Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causality: Production and Propagation', 'A Priori Knowledge Revisited' and 'The Roots of Reference'

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8 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic

12430	Classical logic is our preconditions for assessing empirical evidence [Kitcher]
	Full Idea: In my terminology, classical logic (or at least, its most central tenets) consists of propositional preconditions for our assessing empirical evidence in the way we do.
	From: Philip Kitcher (A Priori Knowledge Revisited [2000], §VII)
	A reaction: I like an even stronger version of this - that classical logic arises out of our experiences of things, and so we are just assessing empirical evidence in terms of other (generalised) empirical evidence. Logic results from induction. Very unfashionable.

12431	I believe classical logic because I was taught it and use it, but it could be undermined [Kitcher]
	Full Idea: I believe the laws of classical logic, in part because I was taught them, and in part because I think I see how those laws are used in assessing evidence. But my belief could easily be undermined by experience.
	From: Philip Kitcher (A Priori Knowledge Revisited [2000], §VII)
	A reaction: Quine has one genuine follower! The trouble is his first sentence would fit witch-doctoring just as well. Kitcher went to Cambridge; I hope he doesn't just believe things because he was taught them, or because he 'sees how they are used'!

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived

14296	Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine]
	Full Idea: Each disposition, in my view, is a physical state or mechanism. ...In some cases nowadays we understand the physical details and set them forth explicitly in terms of the arrangement and interaction of small bodies. This replaces the old disposition.
	From: Willard Quine (The Roots of Reference [1990], p.11), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions 01.3
	A reaction: A challenge to the dispositions and powers view of nature, one which rests on the 'categorical' structural properties, rather than the 'hypothetical' dispositions. But can we define a mechanism without mentioning its powers?

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary

12428	Many necessities are inexpressible, and unknowable a priori [Kitcher]
	Full Idea: There are plenty of necessary truths that we are unable to express, let alone know a priori.
	From: Philip Kitcher (A Priori Knowledge Revisited [2000], §II)
	A reaction: This certainly seems to put paid to any simplistic idea that the a priori and the necessary are totally coextensive. We might, I suppose, claim that all necessities are a priori for the Archangel Gabriel (or even a very bright cherub). Cf. Idea 12429.

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent

12429	Knowing our own existence is a priori, but not necessary [Kitcher]
	Full Idea: What is known a priori may not be necessary, if we know a priori that we ourselves exist and are actual.
	From: Philip Kitcher (A Priori Knowledge Revisited [2000], §II)
	A reaction: Compare Idea 12428, which challenges the inverse of this relationship. This one looks equally convincing, and Kripke adds other examples of contingent a priori truths, such as those referring to the metre rule in Paris.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation

8412	A causal interaction is when two processes intersect, and correlated modifications persist afterwards [Salmon]
	Full Idea: When two processes intersect, and they undergo correlated modifications which persist after the intersection, I shall say that the intersection is a causal interaction. I take this as a fundamental causal concept.
	From: Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §4)
	A reaction: There may be a problem individuating processes, just as there is for events. I like this approach to causation, which is ontologically sparse, and fits in with the scientific worldview. Change of properties sounds precise, but isn't. Stick to processes.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation

8413	Cause must come first in propagations of causal interactions, but interactions are simultaneous [Salmon]
	Full Idea: In a typical cause-effect situation (a 'propagation') cause must precede effect, for propagation over a finite time interval is an essential feature. In an 'interaction', an intersection of processes resulting in change, we have simultaneity.
	From: Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §8)
	A reaction: This takes the direction of time as axiomatic, and quite right too. Salmon isn't addressing the real difficulty, though, which is that the resultant laws are usually held to be time-reversible, which is a bit of a puzzle.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata

8411	Instead of localised events, I take enduring and extended processes as basic to causation [Salmon]
	Full Idea: I propose to approach causality by taking processes rather than events as basic entities. Events are relatively localised in space and time, while processes have much greater temporal duration, and, in many cases, much greater spatial extent.
	From: Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §2)
	A reaction: This strikes me as an incredibly promising proposal, not just in our understanding of causation, but for our general metaphysics and understanding of nature. See Idea 4931, for example. Vague events and processes blend into one another.