55 ideas
| 16674 | The quantity is just the matter, in that it has extended parts and is diffuse [Charleton] |
| Full Idea: The extension or quantity of a thing is merely modus materiae, or (rather) the matter itself composing that thing; insomuch as it consists not in a point, but has parts posited without parts, in respect whereof it is diffuse. | |
| From: Walter Charleton (Physiologia [1654], III.10.1.4), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 14.2 |
| 17979 | Research shows perceptual discrimination is sharper at category boundaries [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: Goldstone's research has shown how learning concepts can change perceptual units. For example, perceptual discrimination is heightened along category boundaries. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch.13) | |
| A reaction: [Goldstone 1994, 2000] This is just the sort of research which throws a spanner into the simplistic a priori thinking of many philosophers. |
| 18690 | Induction is said to just compare properties of categories, but the type of property also matters [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: Most theories of induction claim that it should depend primarily on the similarity of the categories involved, but then the type of property should not matter, yet research shows that it does. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be good empirical support for Gilbert Harman's view that induction is really inference to the best explanation. The thought (which strikes me as obviously correct) is that we bring nested domains of knowledge to bear in induction. |
| 4363 | The word 'person' is useless in ethics, because what counts as a good or bad self-conscious being? [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: An excellent reason for keeping the word 'person' out of ethics is that it is usually so thinly defined that it cannot generate any sense of 'good person'. If a person is just a self-conscious being, what would count as a good or bad one? | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.9 n20) | |
| A reaction: A nice point. Locke's concept of a person (rational self-conscious being) lacks depth and individuality, and Hitler fulfils the criteria as well as any saint. But if Hitler wasn't a 'bad person', what was he bad at being? |
| 17980 | The main theories of concepts are exemplar, prototype and knowledge [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: The three main theories of concepts under consideration are the exemplar, the prototype and the knowledge approaches. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch.13) |
| 17973 | The theoretical and practical definitions for the classical view are very hard to find [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: It has been extremely difficult to find definitions for most natural categories, and even harder to find definitions that are plausible psychological representations that people of all ages would be likely to use. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 2) |
| 17969 | The classical definitional approach cannot distinguish typical and atypical category members [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: The early psychological approaches to concepts took a definitional approach. ...but this view does not have any way of distinguishing typical and atypical category members (...as when a trout is a typical fish and an eel an atypical one). | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 2) | |
| A reaction: [pp. 12 and 22] Eleanor Rosch in the 1970s is said to have largely killed off the classical view. |
| 17970 | Classical concepts follow classical logic, but concepts in real life don't work that way [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: The classical view of concepts has been tied to traditional logic. 'Fido is a dog and a pet' is true if it has the necessary and sufficient conditions for both, ...but there is empirical evidence that people do not follow that rule. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 2) | |
| A reaction: Examples given are classifying chess as a sport and/or game, and classifying a tree house (which is agreed to be both a building and not a building!). |
| 17971 | Classical concepts are transitive hierarchies, but actual categories may be intransitive [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: The classical view of concepts explains hierarchical order, where categories form nested sets. But research shows that categories are often not transitive. Research shows that a seat is furniture, and a car seat is a seat, but it is not furniture. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 2) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] Murphy adds that the nesting of definitions is classically used to match the nesting of hierarchies. This is a nice example of the neatness of the analytic philosopher breaking down when it meets the mess of the world. |
| 17972 | The classical core is meant to be the real concept, but actually seems unimportant [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: A problem with the revised classical view is that the concept core does not seem to be an important part of the concept, despite its name and theoretical intention as representing the 'real' concept. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 2) | |
| A reaction: Apparently most researchers feel they can explain their results without reference to any core. Not so fast, I would say (being an essentialist). Maybe people acknowledge an implicit core without knowing what it is. See Susan Gelman. |
| 17975 | There is no 'ideal' bird or dog, and prototypes give no information about variability [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: Is there really an 'ideal bird' that could represent all birds? ...Furthermore a single prototype would give no information about the variability of a category. ...Compare the incredible variety of dogs to the much smaller diversity of cats. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 3) | |
| A reaction: The point about variability is particularly noteworthy. You only grasp the concept of 'furniture' when you understand its range, as well as its typical examples. What structure is needed in a concept to achieve this? |
| 17976 | Prototypes are unified representations of the entire category (rather than of members) [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: In the prototype view the entire category is represented by a unified representation rather than separate representations for each member, or for different classes of members. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 3) | |
| A reaction: This is the improved prototype view, as opposed to the implausible idea that there is one ideal exemplar. The new theory still have the problem of how to represent diversity within the category, while somehow remaining 'unified'. |
| 18691 | The prototype theory uses observed features, but can't include their construction [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: Nothing in the prototype model says the shape of an animal is more important than its location in identifying its kind. The theory does not provide a way the features can be constructed, rather than just observed. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: This makes some kind of mental modelling central to thought, and not just a bonus once you have empirically acquired the concepts. We bring our full range of experience to bear on even the most instantaneous observations. |
| 17983 | The prototype theory handles hierarchical categories and combinations of concepts well [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: The prototype view has no trouble with either hierarchical structure or explaining categories. ...Meaning and conceptual combination provide strong evidence for prototypes. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch.13) | |
| A reaction: Prototypes are not vague, making clearer classification possible. A 'mountain lion' is clear, because its components are clear. |
| 17985 | Prototypes theory of concepts is best, as a full description with weighted typical features [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: Our theory of concepts must be primarily prototype-based. That is, it must be a description of an entire concept, with its typical features (presumably weighted by their importance). | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch.13) | |
| A reaction: This is to be distinguished from the discredited 'classical' view of concepts, that the concept consists of its definition. I take Aristotle's account of definition to be closer to a prototype description than to a dictionary definition. |
| 17986 | Learning concepts is forming prototypes with a knowledge structure [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: My proposal is that people attempt to form prototypes as part of a larger knowledge structure when they learn concepts. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch.13) | |
| A reaction: This combines theory theory (knowledge) with the prototype view, and sounds rather persuasive. The formation of prototypes fits with the explanatory account of essentialism I am defending. He later calls prototype formation 'abstraction' (494). |
| 17974 | The most popular theories of concepts are based on prototypes or exemplars [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: The most popular theories of concepts are based on prototype or exemplar theories that are strongly unclassical. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 2) |
| 17977 | The exemplar view of concepts says 'dogs' is the set of dogs I remember [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: In the exemplar view of concepts, the idea that people have a representation that somehow encompasses an entire concept is rejected. ...Instead a person's concept of dogs is the set of dogs that the person remembers. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 3) | |
| A reaction: [The theory was introduced by Medin and Schaffer 1978] I think I have finally met a plausible theory of concepts. When I think 'dog' I conjure up a fuzz of dogs that exhibit the range I have encountered (e.g. tiny to very big). Individuals come first! |
| 17982 | Exemplar theory struggles with hierarchical classification and with induction [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: The exemplar view has trouble with hierarchical classification and with induction in adults. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch.13) | |
| A reaction: To me these both strongly support essentialism - that you form the concept 'dog' from seeing some dogs, but you then extrapolate to large categories and general truths about dogs, on the assumption of the natures of the dogs you have seen. |
| 17981 | Children using knowing and essentialist categories doesn't fit the exemplar view [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: The findings showing that children use knowledge and may be essentialist about category membership do not comport well with the exemplar view. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch.13) | |
| A reaction: Tricky, because Gelman persuaded me of the essentialism, but the exemplar view of concepts looks the most promising. Clearly they must be forced to coexist.... |
| 17984 | Conceptual combination must be compositional, and can't be built up from exemplars [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: The exemplar accounts of conceptual combination are demonstrably wrong, because the meaning of a phrase has to be composed from the meaning of its parts (plus broader knowledge), and it cannot be composed as a function of exemplars. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch.13) | |
| A reaction: This sounds quite persuasive, and I begin to see that my favoured essentialism fits the prototype view of concepts best, though this mustn't be interpreted too crudely. We change our prototypes with experience. 'Bird' is a tricky case. |
| 17987 | The concept of birds from exemplars must also be used in inductions about birds [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: We don't have one concept of birds formed by learning from exemplars, and another concept of birds that is used in induction. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch.13) | |
| A reaction: In other words exemplar concepts break down when we generalise using the concept. The exemplars must be unified, to be usable in thought and language. |
| 17978 | We do not learn concepts in isolation, but as an integrated part of broader knowledge [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: The knowledge approach argues that concepts are part of our general knowledge about the world. We do not learn concepts in isolation, ...but as part of our overall understanding of the world. Animal concepts are integrated with biology, behaviour etc. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 3) | |
| A reaction: This is one of the leading theories of concepts among psychologists. It seems to be an aspect of the true theory, but it needs underpinning with some account of isolated individual concepts. This is also known as the 'theory theory'. |
| 18687 | Concepts with familiar contents are easier to learn [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: A concept's content influences how easy it is to learn. If the concept is grossly incompatible with what people know prior to the experiment, it will be difficult to acquire. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: This is a preliminary fact which leads towards the 'knowledge' theory of concepts (aka 'theory theory'). The point being that the knowledge involved is integral to the concept. Fits my preferred mental files approach. |
| 18688 | Some knowledge is involved in instant use of categories, other knowledge in explanations [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: Some kinds of knowledge are probably directly incorporated into the category representation and used in normal, fast decisions about objects. Other kinds of knowledge, however, may come into play only when it has been solicited. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: This is a summary of empirical research, but seems to fit our normal experience. If you see a hawk, you have some instant understanding, but if you ask what the hawk is doing here, you draw more widely. |
| 18689 | People categorise things consistent with their knowledge, even rejecting some good evidence [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: People tend to positively categorise items that are consistent with their knowledge and to exclude items that are inconsistent, sometimes even overruling purely empirical sources of information. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: The main rival to 'theory theory' is the purely empirical account of how concepts are acquired. This idea reports empirical research in favour of the theory theory (or 'knowledge') approach. |
| 4355 | There may be inverse akrasia, where the agent's action is better than their judgement recommends [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: There seem to be cases of 'inverse akrasia', in which the course of action actually followed is superior to the course of action recommended by the agent's best judgement. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.7) | |
| A reaction: This must occur, as when an assassin lets his victim off, and then regrets the deed. It strengthens the case against Socrates, and in favour of their being two parts of the soul which compete to motivate our actions. |
| 4325 | Must all actions be caused in part by a desire, or can a belief on its own be sufficient? [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: In contemporary philosophy of action, there is a fervid debate about whether any intentional action must be prompted in part by desire, or whether it is possible to be moved to action by a belief alone. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Intro) | |
| A reaction: I want a cool belief to be sufficient to produce an action, because it will permit at least a Kantian dimension to ethics, and make judgement central, and marginalise emotivism, which is the spawn of Satan. |
| 4351 | It is a fantasy that only through the study of philosophy can one become virtuous [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: It is a fantasy that only through the study of philosophy can one become virtuous. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.6) | |
| A reaction: I personally believe that philosophy is the best route yet devised to the achievement of virtue, but it is clearly not essential. All the philosophers I meet are remarkably virtuous, but that may be a chicken/egg thing. |
| 4340 | You are not a dishonest person if a tragic dilemma forces you to do something dishonest [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: Doing what is, say, dishonest solely in the context of a tragic dilemma does not entail being dishonest, possessing that vice. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.3 n8) | |
| A reaction: This seems right, although it mustn't be thought that the dishonesty is thereby excused. Virtuous people find being dishonest very painful. |
| 4329 | After a moral dilemma is resolved there is still a 'remainder', requiring (say) regret [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: When one moral requirement has overriden another in a dilemma, there is still a 'remainder', so that regret, or the recognition of some new requirement, are still appropriate. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: This is a powerful point on behalf of virtue ethics. There is a correct way to feel about the application of rules and calculations. Judges sleep well at night, but virtuous people may not. |
| 4330 | Deontologists resolve moral dilemmas by saying the rule conflict is merely apparent [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: With respect to resolvable dilemmas, the deontologist's strategy is to argue that the 'conflict' between the two rules which has generated the dilemma is merely apparent. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: This assumes that the rules can't conflict (because they come for God, or pure reason), but we might say that there are correct rules which do conflict. Morality isn't physics, or tennis. |
| 4341 | Involuntary actions performed in tragic dilemmas are bad because they mar a good life [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: The actions a virtuous agent is forced to in tragic dilemmas fail to be good actions because the doing of them, no matter how unwillingly or involuntarily, mars or ruins a good life. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: Of course, only virtuous people have their lives ruined by such things. For the cold or the wicked it is just water off a duck's back. |
| 4358 | Virtue may be neither sufficient nor necessary for eudaimonia [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: Some critics say virtue is not necessary for eudaimonia (since the wicked sometimes flourish), and others say it is not sufficient (because virtuous behaviour sometimes ruins a life). | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.8) | |
| A reaction: Both criticisms seem wrong (the wicked don't 'flourish', and complete virtue never ruins lives, except in tragic dilemmas). But it is hard to prove them wrong. |
| 4337 | Teenagers are often quite wise about ideals, but rather stupid about consequences [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: Adolescents tend to be much more gormless about consequences than they are about ideals. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.2 n12) | |
| A reaction: Very accurate, I'm afraid. But this cuts both ways. They seem to need education not in virtue, but simply in consequences. |
| 4324 | Animals and plants can 'flourish', but only rational beings can have eudaimonia [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: The trouble with 'flourishing' as a translation of 'eudaimonia' is that animals and even plants can flourish, but eudaimonia is possible only for rational beings. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Intro) | |
| A reaction: 'Flourishing' still seems better than 'happy', which is centrally used now to refer to a state of mind, not a situation. 'Well being' seems good, and plants are usually permitted that. |
| 4359 | When it comes to bringing up children, most of us think that the virtues are the best bet [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: If you think about bringing up children to prepare them for life, rather than converting the wicked or convincing the moral sceptic, isn't virtue the most reliable bet? | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.8) | |
| A reaction: A very convincing idea. They haven't the imagination to grasp consequences properly, or sufficient abstract thought to grasp principles, or the political cunning to negotiate contracts, but they can grasp ideals of what a good person is like. |
| 4336 | Any strict ranking of virtues or rules gets abandoned when faced with particular cases [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: Any codification ranking the virtues, like any codification ranking the rules, is bound to come up against cases where we will want to change the rankings. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: This seems right, and yet it feels like a slippery slope. Am I supposed to be virtuous and wise, but have no principles? Infinite flexibility can lead straight to wickedness. Even the wise need something to hang on to. |
| 4334 | Virtue ethics is open to the objection that it fails to show priority among the virtues [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: One criticism of virtue ethics is that it lamentably fails to come up with a priority ranking of the virtues. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: However, one might refer to man's essential function, or characteristic function, and one might derive the virtues of a good citizen from the nature of a good society. |
| 4361 | Good animals can survive, breed, feel characteristic pleasure and pain, and contribute to the group [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: A good social animal is well fitted for 1) individual survival, 2) continuance of its species, 3) characteristic freedom from pain and enjoyment, and 4) good characteristic functioning of its social group. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.9) | |
| A reaction: This feels right, but brings out the characteristic conservativism of virtue theory. A squirrel which can recite Shakespeare turns out to be immoral. |
| 4349 | Virtuous people may not be fully clear about their reasons for action [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: Virtue must surely be compatible with a fair amount of inarticulacy about one's reasons for action. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.6) | |
| A reaction: Virtuous people may be unclear, but we are entitled to hope for clarification from moral philosophers. The least we can hope for is some distinction between virtue and vice. |
| 4352 | Performing an act simply because it is virtuous is sufficient to be 'morally motivated' or 'dutiful' [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: Acting virtuously, in the way the virtuous agent acts, namely from virtue, is sufficient for being 'morally motivated' or acting 'from a sense of duty'. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.7) | |
| A reaction: Fine, but it invites the question of WHY virtue is motivating, just as one can ask this of maximum happiness, or duty, or even satisfaction of selfish desires. |
| 4353 | If moral motivation is an all-or-nothing sense of duty, how can children act morally? [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: If you are inclined to think that 'moral motivation', acting because you think it is right, must be an all-or-nothing matter, its presence determined by the agent's mind at the moment of acting, do, please, remember children. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.7) | |
| A reaction: I agree about the vital importance of remembering children when discussing morality. However, Kantians might legitimately claim that when a child is simply trained to behave well, it has not yet reached the age of true morality. |
| 4346 | The emotions of sympathy, compassion and love are no guarantee of right action or acting well [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: The emotions of sympathy, compassion and love are no guarantee of right action or acting well. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: This is a critique of Hume, and of utlitarianism. It pushes us either to the concept of duty, or the concept of virtue (independent of right feeling). |
| 4339 | According to virtue ethics, two agents may respond differently, and yet both be right [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: According to virtue ethics, in a given situation two different agents may do what is right, what gets a tick of approval, despite the fact that each fails to do what the other did. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: You could certainly have great respect for two entirely different decisions about a medical dilemma, if they both showed integrity and good will, even if one had worse consequences than the other. |
| 4354 | Maybe in a deeply poisoned character none of their milder character traits could ever be a virtue [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: I am prepare to stick my neck out and say that extreme Nazis or racists (say) have poisoned characters to such an extent that none of their character traits could ever count as a virtue. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.7) | |
| A reaction: Hard to justify, but it is hard to respect a mass murderer because they seem to love their dog or the beauty of music or flowers. They can't possibly appreciate the Platonic Form of love or beauty? |
| 4364 | Being unusually virtuous in some areas may entail being less virtuous in others [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: It may well be that being particularly well endowed with respect to some virtues inevitably involves being not very well endowed in others. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.9) | |
| A reaction: Maybe, but this sound a bit like an excuse. Newton wasn't very nice, but Einstein was. I can't believe in a finite reservoir of virtue. |
| 4356 | We are puzzled by a person who can show an exceptional virtue and also behave very badly [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: That we have some intuitive belief in the unity of the virtues is shown by our reaction to stories of a person who has shown an exceptional virtue, but also done something morally repellent. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.7) | |
| A reaction: A nice observation, but not enough to establish the unity of virtue. People tend to love all virtue, but it is not obviously impossible to love selected virtues and despise others (e.g. love courage, and despise charity). |
| 4327 | Deontologists do consider consequences, because they reveal when a rule might apply [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: Though it is sometimes said that deontologists 'take no account of consequences', this is manifestly false, for many actions we deliberate about only fall under rules or principles when we bring in their predicted consequences. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: An important defence of deontology, which otherwise is vulnerable to the 'well-meaning fool' problem. It is no good having a good will, but refusing to think about consequences. |
| 4335 | 'Codifiable' morality give rules for decisions which don't require wisdom [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: If morality is strongly 'codifiable', it should consist of rules which provide a decision procedure, and it should be equally applicable by the virtuous and the non-virtuous, without recourse to wisdom. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: A key idea. Religions want obedience, and Kant wants morality to be impersonal, and most people want morality which simple uneducated people can follow. And yet how can wisdom ever be irrelevant? |
| 4328 | Preference utilitarianism aims to be completely value-free, or empirical [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: There are some forms of utilitarianism which aim to be entirely 'value-free' or empirical, such as those which define happiness in terms of the satisfaction of actual desires or preferences, regardless of their content. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: This point makes it clear that preference utilitarianism is a doomed enterprise. For a start I can prefer not to be a utilitarian. You can only maximise something if you value if. Are preferences valuable? |
| 4343 | We are torn between utilitarian and deontological views of lying, depending on the examples [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: Utilitarianism says there is nothing intrinsically wrong with lying, but examples of bare-faced lying to increase happiness drive us to deontology; but then examples where telling the truth has appalling consequences drive us back to utilitarianism again. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: A nice illustration of why virtue theory suddenly seemed appealing. Deontology can cope, though, by seeing other duties when the consequences are dreadful. |
| 4338 | Deontologists usually accuse utilitarians of oversimplifying hard cases [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: Deontologists characteristically maintain that utilitarians have made out a particular hard case to be too simple. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: Utilitarianism certainly seems to ignore the anguish of hard dilemmas, but that is supposed to be its appeal. If you think for too long, every dilemma begins to seem hopeless. |
| 4365 | We are distinct from other animals in behaving rationally - pursuing something as good, for reasons [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: Our characteristic way of going on, which distinguishes us from all the other species of animals, is a rational way, which is any way we can rightly see as good, as something we have reason to do. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch10) | |
| A reaction: Some people more than others, and none of us all the time. Romantics see rationality as a restraint on the authentic emotional and animal life. 'Be a good animal'. However, I agree. |
| 4350 | If people are virtuous in obedience to God, would they become wicked if they lost their faith? [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: If people perform virtuous actions simply because they are commanded by God, would they cease to perform such actions if they lost their faith in God? | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.6) | |
| A reaction: To be consistent, the answer might be 'yes', but that invites the response that only intrinsically evil people need to be Christians. The rest of us can be good without it. |