|
13952
|
Essentialism says some of a thing's properties are necessary, and could not be absent [Cartwright,R]
|
|
Full Idea:
Essentialism, as I shall understand it, is the doctrine that among the attributes of a thing some are essential, others merely accidental. Its essential attributes are those it has necessarily, those it could not have lacked.
|
|
From:
Richard Cartwright (Some Remarks on Essentialism [1968], p.149)
|
|
A reaction:
The problem with this, which Cartwright does not address, is that trivial and gerrymandered properties (such as having self-identity, or being 'such that 2+2=4') seem to be necessarily, but don't seem to constitute the essence of a thing.
|
|
13953
|
An act of ostension doesn't seem to need a 'sort' of thing, even of a very broad kind [Cartwright,R]
|
|
Full Idea:
For an ostension to be successful it is surely not necessary that I gather what sort of object it is you have indicated, such as being a horse or a zebra. I may even gather which thing you have indicated without knowing that it is a mammal or even alive.
|
|
From:
Richard Cartwright (Some Remarks on Essentialism [1968], p.157)
|
|
A reaction:
This nicely articulates the objection I have always felt to Geach's relative identity. 'Oh my God, what the hell is THAT???' is probably going to be a successful act of verbal reference, even while explicitly denying all knowledge of sortals.
|
|
8412
|
A causal interaction is when two processes intersect, and correlated modifications persist afterwards [Salmon]
|
|
Full Idea:
When two processes intersect, and they undergo correlated modifications which persist after the intersection, I shall say that the intersection is a causal interaction. I take this as a fundamental causal concept.
|
|
From:
Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §4)
|
|
A reaction:
There may be a problem individuating processes, just as there is for events. I like this approach to causation, which is ontologically sparse, and fits in with the scientific worldview. Change of properties sounds precise, but isn't. Stick to processes.
|
|
8413
|
Cause must come first in propagations of causal interactions, but interactions are simultaneous [Salmon]
|
|
Full Idea:
In a typical cause-effect situation (a 'propagation') cause must precede effect, for propagation over a finite time interval is an essential feature. In an 'interaction', an intersection of processes resulting in change, we have simultaneity.
|
|
From:
Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §8)
|
|
A reaction:
This takes the direction of time as axiomatic, and quite right too. Salmon isn't addressing the real difficulty, though, which is that the resultant laws are usually held to be time-reversible, which is a bit of a puzzle.
|
|
8411
|
Instead of localised events, I take enduring and extended processes as basic to causation [Salmon]
|
|
Full Idea:
I propose to approach causality by taking processes rather than events as basic entities. Events are relatively localised in space and time, while processes have much greater temporal duration, and, in many cases, much greater spatial extent.
|
|
From:
Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §2)
|
|
A reaction:
This strikes me as an incredibly promising proposal, not just in our understanding of causation, but for our general metaphysics and understanding of nature. See Idea 4931, for example. Vague events and processes blend into one another.
|