24 ideas
8011 | Aristotle is a buffoon who has misled the Church [Luther, by MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: Aristotle is a buffoon who has misled the Church. | |
From: report of Martin Luther (talk [1525]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.10 | |
A reaction: Before he became famous, Luther was a university lecturer on Aristotle. This remark was a hundred years before philosophers began serious criticism of Aristotle. Presumably Protestants just stopped reading him. |
3859 | We do not wish merely to predict, we also want to explain [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: We do not wish merely to predict, we also want to explain. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], II.3) |
3870 | The real problem of science is how to choose between possible explanations [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: Once we move beyond investigating correlations between observables the question of what does or should guide our choice between alternative explanatory accounts becomes problematic. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], IX.2) |
3853 | For science to be rational, we must explain scientific change rationally [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: We are only justified in regarding scientific practice as the very paradigm of rationality if we can justify the claim that scientific change is rationally explicable. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.2) |
3855 | Critics attack positivist division between theory and observation [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: The critics of positivism attacked the conception of a dichotomy between theory and observation. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.4) |
3854 | Positivists hold that theoretical terms change, but observation terms don't [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: For positivists it was taken that while theory change meant change in the meaning of theoretical terms, the meaning of observational terms was invariant under theory change. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.4) |
3869 | More truthful theories have greater predictive power [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: If a theory is a better approximation to the truth, then it is likely that it will have greater predictive power. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], VIII.8) |
3861 | Theories generate infinite truths and falsehoods, so they cannot be used to assess probability [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: We cannot explicate a useful notion of verisimilitude in terms of the number of truths and the number of falsehoods generated by a theory, because they are infinite. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], III.4) |
11022 | Gentzen introduced a natural deduction calculus (NK) in 1934 [Gentzen, by Read] |
Full Idea: Gentzen introduced a natural deduction calculus (NK) in 1934. | |
From: report of Gerhard Gentzen (works [1938]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.8 |
11065 | The inferential role of a logical constant constitutes its meaning [Gentzen, by Hanna] |
Full Idea: Gentzen argued that the inferential role of a logical constant constitutes its meaning. | |
From: report of Gerhard Gentzen (works [1938]) by Robert Hanna - Rationality and Logic 5.3 | |
A reaction: Possibly inspired by Wittgenstein's theory of meaning as use? This idea was the target of Prior's famous connective 'tonk', which has the role of implying anything you like, proving sentences which are not logical consequences. |
11023 | The logical connectives are 'defined' by their introduction rules [Gentzen] |
Full Idea: The introduction rules represent, as it were, the 'definitions' of the symbols concerned, and the elimination rules are no more, in the final analysis, than the consequences of these definitions. | |
From: Gerhard Gentzen (works [1938]), quoted by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.8 | |
A reaction: If an introduction-rule (or a truth table) were taken as fixed and beyond dispute, then it would have the status of a definition, since there would be nothing else to appeal to. So is there anything else to appeal to here? |
11213 | Each logical symbol has an 'introduction' rule to define it, and hence an 'elimination' rule [Gentzen] |
Full Idea: To every logical symbol there belongs precisely one inference figure which 'introduces' the symbol ..and one which 'eliminates' it. The introductions represent the 'definitions' of the symbols concerned, and eliminations are consequences of these. | |
From: Gerhard Gentzen (works [1938], II.5.13), quoted by Ian Rumfitt - "Yes" and "No" III | |
A reaction: [1935 paper] This passage is famous, in laying down the basics of natural deduction systems of logic (ones using only rules, and avoiding axioms). Rumfitt questions whether Gentzen's account gives the sense of the connectives. |
10067 | Gentzen proved the consistency of arithmetic from assumptions beyond arithmetic [Gentzen, by Musgrave] |
Full Idea: Gentzen proved the consistency of arithmetic from assumptions which transcend arithmetic. | |
From: report of Gerhard Gentzen (works [1938]) by Alan Musgrave - Logicism Revisited §5 | |
A reaction: This does not contradict Gödel's famous result, but reinforces it. The interesting question is what assumptions Gentzen felt he had to make. |
3867 | De re necessity arises from the way the world is [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: A necessary truth is 'de re' if its necessity arises from the way the world is. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], VII.6) |
3872 | We must assess the truth of beliefs in identifying them [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: We cannot determine what someone's beliefs are independently of assessing to some extent the truth or falsity of the beliefs. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], X.4) |
3857 | Defeat relativism by emphasising truth and reference, not meaning [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: The challenge of incommensurability can be met once it is realised that in comparing theories the notions of truth and reference are more important than that of meaning. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.6) |
3858 | A full understanding of 'yellow' involves some theory [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: A full grasp of the concept '…is yellow' involves coming to accept as true bits of theory; that is, generalisations involving the term 'yellow'. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], II.2) |
3862 | All theories contain anomalies, and so are falsified! [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: According to Feyerabend all theories are born falsified, because no theory has ever been totally free of anomalies. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], III.9) |
3863 | The anomaly of Uranus didn't destroy Newton's mechanics - it led to Neptune's discovery [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: When scientists observed the motion of Uranus, they did not give up on Newtonian mechanics. Instead they posited the existence of Neptune. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], III.9) |
3864 | Anomalies are judged against rival theories, and support for the current theory [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: Whether to reject an anomaly has to be decided on the basis of the availability of a rival theory, and on the basis of the positive evidence for the theory in question. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], III.9) |
3865 | Why should it matter whether or not a theory is scientific? [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: Why should it be so important to distinguish between theories that are scientific and those that are not? | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], IV.3) |
3866 | If theories are really incommensurable, we could believe them all [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: If theories are genuinely incommensurable why should I be faced with the problem of choosing between them? Why not believe them all? | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], VII.1) |
3871 | Explaining an action is showing that it is rational [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: To explain an action as an action is to show that it is rational. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], X.2) |
6609 | With respect to religion, reason is a blind whore [Luther] |
Full Idea: With respect to the mysteries of the Christian religion, reason is a blind whore. | |
From: Martin Luther (talk [1525]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason n4.2 | |
A reaction: Reason is presumably a blind whore with respect to all impenetrable mysteries. Since the reason of Aquinas endorsed the mysteries of Christianity, the remark seems a bit strong, but it is appropriate if you think that only faith (in Christianity) matters. |