experience raw, uninterpreted sense-data - these are the inventions of philosophers.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], 207/163-4), quoted by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§31-3
     A reaction: This is something like the modern view of sense-data as promoted by John McDowell, rather than the experiential atoms of Russell and Moore. Experience is holistic, but that doesn't mean we can't analyse it into components.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Perceived objects always appear in a context [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: The perceptual 'something' is always in the middle of something else, it always forms part of a 'field'.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.4), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 3 'Perceptual'
     A reaction: Sounds like our knowledge of electrons. Nice point. Standard analytic discussions of perceiving a glass always treat it in isolation, when it is on an expensive table near a brandy bottle. Or near a hammer.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
The scandal of philosophy is expecting to prove reality when the prover's Being is vague [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: The 'scandal of philosophy' is not that this proof [of external things] has yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again. ...The kind of Being of the entity which does the proving has not been made definite enough.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.6.43a)
     A reaction: The 'scandal' was a remark of Kant's. Presumably Heidegger's exploration of Dasein aims to establish the Being of the prover sufficiently to solve this problem (via phenomenology).
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
Having thoughts and feelings need engagement in the world [Heidegger, by Wrathall]
     Full Idea: Heidegger argues that having thoughts and feelings is only possible for entity that is actually engaged in the world.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Mark Wrathall - Heidegger: how to read 1
     A reaction: This seems to be an a priori exclusion of the possibility of a brain in a vat. I guess the ancestor of this idea is Schopenhauer.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
Dasein finds itself already amongst others [Heidegger, by Caputo]
     Full Idea: The world is a world shared with others, so that far from being a solipsistic ego ...Dasein finds itself already amongst others.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by John D. Caputo - Heidegger p.226
     A reaction: Phenomenologists don't seem bothered about the problem of knowing other minds. If you take something for granted, it ceases to be a problem to be solved!
If we work and play with other people, they are bound to be 'Dasein', intelligent agents [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE]
     Full Idea: How do I know that other people have minds? The question is a bad one. Precisely because I encounter them at work, play and the like, it is guaranteed that they, too, are Dasein, intelligent agents.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.153-) by David E. Cooper - Heidegger Ch.3
     A reaction: I've seen film of someone playing peek-a-boo with a bonobo ape, so presumably they have Dasein. It might be easier for the AI community to aim at building a robot with Dasein, than one which was simply conscious.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
When Dasein grasps something it exists externally alongside the thing [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: When Dasein directs itself towards something and grasps it, it does not somehow first get out of an inner sphere in which it has been proximally encapsulated, but its primary kind of Being is such that it is always 'outside' alongside entities.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.2.13)
     A reaction: This is the first plausible fruit of phenomenology I have been able to discover. Analysing the passive mind is not very promising, but seeing what happens when we become more proactive is revealing.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
There is an everyday self, and an authentic self, when it is grasped in its own way [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: The self of everyday Dasein is the they-self [das Man-selbst], which we distinguish from the authentic self - that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.4.27)
     A reaction: To a novice this sounds like a requirement for increased self-consciousness during daily activity. 'Be a good animal, true to your animal self' said one of Lawrence's characters.
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
Everyone is other, and no one is himself [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: Everyone is other, and no one is himself.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.165), quoted by Rüdiger Safranski - Nietzsche: a philosophical biography 09
     A reaction: Safranski describes this as the idea of 'structural self-evasion'. He detects the same idea in Nietzsche's 'Daybreak'.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
Saying we must will whatever we decide to will leads to an infinite regress [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: As for volition itself, to say that it is the object of free will is incorrect. We will to act, strictly speaking, and we do not will to will, else we should still say we will to have the will to will, and that would go on to infinity.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.151), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 4.IV
     A reaction: This strikes me as an elementary difficulty which most fans of free will appear to evade. Thoughts just arise in us, and some of them are volitions. We can say there is then a 'gap' (Searle) where we choose, but what happens in the gap?
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 5. Parallelism
Perfections of soul subordinate the body, but imperfections of soul submit to the body [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Insofar as the soul has perfection ...God has accommodated the body to the soul, and has arranged beforehand that the body is impelled to execute its orders. Insofar as it is imperfect and confused, God accommodates soul to body, swayed by passions.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.159), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 3.IV
     A reaction: Perkins says this is the nearest Leibniz gets to the idea of interaction between body and soul. Perfection and confusion are on a continuum for Leibniz. With such speculations I always wonder how these things can be known. How perfect is my mind?
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
Moods are more fundamentally revealing than theories - as when fear reveals a threat [Heidegger, by Polt]
     Full Idea: For Heidegger moods are disclosive; they show us things in a more fundamental way than theoretical propositions ever can. For example, fear reveals something as a threat.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.5.30) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§30
     A reaction: Most modern students of emotion seem to agree. Even though they may not have specific content, it is always possible to consider the underlying cause of the mood.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Will is an inclination to pursue something good [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: One may say that 'will' consists in the inclination to do something in proportion to the good it contains.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.136), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.III
     A reaction: This emphasises that the will is faced with options, rather than generating the options. The context is a discussion of the nature of God's will. I think 'will' is a really useful concept, and dislike the Hobbesian rejection of will.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
We do not add value to naked things; its involvement is disclosed in understanding it [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: We do not throw a 'signification' over some naked thing which is present-at-hand, we do not stick a value on it; but when something is encountered as such, the thing in question has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.190-1), quoted by George Dickie - The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude 3 'Undoing'
     A reaction: Analytic philosophy and science have tried to dismantle experience, and Heidegger wants to put it back together. I would say there is a big difference between encountering a thing (which is a bit facty), and understanding it (which is more valuey).
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Most people facing death would happily re-live a similar life, with just a bit of variety [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: I believe there would be few persons who, being at the point of death, were not content to take up life again, on condition of passing through the same amount of good and evil, provided that it were not the same kind.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.130), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.IV
     A reaction: Nice challenge. People who refuse the offer are not necessarily suicidal. He's probably right, but Leibniz doesn't recognise the factor of boredom. Look up the suicide note of the actor George Sanders! One life may be enough.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
Metaphysical evil is imperfection; physical evil is suffering; moral evil is sin [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Evil may be taken metaphysically, physically, and morally. Metaphysical evil consists in mere imperfection, physical evil is suffering, and moral evil is sin.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.136), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.IV
     A reaction: There seem to be plenty of imperfections in the world which don't look like evil. Or do you only declare it to be an imperfection because it seems to be evil (by some other standard)? Human evil comes from ignorance, so metaphysical explains moral.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
You can't assess moral actions without referring to the qualities of character that produce them [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: One is more worthy of praise when one owes the action to one's good qualities, and more culpable in proportion as one has been impelled by one's evil qualities; assessing actions without weighing the qualities whence they spring is to talk at random.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.426), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 4.IV
     A reaction: Mill tries to separate judgement of the agent from judgement of the consequences of the action, but I think Leibniz has spotted that just judging outcomes ceases to be a 'moral' judgement.
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
Dasein has the potential to be itself, but must be shown this in the midst of ordinariness [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: Because Dasein is lost in the 'they', it must first find itself. It must be 'shown' to itself in its possible authenticity. In terms of its possibility, Dasein is already a potentiality-for-Being-its-self, but it needs to have this potentiality attested.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], II.2.54)
     A reaction: I wish there was some criterion for knowing when you are being yourself and when you are not.
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
Anxiety reveals the possibility and individuality of Dasein [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: Anxiety discloses Dasein as Being-possible, and indeed as the only kind of thing which it can be of its own accord as something individualised in individualisation.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.6.40)
     A reaction: Is sounds like insecurity, as a sort of trauma that shocks one into self-realisation. The idea means very little to me personally.
Anxiety about death frees me to live my own life [Heidegger, by Wrathall]
     Full Idea: For Heidegger, as a consequence of my anxiety in the face of death, I am set free to live my life as my own rather than doing things merely because others expect me to do them.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Mark Wrathall - Heidegger: how to read 7
     A reaction: Contrary to Epicurus, Heidegger thinks anxiety about death is a good thing. The point is, I suppose, that we all die alone, and people who are very socially contrained need to face up to death in order to grasp their autonomy.
Anxiety is the uncanniness felt when constantly fleeing from asserting one's own freedom [Heidegger, by Caputo]
     Full Idea: Anxiety [angst] is the disturbing sense of uncanniness by which Dasein is overtaken (thrownness) when it discovers there is nothing other than its own freedom to sustain its projects (projection), and from which Dasein constantly takes flight (falling).
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by John D. Caputo - Heidegger p.227
     A reaction: This seems to be Kierkegaard's idea, unamended. In my experience anxiety only comes when I am forced into making decisions by worldly situations. An 'existential crisis' is a sort of blankness appearing where a future life was supposed to be.
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence
Being what it is (essentia) must be conceived in terms of Being (existence) [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: Dasein's Being-what-it-is (essentia) must….be conceived in terms of its Being (existentia).
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], 67/42), quoted by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§2
     A reaction: This seems to be the origin of Sartre's famous slogan 'existence before essence'. It seems to be a rebellion against Husserl's quest for essences.
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
Heidegger says we must either choose an inauthentic hero, or choose yourself as hero [Heidegger, by Critchley]
     Full Idea: Heidegger says you must choose your hero; either you choose 'das Man', the inauthentic life, or you choose yourself - the point being that you have to choose yourself as your hero in order to be authentic.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Simon Critchley - Impossible Objects: interviews 5
     A reaction: If Nietzsche's 'Ecce Homo' is the model for choosing yourself as hero, I am not too sure about this idea. Needing a hero seems awfully German and romantic. Ein Heldenleben. Be your own anit-hero (like a standup comedian)?
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God must be intelligible, to select the actual world from the possibilities [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The cause of the world must be intelligent: for this existing world being contingent and an infinity of worlds being equally possible, with equal claim to existence, the cause of the world must have regarded all of these worlds to fix on one of them.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.127), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.II
     A reaction: A wonderfully Leibnizian way of putting what looks like the design argument.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
The intelligent cause must be unique and all-perfect, to handle all the interconnected possibilities [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The intelligent cause ought to be infinite in all ways, and absolutely perfect in power, in wisdom, and in goodness, since it relates to all that which is possible. Also, since all is connected together, there is no ground for admitting more than one.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.128), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.II
     A reaction: Notice that Leibniz's possible worlds seem to be all connected together, unlike David Lewis's worlds, which are discrete. Personally I suspect that all perfections will lead to contradiction, though Leibniz strongly argues against it.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
God prefers men to lions, but might not exterminate lions to save one man [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: It is certain that God sets greater store by a man than a lion; nevertheless it can hardly be said with certainty that God prefers a single man in all respects to the whole of lion-kind.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.189), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.IV
     A reaction: Lovely problems arise when you guess at God's values! We have the same problem. Would you kill a poacher who was wiping out the last remaining lions? How many lions would you kill to save a human?
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
If justice is arbitrary, or fixed but not observed, or not human justice, this undermines God [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The three dogmas (1) that the nature of justice is arbitrary, (2) it is fixed, but not certain God will observe it, or (3) the justice we know is not that which God observes, destroy our confidence in the love of God.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.237), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.III
     A reaction: Leibniz proceeds to carefully refute these three responses to the dilemma about how justice relates to God.
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
God is the first reason of things; our experiences are contingent, and contain no necessity [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: God is the first reason of things: all that we see and experience is contingent and nothing in them renders their existence necessary.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.127), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.II
     A reaction: Perkins presents this as the first step in one of Leibniz's arguments for God. They all seem to be variants of the ontological argument. [His 'Theodicy' is the Huggard translation, 1985] This resembles Aquinas's Third Way.
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
The laws of physics are wonderful evidence of an intelligent and free being [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: These admirable laws [of physics] are wonderful evidence of an intelligent and free being, as opposed to the system of absolute and brute necessity, advocated by Strato and Spinoza.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.332), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.II
     A reaction: Note the swipe at Spinoza. Leibniz defends the absolute necessities residing in God, but is too polite to call those 'brute', though personally I can't see the difference. But he says the laws arise from 'perfection and order', not from God's necessity.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Prayers are useful, because God foresaw them in his great plan [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Not only cares and labours but also prayers are useful; God having had these prayers in view before he regulated things.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], Abridge III)
     A reaction: Hm. I'm struggling with this one. So I can't skip prayers today, because God has foreseen them and included them in his great plan? Hard to motivate yourself, like starting a game of chess after you've already been declared the winner.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
How can an all-good, wise and powerful being allow evil, sin and apparent injustice? [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: There is this question of natural theology, how a sole Principle, all-good, all-wise and all-powerful, has been able to admit evil, and especially to permit sin, and how it could resolve to make the wicked often happy and the good unhappy?
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.098), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.IV
     A reaction: His answer is, roughly, that there is an unavoidable trade-off, which humans cannot fully understand. Personally I would say that if there is a God, the evidence for his benevolence towards humanity is not encouraging.
Being confident of God's goodness, we disregard the apparent local evils in the visible world [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Being made confident by demonstrations of the goodness and the justice of God, we disregard the appearances of harshness and justice which we see in this small portion of his Kingdom that is exposed to our gaze.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.120), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.IV
     A reaction: Hm. If this locality is full of evils, and the rest of it is much better, how come we are stuck in this miserable corner of things? God is obliged to compromise, but did he select us to get the worst of it?