57 ideas
24146 | All the major problems were formulated before Socrates [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: All the major problems were formulated before Socrates. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[064]) | |
A reaction: So much for it all being 'footnotes to Plato'! Nietzsche's lectures on the pre-Socratics are in print. Given how little survives, this idea is surprising. Nietzsche knew enough to infer a lot of what is lost. |
24142 | What matters is how humans can be developed [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: What can be made out of humans: this is what matters to superior human beings. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[435]) | |
A reaction: That seems to sum up the main aim of Nietzsche's philosophy. What would we then do if the aim was somehow achieved? Does he seriously think that one magnificent ubermensch could achieve this aim? |
24143 | Thinkers might agree some provisional truths, as methodological assumptions [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: It is sufficient if we [thinkers] come to agree about a totality of methodological presuppositions - about 'provisional truths' that we want to use as a guideline for our work. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[449]) | |
A reaction: Descartes attempted this. Maybe Frege is another attempt. Husserl, perhaps? Parmenides? Hume? Lewis? It is hard to imagine Nietzsche joining in a professional consensus! He has just rejected systems. |
24125 | Aristotle enjoyed the sham generalities of a system, as the peak of happiness! [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Aristotle probably had his best moments when he coldly and clearly (and joyfully) enjoyed the sensual sham of the highest generalities. To perceive the world as a system, and as the pinnacle of human happiness: how the schematic mind betrays itself then! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[017]) | |
A reaction: Painful, this. One of my heroes laughing at the other one. I love systems, and love John Richardson's suggestion that Nietzsche was very systematice, despite his protestations. |
3870 | The real problem of science is how to choose between possible explanations [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: Once we move beyond investigating correlations between observables the question of what does or should guide our choice between alternative explanatory accounts becomes problematic. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], IX.2) |
3859 | We do not wish merely to predict, we also want to explain [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: We do not wish merely to predict, we also want to explain. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], II.3) |
3853 | For science to be rational, we must explain scientific change rationally [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: We are only justified in regarding scientific practice as the very paradigm of rationality if we can justify the claim that scientific change is rationally explicable. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.2) |
3854 | Positivists hold that theoretical terms change, but observation terms don't [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: For positivists it was taken that while theory change meant change in the meaning of theoretical terms, the meaning of observational terms was invariant under theory change. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.4) |
3855 | Critics attack positivist division between theory and observation [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: The critics of positivism attacked the conception of a dichotomy between theory and observation. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.4) |
24147 | Thoughts are uncertain, and are just occasions for interpretation [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: A thought is not taken to be immediately certain, but rather a sign, a question mark. That each thought is initially ambiguous and fluctuating, and is in itself only an occasion for multiple interpretations …is experienced by every deep observer. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[092]) | |
A reaction: This idea makes me a little more sympathetic to the hermeneutic view of philosophy, as endless interpretations. I assumed it only referred to texts. A thought is not a done deal, but an occasion for further thought. He says the same of feelings. |
3869 | More truthful theories have greater predictive power [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: If a theory is a better approximation to the truth, then it is likely that it will have greater predictive power. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], VIII.8) |
3861 | Theories generate infinite truths and falsehoods, so they cannot be used to assess probability [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: We cannot explicate a useful notion of verisimilitude in terms of the number of truths and the number of falsehoods generated by a theory, because they are infinite. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], III.4) |
17325 | Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence [Liggins] |
Full Idea: My charge is that truth-maker theory cannot be integrated into an attractive general account of non-causal dependence. | |
From: David Liggins (Truth-makers and dependence [2012], 10.6) | |
A reaction: [You'll have to read Liggins to see why] |
17318 | Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths? [Liggins] |
Full Idea: Many philosophers agree that true existential propositions have a truth-maker, but some go further, claiming that every true proposition has a truth-maker. More cautious theorists specify a class of truths, such as synthetic propositions. | |
From: David Liggins (Truth-makers and dependence [2012], 10.1) | |
A reaction: [compressed; Armstrong is the ambitious one, and Rodriguez-Pereyra proposes the synthetic propositions] Presumably synthetic propositions can make negative assertions, which are problematic for truth-makers. |
24137 | Mathematics is just accurate inferences from definitions, and doesn't involve objects [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Mathematics contains axioms (definitions) and conclusions from definitions. Its objects do not exist. The truth of its conclusions rests on the accuracy of logical thought. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[307]) | |
A reaction: Not suprising to find Nietzsche defying platonism. This is evidence that he was a systematic philosopher, who knew mathematics could be a challenge to his naturalism. |
24131 | There is no 'being'; it is just the opposition to nothingness [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: 'Being' is unprovable, because there is no 'being'. The concept of being is formed out of the opposition to 'nothingness'. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[185]) | |
A reaction: Presumably a comment on Hegel's most basic idea. I find both thoughts bewildering. 'Being' is just a generalised (and unhelpful) way of referring to the self-evident existence of stuff. |
17320 | Either p is true or not-p is true, so something is true, so something exists [Liggins] |
Full Idea: Either p or not-p. If p, then the proposition 'p' is true. If not p, then the proposition 'not p' is true. Either way, something is true. Thus something exists. | |
From: David Liggins (Truth-makers and dependence [2012], 10.3 n5) | |
A reaction: Liggins offers this dodgy argument as an objection to conceptual truths having truth-makers. |
17326 | The dependence of {Socrates} on Socrates involves a set and a philosopher, not facts [Liggins] |
Full Idea: The dependence of {Socrates} on Socrates appears to involve a set and a philosopher, neither of which is a fact. | |
From: David Liggins (Truth-makers and dependence [2012], 10.6) | |
A reaction: He points out that defenders of facts as the basis of dependence could find a suitable factual paraphrase here. Socrates is just Socrates, but the singleton has to be understood in a particular way to generate the dependence. |
17327 | Non-causal dependence is at present only dimly understood [Liggins] |
Full Idea: Non-causal dependence is at present only dimly understood. | |
From: David Liggins (Truth-makers and dependence [2012], 10.8) | |
A reaction: Not very helpful, you may be thinking, but it is always helpful to know where we have got to in the enquiry. |
17322 | Necessities supervene on everything, but don't depend on everything [Liggins] |
Full Idea: Necessities supervene upon everything, but they do not depend on everything. | |
From: David Liggins (Truth-makers and dependence [2012], 10.4) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure if merely existing together counts as sufficiently close to be 'supervenience'. If 2+2 necessitates 4, that hardly seems to 'supervene' on the Eiffel Tower. If so, how close must things be to qualify for supervenience? |
24151 | I only want thinking that is anchored in body, senses and earth [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: I am not interested …in ways of thinking that are not anchored in the body and the senses and in the earth. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[352]) | |
A reaction: Exhibit A for Nietzsche as Naturalist. Indeed, this could be a manifesto for the whole school. I totally and completely and utterly agree with Nietzsche's assertion!. I see the 'anchor' as two-way: thought connects to earth, and thought arises from it. |
3867 | De re necessity arises from the way the world is [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: A necessary truth is 'de re' if its necessity arises from the way the world is. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], VII.6) |
24150 | We can only understand through concepts, which subsume particulars in generalities [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We have only one form of understanding - concept, the more general case that subsumes the particular case. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[156]) | |
A reaction: This is precisely Aristotle's problem with scientific explanation - that we aim to understand each particular, but accounts and definitions have to be expressed with universals. |
3872 | We must assess the truth of beliefs in identifying them [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: We cannot determine what someone's beliefs are independently of assessing to some extent the truth or falsity of the beliefs. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], X.4) |
24138 | Strongly believed a priori is not certain; it may just be a feature of our existence [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: What we believe the most, everything a priori, is not for that reason more certain, just because it is so strongly believed. Rather, it is perhaps a consequence of the condition for the existence of our species. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[307]) | |
A reaction: This is in defiance of Leibniz and Kant. His proposed explanation is not very convincing. Russell agreed with Nietzsche. |
24130 | An affirmative belief is present in every basic sense impression [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Belief is already present in every sense impression going back to the very moment it begins: a kind of Yes-saying first intellectual activity! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[168]) | |
A reaction: He seems right that there is an intrinsic commitment to believing sense impressions, even in animals. Presumably more of a default setting than an intellectual choice. |
24124 | We now have innumerable perspectives to draw on [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We have been granted perspectives in all directions, broader than any humans have ever been granted, everywhere we look there is no end in sight. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[013]) | |
A reaction: Clearly perspectivism is not the simple relativism of being trapped in our own private perspective. What strikes me as missing from Nietzsche's brief thoughts is the question of consensus, and even rational and objective consensus. |
3857 | Defeat relativism by emphasising truth and reference, not meaning [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: The challenge of incommensurability can be met once it is realised that in comparing theories the notions of truth and reference are more important than that of meaning. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.6) |
3858 | A full understanding of 'yellow' involves some theory [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: A full grasp of the concept '…is yellow' involves coming to accept as true bits of theory; that is, generalisations involving the term 'yellow'. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], II.2) |
3862 | All theories contain anomalies, and so are falsified! [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: According to Feyerabend all theories are born falsified, because no theory has ever been totally free of anomalies. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], III.9) |
3863 | The anomaly of Uranus didn't destroy Newton's mechanics - it led to Neptune's discovery [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: When scientists observed the motion of Uranus, they did not give up on Newtonian mechanics. Instead they posited the existence of Neptune. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], III.9) |
3864 | Anomalies are judged against rival theories, and support for the current theory [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: Whether to reject an anomaly has to be decided on the basis of the availability of a rival theory, and on the basis of the positive evidence for the theory in question. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], III.9) |
3865 | Why should it matter whether or not a theory is scientific? [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: Why should it be so important to distinguish between theories that are scientific and those that are not? | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], IV.3) |
3866 | If theories are really incommensurable, we could believe them all [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: If theories are genuinely incommensurable why should I be faced with the problem of choosing between them? Why not believe them all? | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], VII.1) |
17324 | 'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation [Liggins] |
Full Idea: 'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation. | |
From: David Liggins (Truth-makers and dependence [2012], 10.5) | |
A reaction: Aristotle starts from words like 'why?', but it can be a deceptive approach to explanation. |
17321 | Value, constitution and realisation are non-causal dependences that explain [Liggins] |
Full Idea: 'It is wrong because it produces pain for fun', and 'these constitute a table because they are arranged tablewise', and 'tea is poisonous because it contains arsenic' are clearly non-causal uses of 'because', and neither are they conceptual. | |
From: David Liggins (Truth-makers and dependence [2012], 10.4) | |
A reaction: The general line seems to be that any form of determination will underwrite an explanation. He talks later of the 'wrongmaker' and 'poisonmaker' relationships to add to the 'truthmaker'. The table example is the 'object-maker' dependence relation. |
17323 | If explanations track dependence, then 'determinative' explanations seem to exist [Liggins] |
Full Idea: If explanation often tracks dependence, then we have a theoretical reason to expect such explanations to exist. Let us call such explanations 'determinative'. | |
From: David Liggins (Truth-makers and dependence [2012], 10.4) | |
A reaction: There seems to be an emerging understanding that this 'determination' relation is central to all of explanation - with causal explanations, for example, being a particular instance of it. I like it. These are real, not conventional, explanations. |
24145 | Mind is a mechanism of abstraction and simplification, aimed at control [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The entire cognitive mechanism is a mechanism of abstraction and simplification - not aimed at knowing, but taking control of things. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[061]) | |
A reaction: It is my view that we can explain our metaphysics in this way, though I am more realist than Nietzsche, because I think the world has created these capacities within us, so they fit the world. To control, you must know. |
24144 | A cognitive mechanism wanting to know itself is absurd! [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: A cognitive mechanism that wants to know itself!! We definitely should have moved beyond this absurd goal! (The stomach that consumes itself! -) | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[018]) | |
A reaction: We see his point, but Nietzsche learns a huge amount about himself by introspection. To know the Self is a cat chasing its tail. I don't have to leave England to study England. |
24139 | A 'person' is just one possible abstraction from a bundle of qualities [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Individuals contain many more persons than they think. 'Person' is merely a point of emphasis, synopsis of characteristics and qualities | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[363]) | |
A reaction: He makes similar remarks abour character. For Locke 'person'' is a forensic and legal concept, and so must be enduring and unique. |
24133 | I have perfected fatalism, as recurrence and denial of the will [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: I have perfected fatalism, through eternal recurrence and preexistence, and through the elimination of the concept 'will'. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[214]) | |
A reaction: 'Amor fati' - love of fate - was his oft repeated slogan. We can all understand 'go with the flow', but I'm not sure about anything more universal than that. |
24152 | Fate is inspiring, if you understand you are part of it [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Fate is an inspiring thought for those who understand that they are part of it. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[442]) | |
A reaction: Sounds a bit like the Niagara Falls being inspiring if you are being swept over it. I find the possibility of fatalism neutral, rather than inspiring. |
24129 | We start with images, then words, and then concepts, to which emotions attach [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Images first, the words applied to images. Finally concepts, not possible until there are words a summary of many images. When see similar images for which there is one word - this weak emotion is the common element, the foundation of the concept. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[168]) | |
A reaction: Unusual to have an account of the origin of concepts in 1884. His theory entails that animals can't have concepts, but presumably they can combine images, and hence recognise things. I think he is wrong, but interestng. Mental files. |
3871 | Explaining an action is showing that it is rational [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: To explain an action as an action is to show that it is rational. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], X.2) |
24127 | Judging actions by intentions - like judging painters by their thoughts! [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: To judge people by intentions! That would be like classifying artists, not according to their paintings, but according to their visions! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[119]) | |
A reaction: What is wrong is to judge an action by any simple single principle. Our nuanced attitude to excuses shows the true complexity of it. 'I didn't mean to do that'. |
24149 | Values need a perspective, of preserving some aspect of life [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: All value judgements involve a particular perspective: preservation of the individual, a community, a race, a state, a church, a belief, a culture. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[119]) | |
A reaction: This chimes in with my Aristotelian view of value, as arising out of the thing valued, rather than descending on it from outside. I think more than mere 'preservaation' is at stake. Fostering, cherishing. |
24148 | If you love something, it is connected with everything, so all must be affirmed as good [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: To appreciate and love anything, I must understand it as absolutely necessarily connected with everything that is - therefore I must affirm the goodness of all existence for its own sake. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[117]) | |
A reaction: For those of you out there imagining that Nietzsche was a nihilist…… It's a plausible idea. You could hardly love your dog, but hate the whole universe. A true misanthrope would struggle to love one exceptional person. |
24135 | Egoism should not assume that all egos are equal [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Egoism! But no one has ever asked: what kind of ego! Instead, every person automatically assumes that the ego of every ego is equal. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[287]) | |
A reaction: This is his first step in his defence of some form of egoism. Presumably 'higher' people should be egoists, and the rest should join the herd. |
24132 | After Socrates virtue is misunderstood, as good for all, not for individuals [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: From Socrates onwards arete [virtue] is misunderstood - first it had to reestablish itself over and over, and yet it did not want to do this on an individual basis! But rather tyrannically 'good for all!'. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[208]) | |
A reaction: Why not both? The virtues of a good citizen can't be private, but we are all allowed to develop virtues that concern us alone. |
24126 | We contain multitudes of characters, which can brought into the open [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: There is a multitude of characters hidden within each one of us: and attempts should be made to allow some of them to appear. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[021]) | |
A reaction: So character is not fate, contrary to Heraclitus (his hero). We are more inclined now to see varied characters as social roles (as in Irving Goffman). This idea challenges it, with our intrinsic nature containing variety. |
24136 | Who can endure the thought of eternal recurrence? [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: I conduct the great test: who will endure the thought of eternal recurrence? | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[290]) | |
A reaction: He sometimes talks as if eternal recurrence were a cosmic fact, but we should definitely ignore that. This idea captures his idea best, I think - that we should try to live with the prospect of recurrence always in mind. A type of existentialism. |
24154 | If you want one experience repeated, you must want all of them [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Whoever wants to have a single experience again must want all of them again. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 29[054]) | |
A reaction: Nehemas says this is the main factual commitment of eternal recurrence (and certainly not that global recurrence actually occurs). It might be expressed in terms of possible worlds. We yearn for recurrence, then dread it? |
24153 | Humans are determined by community, so its preservation is their most valued drive [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: If a community is what absolutely determines the nature of humans, then the drive that allows the community to be preserved will be most forcefully developed in them. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 27[030]) | |
A reaction: Nietzsche was a loner, who despised 'the herd' and its dull 'good and evil', but humans are obviously social creatures, who need to raise families, so it seems perverse to despise the values this requires. Note the Marxist view of human nature. |
24134 | There is always slavery, whether we like it or not [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: In truth there is always slavery - whether you want it or not; e.g. Prussian officials. Scholars. Monks. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[225]) | |
A reaction: Not very persuasive examples. Monks are free to join and to leave. Maybe a lot of marriages are close to slavery for one side (usually the woman). Strict slavery has almost ceased in western civilisation (I think!). Nietzsche saw 'the herd' as slaves. |
24128 | After history following God, or a people, or an idea, we now see it in terms of animals [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Earlier we sought God's intentions in history: then an unconscious purposefulness, in a people or an idea. Only recently are we considering the history of animals, and the first insight is that no plan has so far existed. Coincidences have been dominant. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[127]) | |
A reaction: Not a Whig historian then! Presumably Hegel is his main target. In 2024 there is a definite feeling that western democracies are regressing. |
24140 | Cause and effect is a hypothesis, based on our supposed willing of actions [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Cause and effect is not a truth but rather a hypothesis - and indeed the one which we use to anthropomorphise the world for ourselves, bringing it in closer proximity to our feelings ('willing' is projected into it). | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[371]) | |
A reaction: That is (I think), we read the gap between thought and action onto natural external events, dividing them up. We treat the flow of events as if they were agent causation. Modern theories seem close to Nietzsche's unified view. |
24141 | Having a sense of time presupposes absolute time [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Our derivation of the sense of time etc. still presupposes time as absolute. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[406]) | |
A reaction: 'Etc.'? I suppose this is meant to pre-empt whatever Bergson might have been planning to say. The idea that time actually is subjective strikes as very wrong. Whether physicists can reduce time to something else is above my pay scale. |