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All the ideas for 'The Rationality of Science', 'Buddhacarita' and 'On Multiplying Entities'

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
We do not wish merely to predict, we also want to explain [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: We do not wish merely to predict, we also want to explain.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], II.3)
The real problem of science is how to choose between possible explanations [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: Once we move beyond investigating correlations between observables the question of what does or should guide our choice between alternative explanatory accounts becomes problematic.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], IX.2)
For science to be rational, we must explain scientific change rationally [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: We are only justified in regarding scientific practice as the very paradigm of rationality if we can justify the claim that scientific change is rationally explicable.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.2)
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 2. Positivism
Critics attack positivist division between theory and observation [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: The critics of positivism attacked the conception of a dichotomy between theory and observation.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.4)
Positivists hold that theoretical terms change, but observation terms don't [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: For positivists it was taken that while theory change meant change in the meaning of theoretical terms, the meaning of observational terms was invariant under theory change.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.4)
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
The quest for simplicity drove scientists to posit new entities, such as molecules in gases [Quine]
     Full Idea: It is the quest for system and simplicity that has kept driving the scientist to posit further entities as values of his variables. By positing molecules, Boyles' law of gases could be assimilated into a general theory of bodies in motion.
     From: Willard Quine (On Multiplying Entities [1974], p.262)
     A reaction: Interesting that a desire for simplicity might lead to multiplications of entities. In fact, I presume molecules had been proposed elsewhere in science, and were adopted in gas-theory because they were thought to exist, not because simplicity is nice.
In arithmetic, ratios, negatives, irrationals and imaginaries were created in order to generalise [Quine]
     Full Idea: In classical arithmetic, ratios were posited to make division generally applicable, negative numbers to make subtraction generally applicable, and irrationals and finally imaginaries to make exponentiation generally applicable.
     From: Willard Quine (On Multiplying Entities [1974], p.263)
     A reaction: This is part of Quine's proposal (c.f. Idea 8207) that entities have to be multiplied in order to produce simplicity. He is speculating. Maybe they are proposed because they are just obvious, and the generality is a nice side-effect.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
More truthful theories have greater predictive power [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: If a theory is a better approximation to the truth, then it is likely that it will have greater predictive power.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], VIII.8)
Theories generate infinite truths and falsehoods, so they cannot be used to assess probability [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: We cannot explicate a useful notion of verisimilitude in terms of the number of truths and the number of falsehoods generated by a theory, because they are infinite.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], III.4)
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Explaining events just by bodies can't explain two events identical in space-time [Quine]
     Full Idea: An account of events just in terms of physical bodies does not distinguish between events that happen to take up just the same portion of space-time. A man's whistling and walking would be identified with the same temporal segment of the man.
     From: Willard Quine (On Multiplying Entities [1974], p.260)
     A reaction: We wouldn't want to make his 'walking' and his 'strolling' two events. Whistling and walking are different because different objects are involved (lips and legs). Hence a man is not (ontologically) a single object.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Necessity could be just generalisation over classes, or (maybe) quantifying over possibilia [Quine]
     Full Idea: The need to add a note of necessity to 'all black crows are black' could be met by a generalisation over classes (what belongs to sets x and y belongs to y), or maybe be quantifying over possible particulars.
     From: Willard Quine (On Multiplying Entities [1974], p.262)
     A reaction: He dislikes the second strategy because 'unactualized particulars are an obscure and troublesome lot'. The second is the strategy of Lewis. I think necessity starts to creep back in as soon as you ask WHY a generalisation holds true.
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
De re necessity arises from the way the world is [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: A necessary truth is 'de re' if its necessity arises from the way the world is.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], VII.6)
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
We must assess the truth of beliefs in identifying them [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: We cannot determine what someone's beliefs are independently of assessing to some extent the truth or falsity of the beliefs.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], X.4)
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Defeat relativism by emphasising truth and reference, not meaning [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: The challenge of incommensurability can be met once it is realised that in comparing theories the notions of truth and reference are more important than that of meaning.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.6)
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
A full understanding of 'yellow' involves some theory [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: A full grasp of the concept '…is yellow' involves coming to accept as true bits of theory; that is, generalisations involving the term 'yellow'.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], II.2)
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 5. Anomalies
All theories contain anomalies, and so are falsified! [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: According to Feyerabend all theories are born falsified, because no theory has ever been totally free of anomalies.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], III.9)
The anomaly of Uranus didn't destroy Newton's mechanics - it led to Neptune's discovery [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: When scientists observed the motion of Uranus, they did not give up on Newtonian mechanics. Instead they posited the existence of Neptune.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], III.9)
Anomalies are judged against rival theories, and support for the current theory [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: Whether to reject an anomaly has to be decided on the basis of the availability of a rival theory, and on the basis of the positive evidence for the theory in question.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], III.9)
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Why should it matter whether or not a theory is scientific? [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: Why should it be so important to distinguish between theories that are scientific and those that are not?
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], IV.3)
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
If theories are really incommensurable, we could believe them all [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: If theories are genuinely incommensurable why should I be faced with the problem of choosing between them? Why not believe them all?
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], VII.1)
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
When the Buddha reached the highest level of insight, he could detect no self in the world [Ashvaghosha]
     Full Idea: The great Buddha passed through the eight stages of Transic insight, and quickly reached their highest point. From the summit of the world downwards he could detect no self anywhere.
     From: Ashvaghosha (Buddhacarita [c.50], XIV)
     A reaction: In the manner of Nietzsche, I am inclined to say that they find what they want to find, because that is their value. They want to get rid of the self, and dream of a mode in which existence continues without it. Is Buddhism opposed to human life?
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Explaining an action is showing that it is rational [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: To explain an action as an action is to show that it is rational.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], X.2)
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 3. Buddhism
The first stage of trance is calm amidst applied and discursive thinking [Ashvaghosha]
     Full Idea: The first stage of trance is calm amidst applied and discursive thinking.
     From: Ashvaghosha (Buddhacarita [c.50], V.11)
     A reaction: Personally I am not sure that I would want to go any further that the first stage, since the elimination of discursive thinking seems to me to be approaching death. To pursue intense thinking very calmly I take to be the ideal of all western philosophers.
The Buddha sought ultimate reality and the final goal of existence in his meditations [Ashvaghosha]
     Full Idea: Next the Boddhisatva, possessed of great skill in Transic meditation, put himself into a trance, intent on discerning both the ultimate reality of things and the final goal of existence.
     From: Ashvaghosha (Buddhacarita [c.50], XIV.2)
     A reaction: The ontological and teleological goals of the Buddha were identical to the goals of the ancient Greek philosophers, and even we have teleological aims in our study of evolution. I would expect better results from the western approach.