22 ideas
15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
Full Idea: It is far from clear that a definition of truth can lead to a philosophically satisfactory theory of truth. Tarski's theorem on the undefinability of the truth predicate needs resources beyond those of the language for which it is being defined. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: The idea is that you need a 'metalanguage' for the definition. If I say 'p' is a true sentence in language 'L', I am not making that observation from within language L. The dream is a theory confined to the object language. |
15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
Full Idea: In semantic theories of truth (Tarski or Kripke), a truth predicate is defined for an object-language. This definition is carried out in a metalanguage, which is typically taken to include set theory or another strong theory or expressive language. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: Presumably the metalanguage includes set theory because that connects it with mathematics, and enables it to be formally rigorous. Tarski showed, in his undefinability theorem, that the meta-language must have increased resources. |
15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
Full Idea: If truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should not allow proof of new theorems not involving the truth predicate. It is hence said that axiomatic truth should be 'conservative' - not implying further sentences beyond what the axioms can prove. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1.3) | |
A reaction: [compressed] |
15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
Full Idea: If truth can be explicitly defined, it can be eliminated, whereas an axiomatized notion of truth may bring all kinds of commitments. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1.3) | |
A reaction: The general principle that anything which can be defined can be eliminated (in an abstract theory, presumably, not in nature!) raises interesting questions about how many true theories there are which are all equivalent to one another. |
15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
Full Idea: The axiomatic approach does not presuppose that truth can be defined. Instead, a formal language is expanded by a new primitive predicate of truth, and axioms for that predicate are then laid down. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: Idea 15647 explains why Halbach thinks the definition route is no good. |
15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
Full Idea: Axiomatic theories of truth can be presented within very weak logical frameworks which require very few resources, and avoid the need for a strong metalanguage and metatheory. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1) |
15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
Full Idea: According to many deflationists, truth serves merely the purpose of expressing infinite conjunctions. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1.3) | |
A reaction: That is, it asserts sentences that are too numerous to express individually. It also seems, on a deflationist view, to serve for anaphoric reference to sentences, such as 'what she just said is true'. |
15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
Full Idea: The consistency of set theory cannot be established without assumptions transcending set theory. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 2.1) |
15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
Full Idea: The reduction of 2nd-order theories (of properties or sets) to axiomatic theories of truth may be conceived as a form of reductive nominalism, replacing existence assumptions (for comprehension axioms) by ontologically innocent truth assumptions. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1.1) | |
A reaction: I like this very much, as weeding properties out of logic (without weeding them out of the world). So-called properties in logic are too abundant, so there is a misfit with their role in science. |
15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
Full Idea: Quantification over (certain) properties can be mimicked in a language with a truth predicate by quantifying over formulas. Instead of saying that Tom has the property of being a poor philosopher, we can say 'x is a poor philosopher' is true of Tom. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1.1) | |
A reaction: I love this, and think it is very important. He talks of 'mimicking' properties, but I see it as philosophers mistakenly attributing properties, when actually what they were doing is asserting truths involving certain predicates. |
4760 | Belief aims at knowledge (rather than truth), and mere believing is a kind of botched knowing [Williamson] |
Full Idea: Knowing is the best kind of believing. Mere believing is a kind of botched knowing. In short, belief aims at knowledge (not just truth). | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Knowledge and its Limits [2000], §1.5) | |
A reaction: The difference between aiming at truth and aiming at knowledge has to be in the justificiation, so beliefs aim to be justified. Believers always aim at truth, but they can be strikingly relaxed about justification. |
19512 | Don't analyse knowledge; use knowledge to analyse other concepts in epistemology [Williamson, by DeRose] |
Full Idea: Williamson says that instead of being viewed as a concept to be analysed, knowledge should be seen as something useful in the analysis of all sorts of other concepts to epistemology - and to philosophy of mind as well. | |
From: report of Timothy Williamson (Knowledge and its Limits [2000]) by Keith DeRose - The Case for Contextualism 1.8 | |
A reaction: I just don't believe this, because knowledge is obviously a complex state of mind, which invites breaking it down into ingredients. How could knowledge possibly be prior to truth? |
20086 | Nowadays sovereignty (once the basis of a state) has become relative [Reybrouck] |
Full Idea: In the twenty-first century, sovereignty, once the basis of the nation state, has become a relative concept. ...Powerlessness is the key word of our time. | |
From: David van Reybrouck (Against Elections [2013], 1 'Crisis') | |
A reaction: The point is that nation states now have limited power, in the face of larger unions, multinational companies, and global problems. |
20090 | Today it seems almost impossible to learn the will of the people [Reybrouck] |
Full Idea: Imagine having to develop a system today that would express the will of the people. | |
From: David van Reybrouck (Against Elections [2013], 2 'electoral') | |
A reaction: Our recent Brexit referendum didn't do the job, because it was confined to a single question. Van Reybrouck laughs at the idea of expressing it through a polling both. How about a council of 500, drawn by lots? Meet for three months. |
20087 | There are no united monolothic 'peoples', and no 'national gut feelings' [Reybrouck] |
Full Idea: There is no such thing as one monolithic 'people' (every society has its diversity), nor is there anything that could be described as a 'national gut feeling'. | |
From: David van Reybrouck (Against Elections [2013], 2 'populism') | |
A reaction: Rousseau yearned for a republic no bigger than Geneva. I don't see why we should give up on the general will in huge modern societies. It is likely, though, to be an anodyne lowest common denominator. No bad thing, perhaps. |
20089 | Technocrats may be efficient, but they lose legitimacy as soon as they do unpopular things [Reybrouck] |
Full Idea: Efficiency does not automatically generate legitimacy, and faith in the technocrat melts away as soon as spending cuts are implemented. | |
From: David van Reybrouck (Against Elections [2013], 2 'democracy') | |
A reaction: They can hang on to legitimacy if they can come up with some technical mumbo-jumbo like 'monetarism' which the people will swallow. |
20088 | Technocrats are expert managers, who replace politicians, and can be long-term and unpopular [Reybrouck] |
Full Idea: Technocracy is a system where experts are charged with looking after the public interest. ...Technocrats are managers who replace politicians, so they can concentrate on long-term solutions and announce unpopular measures. | |
From: David van Reybrouck (Against Elections [2013], 2 'technocracy') | |
A reaction: I like technocrats. They just need to be accountable. In the UK we have far more respect for the governor of the Bank of England than for any politician. |
20085 | Democracy is the best compromise between legitimacy and efficiency [Reybrouck] |
Full Idea: Democracy is the least bad form of all governments precisely because it attempts to find a healthy balance between legitimacy and efficiency. | |
From: David van Reybrouck (Against Elections [2013], 1 'Crisis') | |
A reaction: There seems to be a widespread feeling that democracy is declining in efficiency, and that may be because our remoteness from government decreases legitimacy, so we have less commitment to getting things done. |
20095 | A referendum result arises largely from ignorance [Reybrouck] |
Full Idea: In a referendum you ask everyone to vote on a subject that usually only a few know anything about. | |
From: David van Reybrouck (Against Elections [2013], 4 'remedies') | |
A reaction: Tell me about it! I was forced to vote in the 2016 Brexit referendum, and felt thoroughly out of my depth on such a complex economic question. |
20094 | You don't really govern people if you don't involve them [Reybrouck] |
Full Idea: Even with the best of intentions, those who govern the people without involving them, govern them only in a limited sense. | |
From: David van Reybrouck (Against Elections [2013], 4 intro) | |
A reaction: But if they are highly involved, who is governing who? Do we want the people to become happier about being governed, or do we want them more involved in doing the governing? |
20093 | In the 18th century democratic lots lost out to elections, that gave us a non-hereditary aristocracy [Reybrouck] |
Full Idea: The drawing of lots, the most democratic of all political instruments, lost out in the eighteenth century to elections, a procedure that was not invented as a democratic instrument, but as a means of bringing a new non-hereditary aristocracy to power. | |
From: David van Reybrouck (Against Elections [2013], 3 'democratisation') | |
A reaction: This is the basic thesis of Van Reybrouck's book. He argues for the extensive use of lots ('sortition') for getting people involved in modern democracies. I love the idea that in a good democracy you get an occasional chance to rule. |
20091 | Representative elections were developed in order to avoid democracy [Reybrouck] |
Full Idea: Bernard Manin (1995) revealed how, immediately after the American and French revolutions, the electoral-representative system was chosen with the intention of keeping at bay the tumult of democracy. | |
From: David van Reybrouck (Against Elections [2013], 3 'procedure') | |
A reaction: At the time America and France were two of the largest countries in the world, and communication and transport were slow. That has changed. |