30 ideas
3853 | For science to be rational, we must explain scientific change rationally [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: We are only justified in regarding scientific practice as the very paradigm of rationality if we can justify the claim that scientific change is rationally explicable. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.2) |
3859 | We do not wish merely to predict, we also want to explain [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: We do not wish merely to predict, we also want to explain. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], II.3) |
3870 | The real problem of science is how to choose between possible explanations [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: Once we move beyond investigating correlations between observables the question of what does or should guide our choice between alternative explanatory accounts becomes problematic. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], IX.2) |
3855 | Critics attack positivist division between theory and observation [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: The critics of positivism attacked the conception of a dichotomy between theory and observation. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.4) |
3854 | Positivists hold that theoretical terms change, but observation terms don't [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: For positivists it was taken that while theory change meant change in the meaning of theoretical terms, the meaning of observational terms was invariant under theory change. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.4) |
8623 | Proof reveals the interdependence of truths, as well as showing their certainty [Euclid, by Frege] |
Full Idea: Euclid gives proofs of many things which anyone would concede to him without question. ...The aim of proof is not merely to place the truth of a proposition beyond doubt, but also to afford us insight into the dependence of truths upon one another. | |
From: report of Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by Gottlob Frege - Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) §02 | |
A reaction: This connects nicely with Shoemaker's view of analysis (Idea 8559), which I will adopt as my general view. I've always thought of philosophy as the aspiration to wisdom through the cartography of concepts. |
3869 | More truthful theories have greater predictive power [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: If a theory is a better approximation to the truth, then it is likely that it will have greater predictive power. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], VIII.8) |
3861 | Theories generate infinite truths and falsehoods, so they cannot be used to assess probability [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: We cannot explicate a useful notion of verisimilitude in terms of the number of truths and the number of falsehoods generated by a theory, because they are infinite. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], III.4) |
13907 | If you pick an arbitrary triangle, things proved of it are true of all triangles [Euclid, by Lemmon] |
Full Idea: Euclid begins proofs about all triangles with 'let ABC be a triangle', but ABC is not a proper name. It names an arbitrarily selected triangle, and if that has a property, then we can conclude that all triangles have the property. | |
From: report of Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by E.J. Lemmon - Beginning Logic 3.2 | |
A reaction: Lemmon adds the proviso that there must be no hidden assumptions about the triangle we have selected. You must generalise the properties too. Pick a triangle, any triangle, say one with three angles of 60 degrees; now generalise from it. |
6297 | Euclid's geometry is synthetic, but Descartes produced an analytic version of it [Euclid, by Resnik] |
Full Idea: Euclid's geometry is a synthetic geometry; Descartes supplied an analytic version of Euclid's geometry, and we now have analytic versions of the early non-Euclidean geometries. | |
From: report of Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by Michael D. Resnik - Maths as a Science of Patterns One.4 | |
A reaction: I take it that the original Euclidean axioms were observations about the nature of space, but Descartes turned them into a set of pure interlocking definitions which could still function if space ceased to exist. |
9603 | An assumption that there is a largest prime leads to a contradiction [Euclid, by Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: Assume a largest prime, then multiply the primes together and add one. The new number isn't prime, because we assumed a largest prime; but it can't be divided by a prime, because the remainder is one. So only a larger prime could divide it. Contradiction. | |
From: report of Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch.1 | |
A reaction: Not only a very elegant mathematical argument, but a model for how much modern logic proceeds, by assuming that the proposition is false, and then deducing a contradiction from it. |
9894 | A unit is that according to which each existing thing is said to be one [Euclid] |
Full Idea: A unit is that according to which each existing thing is said to be one. | |
From: Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE], 7 Def 1) | |
A reaction: See Frege's 'Grundlagen' §29-44 for a sustained critique of this. Frege is good, but there must be something right about the Euclid idea. If I count stone, paper and scissors as three, each must first qualify to be counted as one. Psychology creeps in. |
8738 | Postulate 2 says a line can be extended continuously [Euclid, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Euclid's Postulate 2 says the geometer can 'produce a finite straight line continuously in a straight line'. | |
From: report of Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 4.2 | |
A reaction: The point being that this takes infinity for granted, especially if you start counting how many points there are on the line. The Einstein idea that it might eventually come round and hit you on the back of the head would have charmed Euclid. |
22278 | Euclid relied on obvious properties in diagrams, as well as on his axioms [Potter on Euclid] |
Full Idea: Euclid's axioms were insufficient to derive all the theorems of geometry: at various points in his proofs he appealed to properties that are obvious from the diagrams but do not follow from the stated axioms. | |
From: comment on Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 03 'aim' | |
A reaction: I suppose if the axioms of a system are based on self-evidence, this would licence an appeal to self-evidence elsewhere in the system. Only pedants insist on writing down what is obvious to everyone! |
8673 | Euclid's parallel postulate defines unique non-intersecting parallel lines [Euclid, by Friend] |
Full Idea: Euclid's fifth 'parallel' postulate says if there is an infinite straight line and a point, then there is only one straight line through the point which won't intersect the first line. This axiom is independent of Euclid's first four (agreed) axioms. | |
From: report of Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 2.2 | |
A reaction: This postulate was challenged in the nineteenth century, which was a major landmark in the development of modern relativist views of knowledge. |
10250 | Euclid needs a principle of continuity, saying some lines must intersect [Shapiro on Euclid] |
Full Idea: Euclid gives no principle of continuity, which would sanction an inference that if a line goes from the outside of a circle to the inside of circle, then it must intersect the circle at some point. | |
From: comment on Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 6.1 n2 | |
A reaction: Cantor and Dedekind began to contemplate discontinuous lines. |
10302 | Euclid says we can 'join' two points, but Hilbert says the straight line 'exists' [Euclid, by Bernays] |
Full Idea: Euclid postulates: One can join two points by a straight line; Hilbert states the axiom: Given any two points, there exists a straight line on which both are situated. | |
From: report of Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by Paul Bernays - On Platonism in Mathematics p.259 |
14157 | Modern geometries only accept various parts of the Euclid propositions [Russell on Euclid] |
Full Idea: In descriptive geometry the first 26 propositions of Euclid hold. In projective geometry the 1st, 7th, 16th and 17th require modification (as a straight line is not a closed series). Those after 26 depend on the postulate of parallels, so aren't assumed. | |
From: comment on Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by Bertrand Russell - The Principles of Mathematics §388 |
1600 | Euclid's common notions or axioms are what we must have if we are to learn anything at all [Euclid, by Roochnik] |
Full Idea: The best known example of Euclid's 'common notions' is "If equals are subtracted from equals the remainders are equal". These can be called axioms, and are what "the man who is to learn anything whatever must have". | |
From: report of Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE], 72a17) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.149 |
3867 | De re necessity arises from the way the world is [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: A necessary truth is 'de re' if its necessity arises from the way the world is. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], VII.6) |
3872 | We must assess the truth of beliefs in identifying them [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: We cannot determine what someone's beliefs are independently of assessing to some extent the truth or falsity of the beliefs. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], X.4) |
3857 | Defeat relativism by emphasising truth and reference, not meaning [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: The challenge of incommensurability can be met once it is realised that in comparing theories the notions of truth and reference are more important than that of meaning. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.6) |
3858 | A full understanding of 'yellow' involves some theory [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: A full grasp of the concept '…is yellow' involves coming to accept as true bits of theory; that is, generalisations involving the term 'yellow'. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], II.2) |
3862 | All theories contain anomalies, and so are falsified! [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: According to Feyerabend all theories are born falsified, because no theory has ever been totally free of anomalies. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], III.9) |
3863 | The anomaly of Uranus didn't destroy Newton's mechanics - it led to Neptune's discovery [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: When scientists observed the motion of Uranus, they did not give up on Newtonian mechanics. Instead they posited the existence of Neptune. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], III.9) |
3864 | Anomalies are judged against rival theories, and support for the current theory [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: Whether to reject an anomaly has to be decided on the basis of the availability of a rival theory, and on the basis of the positive evidence for the theory in question. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], III.9) |
3865 | Why should it matter whether or not a theory is scientific? [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: Why should it be so important to distinguish between theories that are scientific and those that are not? | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], IV.3) |
3866 | If theories are really incommensurable, we could believe them all [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: If theories are genuinely incommensurable why should I be faced with the problem of choosing between them? Why not believe them all? | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], VII.1) |
8638 | Thomae's idea of abstract from peculiarities gives a general concept, and leaves the peculiarities [Frege on Thomae] |
Full Idea: When Thomae says "abstract from the peculiarities of the individual members of a set of items", or "disregard those characteristics which serve to distinguish them", we get a general concept under which they fall. The things keep their characteristics. | |
From: comment on C.J. Thomae (works [1869], §34) by Gottlob Frege - Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) §34 | |
A reaction: Interesting. You don't have to leave out their distinctive fur in order to count cats. But you have to focus on some aspect of them, because they aren't 'three meats'. |
3871 | Explaining an action is showing that it is rational [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: To explain an action as an action is to show that it is rational. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], X.2) |