20400
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Intentions either succeed or fail, so external evidence for them is always irrelevant [Wimsatt/Beardsley, by Davies,S]
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Full Idea:
Wimsatt and Beardsley claimed that either the intention succeeded, so one does not need to look outside the work for its meaning, or the intention failed, so external evidence does not help.
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From:
report of W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946]) by Stephen Davies - The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) 5.3
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A reaction:
Actually, the external evidence may tell you much more clearly and accurately what the intention was than the work itself does. The best example may be the title of the work, which is presumably outside the work.
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7268
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The thoughts of a poem should be imputed to the dramatic speaker, and hardly at all to the poet [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
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Full Idea:
We ought to impute the thoughts and attitudes of the poem immediately to the dramatic speaker, and if to the author at all, only by an act of biographical inference.
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From:
W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §I)
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A reaction:
Wrong. If in Browning's "My Last Duchess" (say), we only inferred the mind of the speaker (and his Duchess), and took no interest in Browning's view of things, we would miss the point. We might end up respecting the Duke, which would be daft.
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7271
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Biography can reveal meanings and dramatic character, as well as possible intentions [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
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Full Idea:
The use of biographical evidence need not involve intentionalism, because while it may be evidence of what the author intended, it may also be evidence of the meaning of his words and the dramatic character of his utterance.
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From:
W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §IV)
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A reaction:
I am very keen to penetrate the author's intentions, but I have always be doubtful about the use of biography as a means to achieve this. Most of the effort to infer intentions must come from a study of the work itself, not introductions, letters etc.
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8412
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A causal interaction is when two processes intersect, and correlated modifications persist afterwards [Salmon]
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Full Idea:
When two processes intersect, and they undergo correlated modifications which persist after the intersection, I shall say that the intersection is a causal interaction. I take this as a fundamental causal concept.
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From:
Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §4)
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A reaction:
There may be a problem individuating processes, just as there is for events. I like this approach to causation, which is ontologically sparse, and fits in with the scientific worldview. Change of properties sounds precise, but isn't. Stick to processes.
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8413
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Cause must come first in propagations of causal interactions, but interactions are simultaneous [Salmon]
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Full Idea:
In a typical cause-effect situation (a 'propagation') cause must precede effect, for propagation over a finite time interval is an essential feature. In an 'interaction', an intersection of processes resulting in change, we have simultaneity.
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From:
Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §8)
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A reaction:
This takes the direction of time as axiomatic, and quite right too. Salmon isn't addressing the real difficulty, though, which is that the resultant laws are usually held to be time-reversible, which is a bit of a puzzle.
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8411
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Instead of localised events, I take enduring and extended processes as basic to causation [Salmon]
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Full Idea:
I propose to approach causality by taking processes rather than events as basic entities. Events are relatively localised in space and time, while processes have much greater temporal duration, and, in many cases, much greater spatial extent.
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From:
Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §2)
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A reaction:
This strikes me as an incredibly promising proposal, not just in our understanding of causation, but for our general metaphysics and understanding of nature. See Idea 4931, for example. Vague events and processes blend into one another.
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