49 ideas
2319 | Metaphysics is the clarification of the ontological relationships between different areas of thought [Kim] |
Full Idea: Metaphysics is the domain where different languages, theories, explanations, and conceptual systems come together and have their mutual ontological relationships sorted out and clarified. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §3 p.066) |
15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
Full Idea: It is far from clear that a definition of truth can lead to a philosophically satisfactory theory of truth. Tarski's theorem on the undefinability of the truth predicate needs resources beyond those of the language for which it is being defined. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: The idea is that you need a 'metalanguage' for the definition. If I say 'p' is a true sentence in language 'L', I am not making that observation from within language L. The dream is a theory confined to the object language. |
15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
Full Idea: In semantic theories of truth (Tarski or Kripke), a truth predicate is defined for an object-language. This definition is carried out in a metalanguage, which is typically taken to include set theory or another strong theory or expressive language. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: Presumably the metalanguage includes set theory because that connects it with mathematics, and enables it to be formally rigorous. Tarski showed, in his undefinability theorem, that the meta-language must have increased resources. |
15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
Full Idea: If truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should not allow proof of new theorems not involving the truth predicate. It is hence said that axiomatic truth should be 'conservative' - not implying further sentences beyond what the axioms can prove. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1.3) | |
A reaction: [compressed] |
15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
Full Idea: If truth can be explicitly defined, it can be eliminated, whereas an axiomatized notion of truth may bring all kinds of commitments. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1.3) | |
A reaction: The general principle that anything which can be defined can be eliminated (in an abstract theory, presumably, not in nature!) raises interesting questions about how many true theories there are which are all equivalent to one another. |
15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
Full Idea: The axiomatic approach does not presuppose that truth can be defined. Instead, a formal language is expanded by a new primitive predicate of truth, and axioms for that predicate are then laid down. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: Idea 15647 explains why Halbach thinks the definition route is no good. |
15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
Full Idea: Axiomatic theories of truth can be presented within very weak logical frameworks which require very few resources, and avoid the need for a strong metalanguage and metatheory. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1) |
15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
Full Idea: According to many deflationists, truth serves merely the purpose of expressing infinite conjunctions. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1.3) | |
A reaction: That is, it asserts sentences that are too numerous to express individually. It also seems, on a deflationist view, to serve for anaphoric reference to sentences, such as 'what she just said is true'. |
15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
Full Idea: The consistency of set theory cannot be established without assumptions transcending set theory. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 2.1) |
15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
Full Idea: The reduction of 2nd-order theories (of properties or sets) to axiomatic theories of truth may be conceived as a form of reductive nominalism, replacing existence assumptions (for comprehension axioms) by ontologically innocent truth assumptions. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1.1) | |
A reaction: I like this very much, as weeding properties out of logic (without weeding them out of the world). So-called properties in logic are too abundant, so there is a misfit with their role in science. |
15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
Full Idea: Quantification over (certain) properties can be mimicked in a language with a truth predicate by quantifying over formulas. Instead of saying that Tom has the property of being a poor philosopher, we can say 'x is a poor philosopher' is true of Tom. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1.1) | |
A reaction: I love this, and think it is very important. He talks of 'mimicking' properties, but I see it as philosophers mistakenly attributing properties, when actually what they were doing is asserting truths involving certain predicates. |
17536 | If it can't be expressed mathematically, it can't occur in nature? [Heisenberg] |
Full Idea: The solution was to turn around the question How can one in the known mathematical scheme express a given experimental situation? and ask Is it true that only such situations can arise in nature as can be expressed in the mathematical formalism? | |
From: Werner Heisenberg (Physics and Philosophy [1958], 02) | |
A reaction: This has the authority of the great Heisenberg, and is the ultimate expression of 'mathematical physics', beyond anything Galileo or Newton ever conceived. I suppose Pythagoras would have thought that Heisenberg was obviously right. |
2317 | Reductionism is good on light, genes, temperature and transparency [Kim, by PG] |
Full Idea: Examples where reductionism seems to give a good account of things are light, genes, temperature and transparency. | |
From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.025) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: This a fairly simple examples, thoroughly confirmed by science a long time ago. Life is a nicer example, because it is more complex and less obvious, but pretty much beyond dispute these days. |
2310 | Supervenience is linked to dependence [Kim] |
Full Idea: It is customary to associate supervenience with the idea of dependence or determination. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.011) | |
A reaction: It is only 'customary' because, in principle, the supervenience might just be a coincidence. I might follow someone everywhere because I love them (dependence) or because they force me to (determination). There's always a reason. |
2315 | Mereological supervenience says wholes are fixed by parts [Kim] |
Full Idea: Mereological supervenience is the doctrine that wholes are fixed by the properties and relations that characterise their parts. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.018) | |
A reaction: Presumably this would be the opposite of 'holism'. Personally I would take mereological supervenience to be not merely correct, but to be metaphysically necessary. Don't ask me to prove it, of course. |
17545 | Quantum theory shows that exact science does not need dogmatic realism [Heisenberg] |
Full Idea: It is only through quantum theory that we have learned that exact science is possible without the basis of dogmatic realism. | |
From: Werner Heisenberg (Physics and Philosophy [1958], 05) |
2329 | Causal power is a good way of distinguishing the real from the unreal [Kim] |
Full Idea: A plausible criterion for distinguishing what is real from what is not real is the possession of causal power. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.119) | |
A reaction: This is, of course, a physicalist view, but for physicalists it is probably the best criterion of what is real. A standard objection to platonism in mathematics is that it denies mathematics causal powers. |
17538 | Quantum theory does not introduce minds into atomic events [Heisenberg] |
Full Idea: Certainly quantum theory does not contain genuine subjective features, it does not introduce the mind of the physicist as a part of the atomic event. | |
From: Werner Heisenberg (Physics and Philosophy [1958], 03) | |
A reaction: This should be digested by anyone who wants to erect some dodgy anti-realist, idealist, subjective metaphysics on the basis of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. |
2320 | Properties can have causal powers lacked by their constituents [Kim] |
Full Idea: Macroproperties can, and in general do, have their own causal powers, powers that go beyond the causal powers of their microconstituents. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §3 p.085) | |
A reaction: I don't see why the macro-powers 'go beyond' the sum of the micro-powers. Admittedly one molecule can't be slippery, but slipperiness can be totally reduced to molecule behaviour. |
17534 | A 'probability wave' is a quantitative version of Aristotle's potential, a mid-way type of reality [Heisenberg] |
Full Idea: The 1924 idea of the 'probability wave' meant a tendency for something. It was a quantitative version of the old concept of 'potentia' in Aristotelian philosophy ...a strange kind of physical reality just in the middle between possibility and reality. | |
From: Werner Heisenberg (Physics and Philosophy [1958], 02) | |
A reaction: [compressed] As far as I can see, he is talking about a disposition or power, which is exactly between a mere theoretical possibility and an actuality. See the Mumford/Lill Anjum proposal for a third modal value, between possible and necessary. |
17553 | We can retain the idea of 'substance', as indestructible mass or energy [Heisenberg] |
Full Idea: One could consider mass and energy as two different forms of the same 'substance' and thereby keep the idea of substance as indestructible. | |
From: Werner Heisenberg (Physics and Philosophy [1958], 07) |
17544 | Basic particles have a mathematical form, which is more important than their substance [Heisenberg] |
Full Idea: The smallest parts of matter are not the fundamental Beings, as in the philosophy of Democritus, but are mathematical forms. Here it is quite evident that the form is more important than the substance of which it is the form. | |
From: Werner Heisenberg (Physics and Philosophy [1958], 04) | |
A reaction: Heisenberg is quite consciously endorsing hylomorphism here, with a Pythagorean twist to it. |
530 | There are two contradictory arguments about everything [Kim] |
Full Idea: There are two contradictory arguments about everything. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], B06a), quoted by (who?) - where? |
13314 | Protagoras says arguments on both sides are always equal [Kim, by Seneca] |
Full Idea: Protagoras declares that it is possible to argue either side of any question with equal force, even the question whether or not one can equally argue either side of any question! | |
From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998]) by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 088 | |
A reaction: This is perhaps the most famous sceptical argument in the ancient world (though, note, Protagoras is most famous for his relativism rather than his scepticism). It is, of course, wrong. The arguments are sometimes equal, but often they are not. |
2065 | Not every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people [Plato on Kim] |
Full Idea: We do not agree that every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people. | |
From: comment on Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], B01) by Plato - Theaetetus 183c | |
A reaction: I fully agree with this, but only because I have an optimistic view that rational people converge on the truth. |
1550 | Why didn't Protagoras begin by saying "a tadpole is the measure of all things"? [Plato on Kim] |
Full Idea: Why didn't he start 'Truth' off by saying "A pig is the measure of all things", or "a baboon",…or " tadpole"? That would have been a magnificently haughty beginning. | |
From: comment on Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], B01) by Plato - Theaetetus 161d1 |
17550 | We give a mathematical account of a system of natural connections in order to clarify them [Heisenberg] |
Full Idea: When we represent a group of connections by a closed and coherent set of concepts, axioms, definitions and laws which in turn is represented by a mathematical scheme we have isolated and idealised them with the purpose of clarification. | |
From: Werner Heisenberg (Physics and Philosophy [1958], 06) | |
A reaction: Attacks on the regularity theory of laws, and the notion that explanation is by laws, tend to downplay this point - that obtaining clarity and precision is a sort of explanation, even if it fails to go deeper. |
2318 | Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes [Kim, by PG] |
Full Idea: The following all require a belief in mental causation: agency (mind causes events), knowledge (perception causes beliefs), reasoning (one belief causes another), memory (events cause ideas), psychology (science of mental causes). | |
From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §2 p.031) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: A very good list, which I cannot fault, and to which I cannot add. The question is: is there any mental activity left over which does NOT require causation? Candidates are free will, and the contingent character of qualia. I say the answer is, no. |
2325 | It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality [Kim] |
Full Idea: It seems to me inconceivable that a possible world exists that is an exact physical duplicate of this world but lacking wholly in intentionality. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.101) | |
A reaction: Personally I can't conceive of such a world lacking qualia either. The physical entails the mental, say I. |
2324 | Intentionality as function seems possible [Kim] |
Full Idea: There has been much scepticism about a functionalist account of intentionality, particularly from Putnam (recently) and Searle, but, like many others, I don't see any principled objections to such an account. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.101) | |
A reaction: I agree. I don't believe that intentionality is a candidate for being one of those many 'magic' qualities which are supposed to make the reduction of mind to brain impossible. |
2314 | Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't [Kim] |
Full Idea: It is possible to hold that phenomenal properties (qualia) are irreducible, while holding intentional properties, including propositional attitudes, to be reducible (functionally, or biologically). | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.017) | |
A reaction: This is the position which Kim has settled for, but I find it baffling. If the universe is full of irreducibles that is one thing, but if everything in the universe is reducible except for one tiny item, that is implausible. |
2313 | Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property [Kim] |
Full Idea: The emergentism (of Searle), like ethical intuitionism, views mind-body supervenience as something that admits no explanation - it is a brute fact. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.013) | |
A reaction: This is why 'emergence' is no sort of theory, and is really old-fashioned dualism in a dubious naturalistic disguise. If mind 'emerges', there is presumably a causal mechanism for that. |
2328 | The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia [Kim] |
Full Idea: If emergentism is correct about anything, it is more likely to be correct about qualia than about anything else. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.103) | |
A reaction: I'm puzzled by a view that says that nearly all of the mind is reducible, but one tiny aspect of it is 'emergent'. What sort of ontology is envisaged by that? |
2309 | Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience [Kim] |
Full Idea: Many philosophers saw in mind-body supervenience a satisfying metaphysical statement of physicalism without reductionism. This widely influential position is now known as "nonreductive physicalism". | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.008) | |
A reaction: If two things supervene on one another, then we should be asking why. Occasionalism and Parallelism are presumably not the answer. Coldness supervenes on ice. |
2311 | Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction [Kim] |
Full Idea: Maybe strong supervenience is inconsistent with the irreducibility of the supervenient properties to their subvenient bases. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.012) | |
A reaction: If two things are really very very supervenient on one another (superdupervenient?), then you have to ask WHY? If there isn't identity, then there is surely a highly lawlike connection? |
2308 | Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies [Kim] |
Full Idea: The two principle arguments which overthrew the mind-brain identity theory were the multiple realization argument of Hilary Putnam, and the anomalist argument of Davidson, which contained the seeds of functionalism and anomalous monism. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.002) | |
A reaction: The first argument strikes me as significant and interesting, but Davidson seems weak. It makes the unsubstantiated claim that mind is outside the laws of physics, and irreducible. |
2322 | Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time [Kim] |
Full Idea: Multiple realization goes deeper and wider than biological species, and even in the same individual the neural realizer, or correlate, of a given mental state or function may change over time through maturation and brain injuries. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.095) | |
A reaction: The tricky question here is what you mean by 'change'. How different must a pattern of neurons be before you say it is of a different type? How do you individuate a type? |
2327 | Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful [Kim] |
Full Idea: My doubts about functionalist accounts of qualia are based on the much discussed arguments from qualia inversions, and from epistemic considerations. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.102) | |
A reaction: With a colour inversion experience changes but function doesn't. But maybe function does change if you ask the right questions. 'Is this a warm colour?' It certainly strikes me that qualia contain useful (epistemic) information. |
2323 | Emotions have both intentionality and qualia [Kim] |
Full Idea: It has been customary to distinguish between two broad categories of mental phenomena, the intentional and the phenomenal, without excluding those that have both (e.g. emotions). | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.101) | |
A reaction: This has become the conventional modern account of the mind. It seems a little too simple to say that the mind is characterised by two clearcut phenomena like this. I suspect that his picture will be modified in time. |
17549 | Seven theories in science: mechanics, heat, electricity, quantum, particles, relativity, life [Heisenberg, by PG] |
Full Idea: Science has seven closed systems of concepts and axioms: Newtonian mechanics; the theory of heat; electricity and magnetism; quantum theory; the theory of elementary particles; general relativity; and the theory of organic life. | |
From: report of Werner Heisenberg (Physics and Philosophy [1958], 06) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: [my summary of pp.86-88 and 92] It is interesting to have spelled out that there are number of 'closed' theories, which are only loosely connected to one another. New discoveries launch whole new theories, instead of being subsumed. |
17540 | Energy is that which moves, and is the substance from which everything is made [Heisenberg] |
Full Idea: Energy is the substance from which all elementary particles, all atoms and therefore all things are made, and energy is that which moves. | |
From: Werner Heisenberg (Physics and Philosophy [1958], 04) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure what energy is, but I like this because it says that nature is fundamentally active. Nothing makes sense without that basic assumption (on which Leibniz continually insists). |
17541 | Energy is an unchanging substance, having many forms, and causing all change [Heisenberg] |
Full Idea: Energy is a substance, since its total amount does not change. ...Energy can be changed into motion, into heat, into light and into tension. Energy may be called the fundamental cause for all change in the world. | |
From: Werner Heisenberg (Physics and Philosophy [1958], 04) | |
A reaction: Grandiose stuff. I remain unconvinced that Heisenberg (clever fellow, I'm told) has any idea of what he is talking about. |
17548 | Maxwell introduced real fields, which transferred forces from point to point [Heisenberg] |
Full Idea: In the theory of fields of force one came back to the older idea, that action is transferred from one point to a neighbouring point. ...With Maxwell the fields of force seemed to have acquired the same degree of reality as the body's of Newton's theory. | |
From: Werner Heisenberg (Physics and Philosophy [1958], 06) |
17533 | Radiation interference needs waves, but radiation photoelectric effects needs particles [Heisenberg] |
Full Idea: How could it be that the same radiation that produces interference patterns, and therefore must consist of waves, also produces the photoelectric effect, and therefore must consist of moving particles. | |
From: Werner Heisenberg (Physics and Philosophy [1958], 02) |
17532 | An atom's stability after collisions needs explaining (which Newton's mechanics can't do) [Heisenberg] |
Full Idea: The first new model of the atom could not explain the most characteristic features of the atom, its enormous stability. No planetary system following the laws of Newton's mechanics would ever go back to its original configuration after a collision. | |
From: Werner Heisenberg (Physics and Philosophy [1958], 02) |
17537 | Position is complementary to velocity or momentum, so the whole system is indeterminate [Heisenberg] |
Full Idea: The knowledge of the position of a particle is complementary to the knowledge of its velocity or momentum. If we know one with high accuracy we cannot know the other with high accuracy; still we must know both for determining the behaviour of the system. | |
From: Werner Heisenberg (Physics and Philosophy [1958], 03) | |
A reaction: This is the famous Uncertainty Principle, expressed in plain language by the man himself. At this point we lost our grip on the prospects of determining the behaviour of natural systems. |
17551 | It was formerly assumed that electromagnetic waves could not be a reality in themselves [Heisenberg] |
Full Idea: The idea that electromagnetic waves could be a reality in themselves, independent of any bodies, did at that time not occur to the physicists. | |
From: Werner Heisenberg (Physics and Philosophy [1958], 07) | |
A reaction: 'At that time' is when they thought the waves must travel through something, called the 'ether'. |
17543 | So-called 'empty' space is the carrier of geometry and kinematics [Heisenberg] |
Full Idea: From our modern point of view we would say that the empty space between the atoms was not nothing; it was the carrier of geometry and kinematics. | |
From: Werner Heisenberg (Physics and Philosophy [1958], 04) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure what the 'carrier of geometry and kinematics' means, but it is interesting that he doesn't mention 'fields' (unless they carry the kinematics?) |
17552 | In relativity the length of the 'present moment' is relative to distance from the observer [Heisenberg] |
Full Idea: In classical theory we assume past and future are separated by an infinitely short time interval called the present moment. In relativity it is different: future and past are separated by a finite time interval dependent on the distance from the observer. | |
From: Werner Heisenberg (Physics and Philosophy [1958], 07) | |
A reaction: Not sure I understand this, but it is a revelation to realise that not only is time made relative to observers, but the length of the 'present moment' also becomes relative. The infinitesimal present moment has always bothered me. |