27 ideas
3859 | We do not wish merely to predict, we also want to explain [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: We do not wish merely to predict, we also want to explain. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], II.3) |
3870 | The real problem of science is how to choose between possible explanations [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: Once we move beyond investigating correlations between observables the question of what does or should guide our choice between alternative explanatory accounts becomes problematic. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], IX.2) |
3853 | For science to be rational, we must explain scientific change rationally [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: We are only justified in regarding scientific practice as the very paradigm of rationality if we can justify the claim that scientific change is rationally explicable. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.2) |
3855 | Critics attack positivist division between theory and observation [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: The critics of positivism attacked the conception of a dichotomy between theory and observation. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.4) |
3854 | Positivists hold that theoretical terms change, but observation terms don't [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: For positivists it was taken that while theory change meant change in the meaning of theoretical terms, the meaning of observational terms was invariant under theory change. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.4) |
3869 | More truthful theories have greater predictive power [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: If a theory is a better approximation to the truth, then it is likely that it will have greater predictive power. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], VIII.8) |
3861 | Theories generate infinite truths and falsehoods, so they cannot be used to assess probability [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: We cannot explicate a useful notion of verisimilitude in terms of the number of truths and the number of falsehoods generated by a theory, because they are infinite. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], III.4) |
16210 | Humean supervenience says the world is just a vast mosaic of qualities in space-time [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Humean supervenience says the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact. We have a geometry of external relations of spatio-temporal distance between points, and local qualities at points. …In short: we have an arrangement of qualities. | |
From: David Lewis (Introduction to Philosophical Papers II [1986], p.ix-x) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This is the key fundamental tenet of David Lewis's philosophy. He names it after Hume because it contains no necessary connections. It is 'supervenient' because all worldly truths reduce to and depend on the mosaic. His thesis is contingent. |
5953 | For the Cyrenaics experience was not enough to give certainty about reality [Aristippus young, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: The Cyrenaics, placing all experience within themselves, thought such evidence was insufficient warrant for certainty about reality, and withdrew as in a siege from the world, admitting that objects 'appear', but refusing to pronounce the word 'are'. | |
From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes §1120 | |
A reaction: This seems to be the most extreme position found in ancient thought. It accompanies their extreme hedonism, based on the reality of experience and lack of interest in anything external. A bit daft, really. |
3867 | De re necessity arises from the way the world is [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: A necessary truth is 'de re' if its necessity arises from the way the world is. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], VII.6) |
3872 | We must assess the truth of beliefs in identifying them [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: We cannot determine what someone's beliefs are independently of assessing to some extent the truth or falsity of the beliefs. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], X.4) |
3857 | Defeat relativism by emphasising truth and reference, not meaning [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: The challenge of incommensurability can be met once it is realised that in comparing theories the notions of truth and reference are more important than that of meaning. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.6) |
3858 | A full understanding of 'yellow' involves some theory [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: A full grasp of the concept '…is yellow' involves coming to accept as true bits of theory; that is, generalisations involving the term 'yellow'. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], II.2) |
3862 | All theories contain anomalies, and so are falsified! [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: According to Feyerabend all theories are born falsified, because no theory has ever been totally free of anomalies. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], III.9) |
3863 | The anomaly of Uranus didn't destroy Newton's mechanics - it led to Neptune's discovery [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: When scientists observed the motion of Uranus, they did not give up on Newtonian mechanics. Instead they posited the existence of Neptune. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], III.9) |
3864 | Anomalies are judged against rival theories, and support for the current theory [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: Whether to reject an anomaly has to be decided on the basis of the availability of a rival theory, and on the basis of the positive evidence for the theory in question. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], III.9) |
3865 | Why should it matter whether or not a theory is scientific? [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: Why should it be so important to distinguish between theories that are scientific and those that are not? | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], IV.3) |
3866 | If theories are really incommensurable, we could believe them all [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: If theories are genuinely incommensurable why should I be faced with the problem of choosing between them? Why not believe them all? | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], VII.1) |
3023 | Even the foolish may have some virtues [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: The Cyrenaics say that some of the virtues may exist even in the foolish. | |
From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.8 |
3871 | Explaining an action is showing that it is rational [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: To explain an action as an action is to show that it is rational. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], X.2) |
3026 | Actions are influenced by circumstances, so Cyrenaics say felons should be reformed, not hated [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Cyrenaics say errors should be pardoned, because men do not err intentionally but are influenced by circumstances; one should not hate a person, but only teach him better. | |
From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.9 | |
A reaction: A very appealing suggestion, and rather wonderful for its time. There is still implied agreement about what is 'error', and what counts as 'better'. |
3024 | Cyrenaics teach that honour, justice and shame are all based on custom and fashion [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: The Cyrenaics taught that there was nothing naturally and intrinsically just, or honourable, or disgraceful; but that things were considered so because of law and fashion. | |
From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.8 | |
A reaction: As we would say now, values and virtues are 'cultural constructs'. This obviously contains a lot of truth, but I don't think our opposition of genocide is just 'fashion'. |
3025 | For a Cyrenaic no one is of equal importance to himself [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: A Cyrenaic will not consider anyone else of equal importance with himself. | |
From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.9 |
3019 | No one pleasure is different from or more pleasant than another [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: No one pleasure is different from or more pleasant than another. | |
From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.8 |
3021 | The Cyrenaics asserted that corporeal pleasures were superior to mental ones [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: The Cyrenaics asserted that corporeal pleasures were superior to mental ones. | |
From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.8 |
3027 | Cyrenaics say wise men are self-sufficient, needing no friends [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Cyrenaics say wise men are sufficient to themselves, and so have no need of friends. | |
From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.13 |
9426 | The world is just a vast mosaic of little matters of local particular fact [Lewis] |
Full Idea: The world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one little thing and then another. | |
From: David Lewis (Introduction to Philosophical Papers II [1986]) | |
A reaction: Basing laws on this picture is what Lewis calls 'Humean Supervenience'. |