12714
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The substantial form is the principle of action or the primitive force of acting [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
The substantial form is the principle of action or the primitive force of acting.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (De Mundo Praesenti [1686], A6.4.1507-8), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 3
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A reaction:
The clearest statement of the modification of Aristotle's hylomorphism which Leibniz preferred in his middle period, and which strikes me as an improvement, and about right. Shame that monads got too much of a grip on him, but he was trying to dig deeper.
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12743
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A true being must (unlike a chain) have united parts, with a substantial form as its subject [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
In a Being one per se a real union is required consisting not in the situation or motion of parts, as in a chain or a house, but in a unique individual principle and subject of attributes and operations, in us a soul and in a body a substantial form.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (De Mundo Praesenti [1686], A6.4.1506), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7
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A reaction:
Leibniz is said not to be an essentialist, by making all properties essential, but he is certainly committed to substance, and it sounds like essence here (or one view of essence), when it makes identity possible. This idea is pure Aristotle.
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4983
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There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene [Davidson]
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Full Idea:
We know too much about thought and behaviour to trust exact and universal statements linking them. Beliefs and desires issue in behaviour only as modified and mediated by further beliefs and desires, attitudes and attendings, without limit.
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From:
Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970], p.217)
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A reaction:
Now seen as a key objection to behaviourism, and rightly so. However, I am not sure about "without limit", which implies an implausible absolute metaphysical freedom. Davidson goes too far in denying any nomological link between thought and brain.
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5497
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Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Davidson, by Lycan]
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Full Idea:
For Davidson, mental types are individuated by considerations that are nonscientific, distinctly humanistic, and part normative, so will not coincide with any types that are designated in scientific terms.
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From:
report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by William Lycan - Introduction - Ontology p.8
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A reaction:
I just don't believe this, mainly because I don't accept that there is a category called 'nonscientific'. All we are saying is that a brain is a hugely complicated object, and we don't properly understand its operations, though we relate to it very well.
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2321
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If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Davidson, by Kim]
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Full Idea:
Davidson takes mental anomalism (that the mind exhibits normativity and rationality), and in particular his claim that there are no laws connecting mental and physical properties, to undermine mind-body reductionism.
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From:
report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by Jaegwon Kim - Mind in a Physical World §4 p.092
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A reaction:
A nice summary of the core idea of property dualism. Personally I expect the whole lot to be reducible, and to follow laws, but the sheer complexity of the brain permanently bars us from actually doing the reduction.
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3404
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Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Davidson, by Kim]
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Full Idea:
Davidson's thesis is that if mental events of a particular kind cause physical events of a particular kind, and the two kinds are connected by a law, then they must both be physical kinds.
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From:
report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.137
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A reaction:
Davidson would pretty obviously be right. The whole problem here is the idea of a 'law'. You can only have strict law for simple entities, like particles and natural kinds. The brain is a mess, like weather or explosions.
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6620
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Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe]
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Full Idea:
Davidson's version of the identity theory is couched in terms of events rather than states, because he regards causation as a relation between events.
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From:
report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.2 n12
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A reaction:
I think it may be more to the point that the mind is a dynamic thing, and so it consists of events rather than states, and hence we want to know what those events are made up from. I think my chair is causing me to rest above the floor…
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8412
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A causal interaction is when two processes intersect, and correlated modifications persist afterwards [Salmon]
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Full Idea:
When two processes intersect, and they undergo correlated modifications which persist after the intersection, I shall say that the intersection is a causal interaction. I take this as a fundamental causal concept.
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From:
Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §4)
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A reaction:
There may be a problem individuating processes, just as there is for events. I like this approach to causation, which is ontologically sparse, and fits in with the scientific worldview. Change of properties sounds precise, but isn't. Stick to processes.
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8413
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Cause must come first in propagations of causal interactions, but interactions are simultaneous [Salmon]
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Full Idea:
In a typical cause-effect situation (a 'propagation') cause must precede effect, for propagation over a finite time interval is an essential feature. In an 'interaction', an intersection of processes resulting in change, we have simultaneity.
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From:
Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §8)
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A reaction:
This takes the direction of time as axiomatic, and quite right too. Salmon isn't addressing the real difficulty, though, which is that the resultant laws are usually held to be time-reversible, which is a bit of a puzzle.
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8411
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Instead of localised events, I take enduring and extended processes as basic to causation [Salmon]
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Full Idea:
I propose to approach causality by taking processes rather than events as basic entities. Events are relatively localised in space and time, while processes have much greater temporal duration, and, in many cases, much greater spatial extent.
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From:
Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §2)
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A reaction:
This strikes me as an incredibly promising proposal, not just in our understanding of causation, but for our general metaphysics and understanding of nature. See Idea 4931, for example. Vague events and processes blend into one another.
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