70 ideas
| 18450 | Philosophy has its own mode of death, by separating soul from body [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: There is a double death. One, known by all men, consists in the separation of the body with the soul; the other, characteristic of philosophers, results in the separation of the soul from the body. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn9 3) |
| 16325 | Analysis rests on natural language, but its ideal is a framework which revises language [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: For me, although the enterprise of philosophical analysis is driven by natural language, its goal is not a linguistic analysis of English but rather an expressively strong framework that may at best be seen as a revision of English. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 12) | |
| A reaction: I agree, but the problem is that there are different ideals for the revision, which may be in conflict. Logicians, mathematicians, metaphysicians, scientists, moralists and aestheticians are queueing up to improve in their own way. |
| 16292 | An explicit definition enables the elimination of what is defined [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: Explicit definitions allow for a complete elimination of the defined notion (at least in extensional contexts). | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 1) | |
| A reaction: If the context isn't extensional (concerning the things themselves) then we could define one description of it, but be unable to eliminate it under another description. Elimination is no the aim of an Aristotelian definition. Halbach refers to truth. |
| 16307 | Don't trust analogies; they are no more than a guideline [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: Arguments from analogy are to be distrusted: at best they can serve as heuristics. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 4) |
| 16330 | Truth-value 'gluts' allow two truth values together; 'gaps' give a partial conception of truth [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: Truth-value 'gluts' correspond to a so-called dialethic conception of truth; excluding gluts and admitting only 'gaps' leads to a conception of what is usually called 'partial' truth. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 15.2) | |
| A reaction: Talk of 'gaps' and 'gluts' seem to be the neatest way of categorising views of truth. I want a theory with no gaps or gluts. |
| 16339 | Truth axioms prove objects exist, so truth doesn't seem to be a logical notion [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: Two typed disquotation sentences, truth axioms of TB, suffice for proving that there at least two objects. Hence truth is not a logical notion if one expects logical notions to be ontologically neutral. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 21.2) |
| 16324 | Any definition of truth requires a metalanguage [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: It is plain that the distinction between object and metalanguage is required for the definability of truth. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 11) | |
| A reaction: Halbach's axiomatic approach has given up on definability, and therefore it can seek to abandon the metalanguage and examine 'type-free' theories. |
| 16293 | Traditional definitions of truth often make it more obscure, rather than less [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: A common complaint against traditional definitional theories of truth is that it is far from clear that the definiens is not more in need of clarification than the definiendum (that is, the notion of truth). | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 1) | |
| A reaction: He refers to concepts like 'correspondence', 'facts', 'coherence' or 'utility', which are said to be trickier to understand than 'true'. I suspect that philosophers like Halbach confuse 'clear' with 'precise'. Coherence is quite clear, but imprecise. |
| 16301 | If people have big doubts about truth, a definition might give it more credibility [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: If one were wondering whether truth should be considered a legitimate notion at all, a definition might be useful in dispersing doubts about its legitimacy. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 3) | |
| A reaction: Halbach is proposing to skip definitions, and try to give rules for using 'true' instead, but he doesn't rule out definitions. A definition of 'knowledge' or 'virtue' or 'democracy' might equally give those credibility. |
| 16297 | Semantic theories avoid Tarski's Theorem by sticking to a sublanguage [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: In semantic theories (e.g.Tarski's or Kripke's), a definition evades Tarski's Theorem by restricting the possible instances in the schema T[φ]↔φ to sentences of a proper sublanguage of the language formulating the equivalences. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 1) | |
| A reaction: The schema says if it's true it's affirmable, and if it's affirmable it's true. The Liar Paradox is a key reason for imposing this restriction. |
| 16337 | Disquotational truth theories are short of deductive power [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: The problem of restricted deductive power has haunted disquotational theories of truth (…because they can't prove generalisations). | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 19.5) |
| 16322 | CT proves PA consistent, which PA can't do on its own, so CT is not conservative over PA [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: Compositional Truth CT proves the consistency of Peano arithmetic, which is not provable in Peano arithmetic by Gödel's second incompleteness theorem. Hence the theory CT is not conservative over Peano arithmetic. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 8.6) |
| 16294 | Axiomatic truth doesn't presuppose a truth-definition, though it could admit it at a later stage [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: Choosing an axiomatic approach to truth might well be compatible with the view that truth is definable; the definability of truth is just not presupposed at the outset. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 1) | |
| A reaction: Is it possible that a successful axiomatisation is a successful definition? |
| 16326 | The main semantic theories of truth are Kripke's theory, and revisions semantics [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: Revision semantics is arguably the main competitor of Kripke's theory of truth among semantic truth theories. …In the former one may hope through revision to arrive at better and better models, ..sorting out unsuitable extensions of the truth predicate. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 14) | |
| A reaction: Halbach notes later that Kripke's theory (believe it or not) is considerably simpler than revision semantics. |
| 16311 | To axiomatise Tarski's truth definition, we need a binary predicate for his 'satisfaction' [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: If the clauses of Tarski's definition of truth are turned into axioms (as Davidson proposed) then a primitive binary predicate symbol for satisfaction is needed, as Tarski defined truth in terms of satisfaction. Standard language has a unary predicate. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 5.2) |
| 16318 | Compositional Truth CT has the truth of a sentence depending of the semantic values of its constituents [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: In the typed Compositional Truth theory CT, it is compositional because the truth of a sentence depends on the semantic values of the constituents of that sentence. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 8) | |
| A reaction: [axioms on p. 65 of Halbach] |
| 16299 | Gödel numbering means a theory of truth can use Peano Arithmetic as its base theory [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: Often syntactic objects are identified with their numerical codes. …Expressions of a countable formal language can be coded in the natural numbers. This allows a theory of truth to use Peano Arithmetic (with its results) as a base theory. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 2) | |
| A reaction: The numbering system is the famous device invented by Gödel for his great proof of incompleteness. This idea is a key to understanding modern analytic philosophy. It is the bridge which means philosophical theories can be treated mathematically. |
| 16340 | Truth axioms need a base theory, because that is where truth issues arise [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: Considering the truth axioms in the absence of a base theory is not very sensible because characteristically truth theoretic reasoning arises from the interplay of the truth axioms with the base theory. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 21.2) | |
| A reaction: The base theory usually seems to be either Peano arithmetic or set theory. We might say that introverted thought (e.g. in infants) has little use for truth; it is when you think about the world that truth becomes a worry. |
| 16305 | We know a complete axiomatisation of truth is not feasible [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: In the light of incompleteness phenomena, one should not expect a categorical axiomatisation of truth to be feasible, but this should not keep one from studying axiomatic theories of truth (or of arithmetic). | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 3) | |
| A reaction: This, of course, is because of Gödel's famous results. It is important to be aware in this field that there cannot be a dream of a final theory, so we are just seeing what can be learned about truth. |
| 16313 | A theory is 'conservative' if it adds no new theorems to its base theory [Halbach, by PG] |
| Full Idea: A truth theory is 'conservative' if the addition of the truth predicate does not add any new theorems to the base theory. | |
| From: report of Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 6 Df 6.6) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: Halbach presents the definition more formally, and this is my attempt at getting it into plain English. Halbach uses Peano Arithmetic as his base theory, but set theory is also sometimes used. |
| 16315 | The Tarski Biconditional theory TB is Peano Arithmetic, plus truth, plus all Tarski bi-conditionals [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: The truth theory TB (Tarski Biconditional) is all the axioms of Peano Arithmetic, including all instances of the induction schema with the truth predicate, plus all the sentences of the form T[φ] ↔ φ. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 7) | |
| A reaction: The biconditional formula is the famous 'snow is white' iff snow is white. The truth of the named sentence is equivalent to asserting the sentence. This is a typed theory of truth, and it is conservative over PA. |
| 16314 | Theories of truth are 'typed' (truth can't apply to sentences containing 'true'), or 'type-free' [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: I sort theories of truth into the large families of 'typed' and 'type-free'. Roughly, typed theories prohibit a truth predicate's application to sentences with occurrences of that predicate, and one cannot prove the truth of sentences containing 'true'. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], II Intro) | |
| A reaction: The problem sentence the typed theories are terrified of is the Liar Sentence. Typing produces a hierarchy of languages, referring down to the languages below them. |
| 16327 | Friedman-Sheard is type-free Compositional Truth, with two inference rules for truth [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: The Friedman-Sheard truth system FS is based on compositional theory CT. The axioms of FS are obtained by relaxing the type restriction on the CT-axioms, and adding rules inferring sentences from their truth, and vice versa. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 15) | |
| A reaction: The rules are called NEC and CONEC by Halbach. The system FSN is FS without the two rules. |
| 16331 | The KF is much stronger deductively than FS, which relies on classical truth [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: The Kripke-Feferman theory is relatively deductively very strong. In particular, it is much stronger than its competitor FS, which is based on a completely classical notion of truth. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 15.3) |
| 16329 | Kripke-Feferman theory KF axiomatises Kripke fixed-points, with Strong Kleene logic with gluts [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: The Kripke-Feferman theory KF is an axiomatisation of the fixed points of an operator, that is, of a Kripkean fixed-point semantics with the Strong Kleene evaluation schema with truth-value gluts. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 15.1) |
| 16332 | The KF theory is useful, but it is not a theory containing its own truth predicate [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: KF is useful for explicating Peano arithmetic, but it certainly does not come to close to being a theory that contains its own truth predicate. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 16) | |
| A reaction: Since it is a type-free theory, its main philosophical aspiration was to contain its own truth predicate, so that is bad news (for philosophers). |
| 16320 | Some say deflationism is axioms which are conservative over the base theory [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: Some authors have tried to understand the deflationist claim that truth is not a substantial notion as the claim that a satisfactory axiomatisation of truth should be conservative over the base theory. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 8) |
| 16338 | Deflationism says truth is a disquotation device to express generalisations, adding no new knowledge [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: There are two doctrines at the core of deflationism. The first says truth is a device of disquotation used to express generalisations, and the second says truth is a thin notion that contributes nothing to our knowledge of the world | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 21) |
| 16317 | The main problem for deflationists is they can express generalisations, but not prove them [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: The main criticism that deflationist theories based on the disquotation sentences or similar axioms have to meet was raised by Tarski: the disquotation sentences do not allow one to prove generalisations. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 7) |
| 16316 | Deflationists say truth is just for expressing infinite conjunctions or generalisations [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: Deflationists do not hold that truth is completely dispensable. They claim that truth serves the purpose of expressing infinite conjunctions or generalisations. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 7) | |
| A reaction: It is also of obvious value as a shorthand in ordinary conversation, but rigorous accounts can paraphrase that out. 'What he said is true'. 'Pick out the true sentences from p,q,r and s' seems to mean 'affirm some of them'. What does 'affirm' mean? |
| 16319 | Compositional Truth CT proves generalisations, so is preferred in discussions of deflationism [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: Compositional Truth CT and its variants has desirable generalisations among its logical consequences, so they seem to have ousted purely disquotational theories such as TB in the discussion on deflationism. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 8) |
| 16335 | In Strong Kleene logic a disjunction just needs one disjunct to be true [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: In Strong Kleene logic a disjunction of two sentences is true if at least one disjunct is true, even when the other disjunct lacks a truth value. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 18) | |
| A reaction: This sounds fine to me. 'Either I'm typing this or Homer had blue eyes' comes out true in any sensible system. |
| 16334 | In Weak Kleene logic there are 'gaps', neither true nor false if one component lacks a truth value [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: In Weak Kleene Logic, with truth-value gaps, a sentence is neither true nor false if one of its components lacks a truth value. A line of the truth table shows a gap if there is a gap anywhere in the line, and the other lines are classical. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 18) | |
| A reaction: This will presumably apply even if the connective is 'or', so a disjunction won't be true, even if one disjunct is true, when the other disjunct is unknown. 'Either 2+2=4 or Lot's wife was left-handed' sounds true to me. Odd. |
| 16309 | Every attempt at formal rigour uses some set theory [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: Almost any subject with any formal rigour employs some set theory. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 4.1) | |
| A reaction: This is partly because mathematics is often seen as founded in set theory, and formal rigour tends to be mathematical in character. |
| 16333 | The underestimated costs of giving up classical logic are found in mathematical reasoning [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: The costs of giving up classical logic are easily underestimated, …the price being paid in terms of mathematical reasoning. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 16.2) | |
| A reaction: No one cares much about such costs, until you say they are 'mathematical'. Presumably this is a message to Graham Priest and his pals. |
| 16310 | A theory is some formulae and all of their consequences [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: A theory is a set of formulae closed under first-order logical consequence. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 5.1) |
| 16342 | You cannot just say all of Peano arithmetic is true, as 'true' isn't part of the system [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: One cannot just accept that all the theorems of Peano arithmetic are true when one accepts Peano arithmetic as the notion of truth is not available in the language of arithmetic. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 22.1) | |
| A reaction: This is given as the reason why Kreisel and Levy (1968) introduced 'reflection principles', which allow you to assert whatever has been proved (with no mention of truth). (I think. The waters are closing over my head). |
| 16341 | Normally we only endorse a theory if we believe it to be sound [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: If one endorses a theory, so one might argue, one should also take it to be sound. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 22.1) |
| 16344 | Soundness must involve truth; the soundness of PA certainly needs it [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: Soundness seems to be a notion essentially involving truth. At least I do not know how to fully express the soundness of Peano arithmetic without invoking a truth predicate. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 22.1) | |
| A reaction: I suppose you could use some alternative locution such as 'assertible' or 'cuddly'. Intuitionists seem a bit vague about the truth end of things. |
| 16347 | Many new paradoxes may await us when we study interactions between frameworks [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: Paradoxes that arise from interaction of predicates such as truth, necessity, knowledge, future and past truths have receive little attention. There may be many unknown paradoxes lurking when we develop frameworks with these intensional notions. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 24.2) | |
| A reaction: Nice. This is a wonderful pointer to new research in the analytic tradition, in which formal problems will gradually iron out our metaphysical framework. |
| 16336 | The liar paradox applies truth to a negated truth (but the conditional will serve equally) [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: An essential feature of the liar paradox is the application of the truth predicate to a sentence with a negated occurrence of the truth predicate, though the negation can be avoided by using the conditional. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 19.3) |
| 16321 | The compactness theorem can prove nonstandard models of PA [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: Nonstandard models of Peano arithmetic are models of PA that are not isomorphic to the standard model. Their existence can be established with the compactness theorem or the adequacy theorem of first-order logic. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 8.3) |
| 16343 | The global reflection principle seems to express the soundness of Peano Arithmetic [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: The global reflection principle ∀x(Sent(x) ∧ Bew[PA](x) → Tx) …seems to be the full statement of the soundness claim for Peano arithmetic, as it expresses that all theorems of Peano arithmetic are true. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 22.1) | |
| A reaction: That is, an extra principle must be introduced to express the soundness. PA is, of course, not complete. |
| 16312 | To reduce PA to ZF, we represent the non-negative integers with von Neumann ordinals [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: For the reduction of Peano Arithmetic to ZF set theory, usually the set of finite von Neumann ordinals is used to represent the non-negative integers. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 6) | |
| A reaction: Halbach makes it clear that this is just one mode of reduction, relative interpretability. |
| 16308 | Set theory was liberated early from types, and recent truth-theories are exploring type-free [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: While set theory was liberated much earlier from type restrictions, interest in type-free theories of truth only developed more recently. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 4) | |
| A reaction: Tarski's theory of truth involves types (or hierarchies). |
| 16345 | That Peano arithmetic is interpretable in ZF set theory is taken by philosophers as a reduction [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: The observation that Peano arithmetic is relatively interpretable in ZF set theory is taken by many philosophers to be a reduction of numbers to sets. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 23) | |
| A reaction: Nice! Being able to express something in a different language is not the same as a reduction. Back to the drawing board. What do you really mean by a reduction? If we model something, we don't 'reduce' it to the model. |
| 18451 | The presence of the incorporeal is only known by certain kinds of disposition [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: Being everywhere and nowhere, the incorporeal, wherever it happens to be, betrays its presence only by a certain kind of disposition. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 4Enn3 21(20)) | |
| A reaction: There is a mystical or dualist view of fundamental powers, as the spiritual engine which drives passive physical nature. It's rubbish of course, but if powers are primitive in a naturalistic theory, it is not a view which can be refuted. |
| 18459 | Diversity arises from the power of unity [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: Diversity is born of the development of the power of unity. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn5 42) | |
| A reaction: I doubt whether even Porphyry understood this, but we might say that once the principle of unification enters into nature, it will inevitably result in diversity. One all-embracing unity would be indiscernible. |
| 16346 | Maybe necessity is a predicate, not the usual operator, to make it more like truth [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: Should necessity be treated as a predicate rather than (as in modal logic) as a sentential operator? It is odd to assign different status to necessity and truth, hampering their interaction. That all necessities are true can't be expressed by an operator. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 24.2) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] Halbach and Horsten consistently treat truth as a predicate, but maybe truth is an operator. Making necessity a predicate and not an operator would be a huge upheaval in the world of modal logic. Nice move! |
| 18452 | Memory is not conserved images, but reproduction of previous thought [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: Memory does not consist in preserving images. It is a faculty of reproducing the conceptions with which our soul has been occupied. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 5Enn6 25(2)) |
| 18453 | Intelligence is aware of itself, so the intelligence is both the thinker and the thought [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: Since intelligence is intelligible for intelligence, intelligence is its own object. ...Intelligence, therefore, is simultaneously thinker and thought, all that thinks and all that is thought. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 5Enn3 32(5-7)) | |
| A reaction: This is a bit of a problem for Descartes, if the Cogito is taken as offering evidence (thought) for the existence of a thinker ('I'). Porphyry implies that the separation Descartes requires is impossible. |
| 18462 | The soul is everywhere and nowhere in the body, and must be its cause [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: The soul is neither a body, nor in the body, but is only the cause of the body, because she is simultaneously everywhere and nowhere in the body. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn5 43) | |
| A reaction: This is the rather bewildering phenomenology of consciousness which persuaded Descartes of dualism. |
| 18463 | Successful introspection reveals the substrate along with the object of thought [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: He who by thought can penetrate within his own substance, and can thus acquire knowledge of it, finds himself in this actualisation of knowledge and consciousness, where the substrate that knows is identical with the object that is known. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn5 44) | |
| A reaction: It seems remarkably that this ability is confidently asserted by Porphyry, and flatly denied by Hume. Were they just different people, or were they looking for different things, or was one of them deluded? |
| 18458 | The soul is bound to matter by the force of its own disposition [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: The individual soul, which declines towards matter, is bound to the matter by the form which her disposition has made her choose. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn4 39) | |
| A reaction: This sounds like the soul is boss over the matter, and yet the soul is 'made' to choose union with matter. The Universal Soul is seen by Porphyr as the controller of the situation. |
| 16298 | We need propositions to ascribe the same beliefs to people with different languages [Halbach] |
| Full Idea: Being able to ascribe the same proposition as a belief to persons who do not have a common language seems to be one of the main reasons to employ propositions. | |
| From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 2) | |
| A reaction: Propositions concern beliefs, as well as sentence meanings. I would want to say that a dog and I could believe the same thing, and that is a non-linguistic reason to believe in propositions. Maybe 'translation' cuts out the proposition middleman? |
| 18464 | Justice is each person fulfilling his function [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: Justice, as has been rightly said, consists in each one fulfilling his [authentic and proper] function. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn5 44) | |
| A reaction: This is presumably a direct reference to the theory in Plato's 'Republic'. It makes the connection between virtue and function which I take to be basic to virtue theory, giving it a naturalistic advantaged over other theories. |
| 18448 | We should avoid the pleasures of love, or at least, should not enact our dreams [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: The pleasures of love will not even involuntarily be tasted, at least, she will not allow herself to be drawn beyond the lights of fancy that occur in dreams. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn2 I.4) | |
| A reaction: Presumably erotic dreams are only tolerated because not much can be done about them. This brings out the puritanism of neo-platonism. |
| 18444 | Civil virtues make us behave benevolently, and thereby unite citizens [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: The object of the civil virtues is to make us benevolent in our dealings with our fellow-human beings, and are so-called because they unite citizens. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn2 I.1) | |
| A reaction: Modern commentators underestimate the close link between ancient virtue and citizenship. It is hard for one person to have much of a notion of virtue if they live on a desert island, beyond caring for personal health. |
| 18445 | Civil virtues control the passions, and make us conform to our nature [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: The civil virtues moderate the passions; their object is to teach us to live in conformity with the laws of human nature. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn2 I.2) | |
| A reaction: The link with human nature is basic to virtue theory, but this proposal is rather too vague. Are passions not part of the laws of human nature? |
| 18446 | Purificatory virtues detach the soul completely from the passions [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: The object of the 'purificatory' virtues is to detach the soul completely from the passions. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn2 I.4) | |
| A reaction: This is an aspect of virtue theory which doesn't appear in Aristotle. He is in favour of rational control of the passions, but not of totally abandoning them. The neo-platonists are much more puritanical. They seem to go against human nature. |
| 18447 | There are practical, purificatory, contemplative, and exemplary virtues [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: The practical virtues make man virtuous; the purificatory virtues make man divine....; the contemplative virtues defiy; while the exemplary virtues make a man the parent of divinities. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn2 I.4) | |
| A reaction: I like the idea of the 'exemplary' virtues. I think an entire theory of morality could be built on the notion that we are all role-models for one another. |
| 22405 | Negative utilitarianism implies that the world should be destroyed, to avoid future misery [Smart] |
| Full Idea: The doctrine of negative utilitarianism (that we should concern ourselves with the minimisation of suffering, rather than the maximisation of happiness) ...means we should support a tyrant who explodes the world, to prevent infinite future misery. | |
| From: J.J.C. Smart (Outline of a System of Utilitarianism [1973], 5) | |
| A reaction: That only seems to imply that the negative utilitarian rule needs supplementary rules. We are too fond of looking for one single moral rule that guides everything. |
| 22404 | Any group interested in ethics must surely have a sentiment of generalised benevolence [Smart] |
| Full Idea: A utilitarian can appeal to the sentiment of generalised benevolence, which is surely present in any group with whom it is profitable to discuss ethical questions. | |
| From: J.J.C. Smart (Outline of a System of Utilitarianism [1973], I) | |
| A reaction: But ethics is not intended only for those who are interested in ethics. If this is the basics of ethics, then we must leave the mafia to pursue its sordid activities without criticism. Their lack of sympathy seems to be their good fortune. |
| 18456 | Unified real existence is neither great nor small, though greatness and smallness participate in it [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: By its identity and numerical unity, real existence is neither great nor small, neither very large nor very small, though it causes even greatest and smallest to participate in its nature. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn4 37(5)) | |
| A reaction: Note the platonic word 'participate' [metechein], suggesting that he is talking about the Form of Existence here. Note also that we have 'real' existence here, implying a lesser type of existence that participates in it. |
| 18454 | Time is the circular movement of the soul [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: It is the circular movement of the soul that constitutes time, just as the permanence of intelligence in itself constitutes eternity. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 5Enn3 32(5-7)) | |
| A reaction: Plato loved circles. If you think time is subjective, this is trying to express your intuition. Personally I think it is nonsense |
| 18455 | Some think time is seen at rest, as well as in movement [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: Some have believed that time manifested in rest as well as in movement. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 5Enn3 32(5-7)) | |
| A reaction: If you like this idea, you should see Shoemaker's lovely three-worlds thought experiment. |
| 18460 | God is nowhere, and hence everywhere [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: The divinity is everywhere because it is nowhere. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn5 43) |
| 18461 | Everything existing proceeds from divinity, and is within divinity [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: All things that possess or do not possess existence proceed from divinity, and are within divinity. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn5 43) | |
| A reaction: Nice to see Porphyry endorsing Meinongian objects. I doubt whether he counts as a pantheist, but this is a very pantheistic remark. |
| 18449 | Nature binds or detaches body to soul, but soul itself joins and detaches soul from body [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: Nature binds the body to the soul, but it is the soul herself that has bound herself to the body. It, therefore, belongs to nature to detach the body from the soul, while it is the soul herself that detaches herself from the body. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn9 2) | |
| A reaction: Baffling. What happens if there is a conflict? I suppose either party can cancel the bargain, but who wins when they disagree? |
| 18457 | Individual souls are all connected, though distinct, and without dividing universal Soul [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: Individual souls are distinct without being separated from each other, and without dividing the universal Soul into a number of parts; they are united to each other without becoming confused. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn4 39) | |
| A reaction: This sounds like Jung's theory that there is a universal subconscious which links us all together. Taken literally, I assume it is nonsense. As an invitation to acknowledge how much we all have in common, it is a nice corrective to liberal individualism. |