Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causality: Production and Propagation', 'What is Knowledge-First Epistemology?' and 'Paraconsistent Logic'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


7 ideas

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 7. Paraconsistency
Paraconsistent reasoning can just mean responding sensibly to inconsistencies [Jago]
     Full Idea: A practical application of paraconsistent reasoning is in large databases. It does not mean that contradictions could be true, but only that we sometimes need to draw sensible conclusions from inconsistent data. 'Dialethists' believe some contradictions.
     From: Mark Jago (Paraconsistent Logic [2010])
     A reaction: Interesting as a more cautious and sensible attitude to the scandal of paraconsistency.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew]
     Full Idea: Much theorizing about justification conflates issues of justified belief with issues of justified/blameless believers.
     From: Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P (What is Knowledge-First Epistemology? [2014], p.12)
     A reaction: [They cite Kent Bach 1985] Presumably the only thing that really justifies a belief is the truth, or the actual facts. You could then say 'p is a justified belief, though no one actually believes it'. E.g. the number of stars is odd.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew]
     Full Idea: If knowledge is indeed unanalyzable, that could be seen as a liberation of justification to assume importance in its own right.
     From: Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P (What is Knowledge-First Epistemology? [2014], p.11)
     A reaction: [They cite Kvanvig 2003:192 and Greco 2010:9-] See Scruton's Idea 3897. I suspect that we should just give up discussing 'knowledge', which is a woolly and uninformative term, and focus on where the real epistemological action is.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew]
     Full Idea: Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion. 'Cat' entails 'mammal' because the cats are a subset of the mammals.
     From: Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P (What is Knowledge-First Epistemology? [2014], p.10)
     A reaction: I would have thought that this was only one type of entailment. 'Travelling to Iceland entails flying'. Travelling includes flying, the reverse of cats/mammals, to a very complex set-theoretic account is needed. Interesting.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
A causal interaction is when two processes intersect, and correlated modifications persist afterwards [Salmon]
     Full Idea: When two processes intersect, and they undergo correlated modifications which persist after the intersection, I shall say that the intersection is a causal interaction. I take this as a fundamental causal concept.
     From: Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §4)
     A reaction: There may be a problem individuating processes, just as there is for events. I like this approach to causation, which is ontologically sparse, and fits in with the scientific worldview. Change of properties sounds precise, but isn't. Stick to processes.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
Cause must come first in propagations of causal interactions, but interactions are simultaneous [Salmon]
     Full Idea: In a typical cause-effect situation (a 'propagation') cause must precede effect, for propagation over a finite time interval is an essential feature. In an 'interaction', an intersection of processes resulting in change, we have simultaneity.
     From: Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §8)
     A reaction: This takes the direction of time as axiomatic, and quite right too. Salmon isn't addressing the real difficulty, though, which is that the resultant laws are usually held to be time-reversible, which is a bit of a puzzle.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Instead of localised events, I take enduring and extended processes as basic to causation [Salmon]
     Full Idea: I propose to approach causality by taking processes rather than events as basic entities. Events are relatively localised in space and time, while processes have much greater temporal duration, and, in many cases, much greater spatial extent.
     From: Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §2)
     A reaction: This strikes me as an incredibly promising proposal, not just in our understanding of causation, but for our general metaphysics and understanding of nature. See Idea 4931, for example. Vague events and processes blend into one another.