15 ideas
| 8793 | If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons [Sellars] |
| Full Idea: In characterizing an observational episode or state as 'knowing', we are not giving an empirical description of it; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says. | |
| From: Wilfrid Sellars (Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation? [1956], p.123) | |
| A reaction: McDowell has made the Kantian phrase 'the logical space of reasons' very popular. This is a very nice statement of the internalist view of justification, with which I sympathise more and more. It is a rationalist coherentist view. It needn't be mystical! |
| 8792 | Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what [Sellars] |
| Full Idea: Observational knowledge of any particular fact, e.g. that this is green, presupposes that one knows general facts of the form 'X is a reliable symptom of Y'. | |
| From: Wilfrid Sellars (Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation? [1956], p.123) | |
| A reaction: This is a nicely observed version of the regress problem with justification. I would guess that foundationalists would simply deny that this further knowledge is required; 'this is green' arises out of the experience, but it is not an inference. |
| 8329 | Either causal relations are given in experience, or they are unobserved and theoretical [Sosa/Tooley] |
| Full Idea: There is a fundamental choice between the realist approach to causation which says that the relation is immediately given in experience, and the view that causation is a theoretical relation, and so not directly observable. | |
| From: E Sosa / M Tooley (Introduction to 'Causation' [1993], §1) | |
| A reaction: Even if immediate experience is involved, there is a step of abstraction in calling it a cause, and picking out events. A 'theoretical relation' is not of much interest there if no observations are involved. I don't think a choice is required here. |
| 23681 | The first motion or effect cannot be produced necessarily, so the First Cause must be a free agent [Reid] |
| Full Idea: That the first motion, or the first effect, whatever it be, cannot be produced necessarily, and, consequently, that the First Cause must be a free agent, has been demonstrated clearly and unanswerably. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 8) | |
| A reaction: He has said that the First Cause can only be conceived by us as an 'agent'. If there is an agential First Cause, then he must be right. It is this need for God to be free which makes scepticism about free will unacceptable to many. |
| 23676 | A willed action needs reasonable understanding of what is to be done [Reid] |
| Full Idea: There can be no will without such a degree of understanding, at least, as gives the conception of that which we will. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 1) | |
| A reaction: Presumably this 'conception' includes an understanding of the probable consequences, but they are of infinite complexity. I see this as an objection to 'ultimate' free will and responsibility, because there are only ever degrees of understanding. |
| 23680 | We are morally free, because we experience it, we are accountable, and we pursue projects [Reid] |
| Full Idea: I believe in moral liberty first because we have a natural conviction of belief that in many cases we act freely, second because we are accountable, and third because we can prosecute an end by a long series of means adapted. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 5) | |
| A reaction: This is his final summary of why he believes in free will. Why didn't Plato and Aristotle have this natural belief? He could only believe we are 'accountable' because he believes in free will. Ants and bees pursue lengthy projects. Hm. |
| 8791 | The concept of 'green' involves a battery of other concepts [Sellars] |
| Full Idea: One can only have the concept of green by having a whole battery of concepts of which it is one element. | |
| From: Wilfrid Sellars (Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation? [1956], p.120) | |
| A reaction: This points in the direction of holism about language and thought, but need not imply it. It might be that concepts have to be learned in small families. It is not clear, though, what is absolutely essential to 'green', except that it indicates colour. |
| 23678 | A motive is merely an idea, like advice, and not a force for action [Reid] |
| Full Idea: A motive is equally incapable of action and of passion; because it is not a thing that exists, but a thing that is conceived. …Motives may be compared to advice or exhortation. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 4) | |
| A reaction: We say people are motivated by greed or anger or love, which seems a bit stronger than mere advice. |
| 8324 | The problem is to explain how causal laws and relations connect, and how they link to the world [Sosa/Tooley] |
| Full Idea: Causal states of affairs encompass causal laws, and causal relations between events or states of affairs; two key questions concern the relation between causal laws and causal relations, and the relation between these and non-causal affairs. | |
| From: E Sosa / M Tooley (Introduction to 'Causation' [1993], §1) | |
| A reaction: This is the agenda for modern analytical philosophy. I'm not quite clear what would count as an answer. When have you 'explained' a relation? Does calling it 'gravity', or finding an equation, explain that relation? Do gravitinos explain it? |
| 8328 | Causation isn't energy transfer, because an electron is caused by previous temporal parts [Sosa/Tooley] |
| Full Idea: The temporal parts of an electron (for example) are causally related, but this relation does not involve any transfer of energy or momentum. Causation cannot be identified with physical energy relations, and physicalist reductions look unpromising. | |
| From: E Sosa / M Tooley (Introduction to 'Causation' [1993], §1) | |
| A reaction: This idea, plus Idea 8327, are their grounds for rejecting Fair's proposal (Idea 8326). It feels like a different use of 'cause' when we say 'the existence of x was caused by its existence yesterday'. It is more like inertia. Destruction needs energy. |
| 8327 | If direction of causation is just direction of energy transfer, that seems to involve causation [Sosa/Tooley] |
| Full Idea: The objection to Fair's view that the direction of causation is the direction of the transference of energy and/or momentum is that the concept of transference itself involves the idea of causation. | |
| From: E Sosa / M Tooley (Introduction to 'Causation' [1993], §1) | |
| A reaction: Does it? If a particle proceeds from a to b, how is that causation? ...But the problem is that the particle kicks open the door when it arrives (i.e. makes changes). We wouldn't call it causation if the transference didn't change any properties. |
| 8330 | Are causes sufficient for the event, or necessary, or both? [Sosa/Tooley] |
| Full Idea: An early view of causation (Mill and Hume) is whatever is (ceteris paribus) sufficient for the event. A second view (E.Nagel) is that the cause should just be necessary. Some (R.Taylor) even contemplate the cause having to be necessary and sufficient. | |
| From: E Sosa / M Tooley (Introduction to 'Causation' [1993], §2) | |
| A reaction: A cause can't be necessary if there is some other way to achieve the effect. A single cause is not sufficient if many other factors are also essential. If neither of those is right, then 'both' is wrong. Enter John Mackie... |
| 23677 | We all know that mere priority or constant conjunction do not have to imply causation [Reid] |
| Full Idea: Every man who understands the language knows that neither priority, nor constant conjunction, nor both taken together, imply efficiency. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 2) | |
| A reaction: This invites the question of how we do know causal events, if none of our experiences are enough to prove it. Reid says we have an innate knowledge that all events are caused, but that isn't much help. The presence of power? |
| 8325 | The dominant view is that causal laws are prior; a minority say causes can be explained singly [Sosa/Tooley] |
| Full Idea: The dominant view is that causal laws are more basic than causal relations, with relations being logically supervenient on causal laws, and on properties and event relations; some, though, defend the singularist view, in which events alone can be related. | |
| From: E Sosa / M Tooley (Introduction to 'Causation' [1993], §1) | |
| A reaction: I am deeply suspicious about laws (see Idea 5470). I suspect that the laws are merely descriptions of the regularities that arise from the single instances of causation. We won't explain the single instances, but then laws don't 'explain' them either. |
| 23679 | The principle of the law of nature is that matter is passive, and is acted upon [Reid] |
| Full Idea: The law of nature respecting matter is grounded upon this principle: That matter is an inert, inactive substance, which does not act, but is acted upon. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 5) | |
| A reaction: A clear statement (alongside Euler's) of the 18th century view, still with us, but strikes me as entirely wrong. Their view needs the active power of God to drive the laws. Matter has intrinsic primitive powers, and laws describe patterns of behaviour. |