Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causal Connections', 'On Probability and Induction' and 'Aristotelian commentaries'

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4 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity

22361	Contextual values are acceptable in research, but not in its final evaluation [Reichenbach, by Reiss/Sprenger]
	Full Idea: Reichenbach's claim is interpreted as saying that contextual values, which may have contributed to the discovery of a theory, are irrelevant for justifying the acceptance of a theory, and for assessing how evidence bears on theory.
	From: report of Hans Reichenbach (On Probability and Induction [1938], pp.36-7) by Reiss,J/Spreger,J - Scientific Objectivity 3.2
	A reaction: This influential idea is very helpful. It allows Galileo and co to pursus all sorts of highly personal and quirky lines of enquiry, because we only demand full objectivity when it is all over. Very good!

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification

16751	Unity by aggregation, order, inherence, composition, and simplicity [Conimbricense, by Pasnau]
	Full Idea: The Coimbrans have five degrees of unity: by aggregation (stones), by order (an army), per accidens (inherence), per se composite unity (connected), and per se unity of simple things.
	From: report of Collegium Conimbricense (Aristotelian commentaries [1595], Phys I.9.11.2) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.3
	A reaction: [my summary of Pasnau's summary] Take some stones, then order them, then glue them together, then melt them together. The unity of inherence is a different type of unity from these stages. This is a hylomorphic view.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary

16720	Secondary qualities come from temperaments and proportions of primary qualities [Conimbricense]
	Full Idea: Colors, flavours, smells, and other secondary qualities arise from the various temperaments and proportions of the primary qualities.
	From: Collegium Conimbricense (Aristotelian commentaries [1595], I.10.4 Gen&C), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 21.2
	A reaction: This is a bit more subtle than merely mixing the primary qualities. What about the powers of the primary qualities? Presumably that is the 'temperaments'?

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata

4784	Salmon says processes rather than events should be basic in a theory of physical causation [Salmon, by Psillos]
	Full Idea: Salmon argues that processes rather than events should be the basic entities in a theory of physical causation.
	From: report of Wesley Salmon (Causal Connections [1984]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §4.2
	A reaction: It increasingly strikes me that the concept of a 'process' ought to be ontologically basic. Edelman says the mind is a process. An 'event' is too loose, and a 'fact' too vague, and heaven knows what Hume meant by an 'object'.