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All the ideas for 'Causality: Production and Propagation', 'fragments/reports' and 'The Folly of Trying to Define Truth'

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9 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler [Davidson]
     Full Idea: We cannot hope to underpin the concept of truth with something more transparent or easier to grasp.
     From: Donald Davidson (The Folly of Trying to Define Truth [1999], p.21)
     A reaction: I suppose precise accounts of correspondence or coherence are offered as replacements for truth, but neither of those ever seem to be possible. I agree with accepting truth as a primitive.
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory [Davidson]
     Full Idea: Neither Aristotle's formula nor Tarski's truth definitions are sympathetic to the correspondence theory, because they don't introduce entities like facts or states of affairs for sentences to correspond.
     From: Donald Davidson (The Folly of Trying to Define Truth [1999], p.25)
     A reaction: This seems convincing, although it is often claimed that both theories offer a sort of correspondence.
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson]
     Full Idea: If the definition of the truth predicate is to be finite (Tarski insisted on this), the definition must take advantage of the fact that sentences, though potentially infinite in number, are constructed from a finite vocabulary.
     From: Donald Davidson (The Folly of Trying to Define Truth [1999], p.23)
     A reaction: Not sure whether this is in the object language or the meta-language, though I guess the former.
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts [Davidson]
     Full Idea: We can still say revealing things about truth, by relating it to other concepts like belief, desire, cause and action.
     From: Donald Davidson (The Folly of Trying to Define Truth [1999], p.21)
     A reaction: The trickiest concept to link it to is meaning. I think Davidson's view points to the Axiomatic account of truth, which flourished soon after Davidson wrote this. We can give rules for the correct use of 'true'.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson]
     Full Idea: You are following Plato's lead if you worry about the concept of truth when it is the focus of your attention, but you pretend you understand it when trying to cope with knowledge (or belief, memory, perception etc.).
     From: Donald Davidson (The Folly of Trying to Define Truth [1999], p.20)
     A reaction: Nice to find someone pointing out this absurdity. He says Hume does the same with doubts about the external world, which he ignores when discussing other minds. Belief is holding true; only truths are actually remembered….
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Xenocrates held that the soul had no form or substance, but was number [Xenocrates, by Cicero]
     Full Idea: Xenocrates denied that the soul had form or any substance, but said that it was number, and the power of number, as had been held by Pythagoras long before, was the highest in nature.
     From: report of Xenocrates (fragments/reports [c.327 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - Tusculan Disputations I.x.20
     A reaction: This shows how strong the Pythagorean influence was in the Academy. This is not totally stupid. Dawkins holds that the essence of DNA is information, which can be expressed mathematically. Xenocrates was a functionalist.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
A causal interaction is when two processes intersect, and correlated modifications persist afterwards [Salmon]
     Full Idea: When two processes intersect, and they undergo correlated modifications which persist after the intersection, I shall say that the intersection is a causal interaction. I take this as a fundamental causal concept.
     From: Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §4)
     A reaction: There may be a problem individuating processes, just as there is for events. I like this approach to causation, which is ontologically sparse, and fits in with the scientific worldview. Change of properties sounds precise, but isn't. Stick to processes.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
Cause must come first in propagations of causal interactions, but interactions are simultaneous [Salmon]
     Full Idea: In a typical cause-effect situation (a 'propagation') cause must precede effect, for propagation over a finite time interval is an essential feature. In an 'interaction', an intersection of processes resulting in change, we have simultaneity.
     From: Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §8)
     A reaction: This takes the direction of time as axiomatic, and quite right too. Salmon isn't addressing the real difficulty, though, which is that the resultant laws are usually held to be time-reversible, which is a bit of a puzzle.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Instead of localised events, I take enduring and extended processes as basic to causation [Salmon]
     Full Idea: I propose to approach causality by taking processes rather than events as basic entities. Events are relatively localised in space and time, while processes have much greater temporal duration, and, in many cases, much greater spatial extent.
     From: Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §2)
     A reaction: This strikes me as an incredibly promising proposal, not just in our understanding of causation, but for our general metaphysics and understanding of nature. See Idea 4931, for example. Vague events and processes blend into one another.