26 ideas
19259 | If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya] |
Full Idea: Chalmers' two-dimensional conceivability account of possibility offers a defence of a priori conceptual analysis, and foundations on which a priori philosophy can be furthered. | |
From: Anand Vaidya (Understanding and Essence [2010], Intro) | |
A reaction: I think I prefer Williamson's more scientific account of possibility through counterfactual conceivability, rather than Chalmers' optimistic a priori account. Deep topic, though, and the jury is still out. |
3859 | We do not wish merely to predict, we also want to explain [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: We do not wish merely to predict, we also want to explain. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], II.3) |
3853 | For science to be rational, we must explain scientific change rationally [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: We are only justified in regarding scientific practice as the very paradigm of rationality if we can justify the claim that scientific change is rationally explicable. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.2) |
3870 | The real problem of science is how to choose between possible explanations [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: Once we move beyond investigating correlations between observables the question of what does or should guide our choice between alternative explanatory accounts becomes problematic. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], IX.2) |
3855 | Critics attack positivist division between theory and observation [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: The critics of positivism attacked the conception of a dichotomy between theory and observation. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.4) |
3854 | Positivists hold that theoretical terms change, but observation terms don't [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: For positivists it was taken that while theory change meant change in the meaning of theoretical terms, the meaning of observational terms was invariant under theory change. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.4) |
1489 | Modern philosophy tends to be a theory-constructing extension of science, but there is also problem-solving [Nagel] |
Full Idea: Philosophy is now dominated by a spirit of theory construction which sees philosophy as continuous with science, but the other problem-centred style is still in existence and it is important to keep it alive. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (The Philosophical Culture [1995], §6) |
3869 | More truthful theories have greater predictive power [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: If a theory is a better approximation to the truth, then it is likely that it will have greater predictive power. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], VIII.8) |
3861 | Theories generate infinite truths and falsehoods, so they cannot be used to assess probability [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: We cannot explicate a useful notion of verisimilitude in terms of the number of truths and the number of falsehoods generated by a theory, because they are infinite. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], III.4) |
19262 | Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya] |
Full Idea: When P is an essence of O it follows that P is a necessary property of O. However, P can be a necessary property of O without being an essence of O. | |
From: Anand Vaidya (Understanding and Essence [2010], 'Knowledge') | |
A reaction: This summarises the Kit Fine view with which I sympathise. However, I dislike presenting essence as a mere list of properties, which is only done for the convenience of logicians. But was Jessie Owens a great athlete after he lost his speed? |
3867 | De re necessity arises from the way the world is [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: A necessary truth is 'de re' if its necessity arises from the way the world is. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], VII.6) |
19267 | Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya] |
Full Idea: Conceivability as evidence for possibility needs four interpretations. How is 'conceivable' defined or explained? How strongly is the idea endorsed? How does inconceivability fit in? And what kind of possibility (logical, physical etc) is implied? | |
From: Anand Vaidya (Understanding and Essence [2010], 'Application') | |
A reaction: [some compression] Williamson's counterfactual account helps with the first one. The strength largely depends on whether your conceptions are well informed. Inconceivability may be your own failure. All types of possibility can be implied. |
19268 | Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya] |
Full Idea: If we aim to derive impossibility from inconceivability, we may either face a failure to conceive something, or arrive at a state of incoherence in conceiving. | |
From: Anand Vaidya (Understanding and Essence [2010], 'Application') | |
A reaction: [summary] Thus I can't manage to conceive a multi-dimensional hypercube, but I don't even try to conceive a circular square. In both cases, we must consider whether the inconceivability results from our own inadequacy, rather than from the facts. |
19265 | Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya] |
Full Idea: Is it possible for an individual to possess objectual understanding without knowing they possess the objectual understanding? | |
From: Anand Vaidya (Understanding and Essence [2010], 'Objections') | |
A reaction: Hm. A nice new question to loose sleep over. We can't demand a regress of meta-understandings, so at some point you just understand. Birds understand nests. Equivalent: can you understand P, but can't explain P? Skilled, but inarticulate. |
3872 | We must assess the truth of beliefs in identifying them [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: We cannot determine what someone's beliefs are independently of assessing to some extent the truth or falsity of the beliefs. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], X.4) |
19260 | Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya] |
Full Idea: In the Gettier case of deductive justification, what we have is a separation between the source of the justification and the truthmaker for the belief. | |
From: Anand Vaidya (Understanding and Essence [2010], 'Distinction') | |
A reaction: A very illuminating insight into the Gettier problem. As a fan of truthmakers, I'm wondering if this might quickly solve it. |
19266 | In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya] |
Full Idea: The disjunctive belief that 'either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona', which Smith believes, derives its justification from the left disjunct, and its truth from the right disjunct. | |
From: Anand Vaidya (Understanding and Essence [2010], 'Application') | |
A reaction: The example is from Gettier's original article. Have we finally got a decent account of the original Gettier problem, after fifty years of debate? Philosophical moves with delightful slowness. |
3857 | Defeat relativism by emphasising truth and reference, not meaning [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: The challenge of incommensurability can be met once it is realised that in comparing theories the notions of truth and reference are more important than that of meaning. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.6) |
3858 | A full understanding of 'yellow' involves some theory [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: A full grasp of the concept '…is yellow' involves coming to accept as true bits of theory; that is, generalisations involving the term 'yellow'. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], II.2) |
3862 | All theories contain anomalies, and so are falsified! [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: According to Feyerabend all theories are born falsified, because no theory has ever been totally free of anomalies. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], III.9) |
3863 | The anomaly of Uranus didn't destroy Newton's mechanics - it led to Neptune's discovery [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: When scientists observed the motion of Uranus, they did not give up on Newtonian mechanics. Instead they posited the existence of Neptune. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], III.9) |
3864 | Anomalies are judged against rival theories, and support for the current theory [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: Whether to reject an anomaly has to be decided on the basis of the availability of a rival theory, and on the basis of the positive evidence for the theory in question. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], III.9) |
3865 | Why should it matter whether or not a theory is scientific? [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: Why should it be so important to distinguish between theories that are scientific and those that are not? | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], IV.3) |
3866 | If theories are really incommensurable, we could believe them all [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: If theories are genuinely incommensurable why should I be faced with the problem of choosing between them? Why not believe them all? | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], VII.1) |
19264 | Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya] |
Full Idea: A representation cannot accidentally be about an object. Aboutness is in general an intentional relation. | |
From: Anand Vaidya (Understanding and Essence [2010], 'Objections') | |
A reaction: 'Intentional' with a 't', not with an 's'. This strikes me as important. Critics dislike the idea of 'representation' because if you passively place a representation and its subject together, what makes the image do the representing job? Answer: I do! |
3871 | Explaining an action is showing that it is rational [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: To explain an action as an action is to show that it is rational. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], X.2) |