Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Rationality of Science', 'Critique of the Gotha Program' and 'fragments/reports'

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
We do not wish merely to predict, we also want to explain [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: We do not wish merely to predict, we also want to explain.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], II.3)
The real problem of science is how to choose between possible explanations [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: Once we move beyond investigating correlations between observables the question of what does or should guide our choice between alternative explanatory accounts becomes problematic.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], IX.2)
For science to be rational, we must explain scientific change rationally [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: We are only justified in regarding scientific practice as the very paradigm of rationality if we can justify the claim that scientific change is rationally explicable.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.2)
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 2. Positivism
Critics attack positivist division between theory and observation [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: The critics of positivism attacked the conception of a dichotomy between theory and observation.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.4)
Positivists hold that theoretical terms change, but observation terms don't [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: For positivists it was taken that while theory change meant change in the meaning of theoretical terms, the meaning of observational terms was invariant under theory change.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.4)
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
More truthful theories have greater predictive power [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: If a theory is a better approximation to the truth, then it is likely that it will have greater predictive power.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], VIII.8)
Theories generate infinite truths and falsehoods, so they cannot be used to assess probability [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: We cannot explicate a useful notion of verisimilitude in terms of the number of truths and the number of falsehoods generated by a theory, because they are infinite.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], III.4)
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
De re necessity arises from the way the world is [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: A necessary truth is 'de re' if its necessity arises from the way the world is.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], VII.6)
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
We must assess the truth of beliefs in identifying them [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: We cannot determine what someone's beliefs are independently of assessing to some extent the truth or falsity of the beliefs.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], X.4)
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
A false object might give the same presentation as a true one [Arcesilaus, by Cicero]
     Full Idea: Arcesilaus said that no presentation proceeding from a true object is such that a presentation proceeding from a false one might not also be of the same form. This is the one argument that has held the field down to the present day.
     From: report of Arcesilaus (fragments/reports [c.275 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - Academica II.24.77
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Defeat relativism by emphasising truth and reference, not meaning [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: The challenge of incommensurability can be met once it is realised that in comparing theories the notions of truth and reference are more important than that of meaning.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.6)
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
A full understanding of 'yellow' involves some theory [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: A full grasp of the concept '…is yellow' involves coming to accept as true bits of theory; that is, generalisations involving the term 'yellow'.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], II.2)
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 5. Anomalies
All theories contain anomalies, and so are falsified! [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: According to Feyerabend all theories are born falsified, because no theory has ever been totally free of anomalies.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], III.9)
The anomaly of Uranus didn't destroy Newton's mechanics - it led to Neptune's discovery [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: When scientists observed the motion of Uranus, they did not give up on Newtonian mechanics. Instead they posited the existence of Neptune.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], III.9)
Anomalies are judged against rival theories, and support for the current theory [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: Whether to reject an anomaly has to be decided on the basis of the availability of a rival theory, and on the basis of the positive evidence for the theory in question.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], III.9)
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Why should it matter whether or not a theory is scientific? [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: Why should it be so important to distinguish between theories that are scientific and those that are not?
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], IV.3)
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
If theories are really incommensurable, we could believe them all [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: If theories are genuinely incommensurable why should I be faced with the problem of choosing between them? Why not believe them all?
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], VII.1)
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Explaining an action is showing that it is rational [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: To explain an action as an action is to show that it is rational.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], X.2)
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
In moving from capitalism to communism a revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat is needed [Marx]
     Full Idea: Between the capitalist and communist society lies the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. Corresponding to this is a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.
     From: Karl Marx (Critique of the Gotha Program [1875], IV)
     A reaction: This hugely influential idea was catastrophic for the twentieth century, because the leaders of the proletarian dictatorship adored and abused the power, and wouldn't give it up for some feeble next stage.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
From each according to his ability, to each according to his need [Marx]
     Full Idea: From each according to his ability, to each according to his need.
     From: Karl Marx (Critique of the Gotha Program [1875]), quoted by Peter Singer - Marx 9
     A reaction: Singer says this was not original to Marx, and he placed little emphasis on it. The obvious capitalist response is to ask how you will motivate someone who has huge abilities but few needs. It implies huge inequalities of altruism.
People who only have their labour power are the slaves of those permitting them to work [Marx]
     Full Idea: The man who possesses no other property than his labour power must, in all conditions of society and culture, be the slave of other men who have made themselves the owners of the material conditions of labour. He can only work with their permission.
     From: Karl Marx (Critique of the Gotha Program [1875], I)
     A reaction: In a world of vast multinationals, the person giving the permission to work is nearly always dependent on some higher level permission. In any sort of society people can only work with the consensus of other people.
Freedom is making the state subordinate to its society [Marx]
     Full Idea: Freedom consists in converting the state from an organ superimposed on society into one completely subordinate to it.
     From: Karl Marx (Critique of the Gotha Program [1875], IV)
     A reaction: The intermediate stage is dictatorship of the proletariat (presumably exercised by the communist leadership). No twentieth century marxist state ever got near the freedom which Marx was seeking. A liberal society might achieve it!
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 2. Freedom of belief
Bourgeois 'freedom of conscience' just tolerates all sorts of religious intolerance [Marx]
     Full Idea: Bourgeois 'freedom of conscience' is just the toleration of all possible kinds of religious unfreedom of conscience, and the workers' party should endeavour to liberate the conscience from the witchery of religion.
     From: Karl Marx (Critique of the Gotha Program [1875], IV)
     A reaction: We see this in modern 'faith' schools in the UK, which do not seem to be required to live up to the standards of freedom of belief expected in the rest of a liberal society.