9 ideas
| 5035 | The two basics of reasoning are contradiction and sufficient reason [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: The two first principles of reasoning are: the principle of contradiction, and the principle of the need for giving a reason. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Specimen of Discoveries [1686], p.75) | |
| A reaction: Could animals have any reasoning ability (say, in solving a physical problem)? Leibniz's criteria both require language. Note the overlapping of the principle of sufficient reason (there IS a reason) with the contractual idea of GIVING reasons. |
| 5038 | Assume that mind and body follow their own laws, but God has harmonised them [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Why not assume that God initially created the soul and body with so much ingenuity that, whilst each follows its own laws and properties and operations, all thing agree most beautifull among themselves? This is the 'hypothesis of concomitance'. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Specimen of Discoveries [1686], p.80) | |
| A reaction: They may be in beautifully planned harmony, but how do we know that they are in harmony? Presumably their actions must be compared, and God would even have to harmonise the comparison. Parallelism seems to imply epiphenomenalism or idealism. |
| 23857 | People in power always try to increase their power [Weil] |
| Full Idea: Every human group that exercises power does so …in such a way as to increase that power. | |
| From: Simone Weil (Prospects: Proletarian Revolution? [1933], p.15) | |
| A reaction: Not so true in smaller institutions, but at the centre of power you can control how power is distributed, so the temptation is too much. |
| 23856 | Spontaneous movements are powerless against organised repression [Weil] |
| Full Idea: A spontaneous movement is fundamentally impotent when it comes to fighting against organised forces of repression. | |
| From: Simone Weil (Prospects: Proletarian Revolution? [1933], p.2) | |
| A reaction: Her example is the Paris Commune of 1870. Hence revolution requires prior penetration of the corridors of power. Hence the phenomenon of 'entryism' of more radical people into reformist parties. |
| 23859 | True democracy is the subordination of society to the individual [Weil] |
| Full Idea: In the subordination of society to the individual lies the definition of true democracy, and that of socialism as well. | |
| From: Simone Weil (Prospects: Proletarian Revolution? [1933], p.19) | |
| A reaction: This is the simplest definition of the liberal view. The big difference is whether this subordination is the starting point of political thinking, or the end result at which it aims. |
| 23858 | War is perpetuated by its continual preparations [Weil] |
| Full Idea: War perpetuates itself under the form of preparation for war. | |
| From: Simone Weil (Prospects: Proletarian Revolution? [1933], p.16) | |
| A reaction: There are periods when military preparations are scaled down, but a reason is always found to scale them back up again. |
| 23860 | Even if a drowning man is doomed, he should keep swimming to the last [Weil] |
| Full Idea: A man who is thrown overboard in the middle of the ocean ought not to let himself drown, even though there is very litte chance of his reaching safety, but to go on swimming till exhausted. | |
| From: Simone Weil (Prospects: Proletarian Revolution? [1933], p.21) | |
| A reaction: You might survive a little longer if you don't exhaust yourself! Not clear where her authority for 'ought' comes from, but it expresses an interesting attitude. |
| 4784 | Salmon says processes rather than events should be basic in a theory of physical causation [Salmon, by Psillos] |
| Full Idea: Salmon argues that processes rather than events should be the basic entities in a theory of physical causation. | |
| From: report of Wesley Salmon (Causal Connections [1984]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §4.2 | |
| A reaction: It increasingly strikes me that the concept of a 'process' ought to be ontologically basic. Edelman says the mind is a process. An 'event' is too loose, and a 'fact' too vague, and heaven knows what Hume meant by an 'object'. |
| 5037 | God doesn't decide that Adam will sin, but that sinful Adam's existence is to be preferred [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: God does not decide whether Adam should sin, but whether that series of things in which there is an Adam whose perfect individual notion involves sin should nevertheless be preferred to others. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Specimen of Discoveries [1686], p.78) | |
| A reaction: Compare whether the person responsible for setting a road speed limit is responsible for subsequent accidents. Leibniz's belief that the world could have been made no better than it is (by an omnipotent being) strikes me as blind faith, not an argument. |