28 ideas
| 15163 | The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames] |
| Full Idea: The chief philosophical interest in quantified modal logic lies with metaphysical necessity, essentialism, and the nontrivial modal de re. | |
| From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 3.1) |
| 15158 | Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames] |
| Full Idea: The indefinite description in 'A man will meet you' is naturally treated as quantificational, but an occurrence in predicative position, in 'Jones is not a philosopher', doesn't have a natural quantificational counterpart. | |
| From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 1.23) |
| 15157 | Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames] |
| Full Idea: Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, rather than a singular term, is a real insight. | |
| From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 1.22) | |
| A reaction: 'Would the man who threw the stone come forward' seems like a different usage from 'would the man in the black hat come forward'. |
| 15156 | The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames] |
| Full Idea: Since Frege and Russell were mainly interested in formalizing mathematics, the only quantifiers they needed were the universal and existential one. | |
| From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 1.22) |
| 15161 | There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames] |
| Full Idea: The set of metaphysically necessary truths is larger than the set of logically necessary truths. | |
| From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: Likewise, the set of logically possible truths is much larger than the set of metaphysically possible truths. If a truth is logically necessary, it will clearly be metaphysically necessary. Er, unless it is necessitated by daft logic... |
| 15162 | We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames] |
| Full Idea: Our understanding of metaphysical necessity is intuitive - drawn from our ordinary thought and talk. | |
| From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: This, of course, is a good reason for analytic philosophers to dislike metaphysical necessity. |
| 9240 | Love creates a necessity concerning what to care about [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: The necessity with which love binds the will puts an end to indecisiveness concerning what to care about. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 2.13) | |
| A reaction: I put this here as a reminder that there may be more to necessity than the dry concept of metaphysicians and logicians. 'Why did you rescue that man first?' 'Because I love him'. Kit Fine recognises many sorts of necessity. |
| 8793 | If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons [Sellars] |
| Full Idea: In characterizing an observational episode or state as 'knowing', we are not giving an empirical description of it; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says. | |
| From: Wilfrid Sellars (Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation? [1956], p.123) | |
| A reaction: McDowell has made the Kantian phrase 'the logical space of reasons' very popular. This is a very nice statement of the internalist view of justification, with which I sympathise more and more. It is a rationalist coherentist view. It needn't be mystical! |
| 8792 | Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what [Sellars] |
| Full Idea: Observational knowledge of any particular fact, e.g. that this is green, presupposes that one knows general facts of the form 'X is a reliable symptom of Y'. | |
| From: Wilfrid Sellars (Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation? [1956], p.123) | |
| A reaction: This is a nicely observed version of the regress problem with justification. I would guess that foundationalists would simply deny that this further knowledge is required; 'this is green' arises out of the experience, but it is not an inference. |
| 8791 | The concept of 'green' involves a battery of other concepts [Sellars] |
| Full Idea: One can only have the concept of green by having a whole battery of concepts of which it is one element. | |
| From: Wilfrid Sellars (Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation? [1956], p.120) | |
| A reaction: This points in the direction of holism about language and thought, but need not imply it. It might be that concepts have to be learned in small families. It is not clear, though, what is absolutely essential to 'green', except that it indicates colour. |
| 15152 | To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames] |
| Full Idea: The systematic study of meaning requires a framework for specifying the truth conditions of sentences on the basis of their syntactic structure, and the representational contents of their parts. | |
| From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Soames presents this as common sense, on the first page of his book, and it is hard to disagree. Representation will shade off into studying the workings of the mind. Fodor seems a good person to start with. |
| 15153 | Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames] |
| Full Idea: The truth conditions provided by Tarski's theories (based on references of subsentential constituents) are too weak to determine meanings, because they lacked context-sensitivity and various forms of intensionality. | |
| From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Interesting. This suggests that stronger modern axiomatic theories of truth might give a sufficient basis for a truth conditions theory of meaning. Soames says possible worlds semantics was an attempt to improve things. |
| 15154 | We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames] |
| Full Idea: Instead of explaining the representationality of sentences and cognitive states in terms of propositions, we must explain the representationality of propositions in terms of the representationality of the relevant cognitive states. | |
| From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Music to my ears. I am bewildered by this Russellian notion of a 'proposition' as some abstract entity floating around in the world waiting to be expressed. The vaguer word 'facts' (and false facts?) will cover that. It's Frege's fault. |
| 9228 | Ranking order of desires reveals nothing, because none of them may be considered important [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: Ranking desires in order of preference is no help, because a person who wants one thing more than another may not regard the former as any more important to him than the latter. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 1.5) | |
| A reaction: A salutary warning. Someone may pursue something with incredible intensity, but only to stave off a boring and empty existence. The only way I can think of to assess what really matters to people is - to ask them! |
| 9238 | Morality isn't based on reason; moral indignation is quite unlike disapproval of irrationality [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: The ultimate warrant for moral principles cannot be found in reason. The sort of opprobrium that attaches to moral transgressions is quite unlike the sort of opprobrium that attaches to the requirements of reason. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 2.5 n6) | |
| A reaction: More like a piece of evidence than a proper argument. We may not feel indignant if someone fails a maths exam, but we might if they mess up the arithmetic of our bank account, even though they meant well. |
| 9232 | It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 1.10) | |
| A reaction: This book is a lovely attempt at getting to the heart of where values come from. 'Football isn't a matter of life and death; it's more important than that' - Bill Shankly (manager of Liverpool). Frankfurt is right. |
| 9234 | If you don't care about at least one thing, you can't find reasons to care about anything [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: It is not possible for a person who does not already care at least about something to discover reasons for caring about anything. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 1.11) | |
| A reaction: This is the key idea of this lovely book. Without a glimmer of love somewhere, it is not possible to bootstrap a meaningful life. The glimmer of caring about one thing is transferable. See the Ancient Mariner and the watersnake. |
| 9229 | What is worthwhile for its own sake alone may be worth very little [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: What is worth having or worth doing for its own sake alone may nonetheless be worth very little. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 1.5) | |
| A reaction: That is one of my cherished notions sunk without trace! Aristotle's idea that ends are what matter, not means, always struck me as crucial. But Frankfurt is right. Collecting trivia is done for its own sake. Great tasks are performed as a means. |
| 9233 | Our criteria for evaluating how to live offer an answer to the problem [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: Identifying the criteria to be employed in evaluating various ways of living is also tantamount to providing an answer to the question of how to live. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 1.10) | |
| A reaction: Presumably critical reflection is still possible about those criteria, even though he implies that they just arise out of you (in a rather Nietzschean way). The fear is that critical reflection on basic criteria kills in infant in its cradle. |
| 9235 | Rather than loving things because we value them, I think we value things because we love them [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: It is often understood that we begin loving things because we are struck by their value. ..However, what I have in mind is rather that what we love necessarily acquires value for us because we love it. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 2.3) | |
| A reaction: The uneasy thought here is that this makes value much less rational. If you love because you value, you could probably give reasons for the value. If love comes first it must be instinctive. He says he loved his children before they were born. |
| 9236 | Love can be cool, and it may not involve liking its object [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: It is not among the defining features of love that it must be hot rather than cool, ..and nor is it essential that a person like what he loves. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 2.4) | |
| A reaction: An interesting pair of observations. The greatness of love would probably be measured by length, or by sacrifice. Extreme heat makes us a little suspicious. It would be hard to love something that was actually disliked. |
| 9237 | The paradigm case of pure love is not romantic, but that between parents and infants [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: Relationships that are primarily romantic or sexual do not provide very authentic or illuminating paradigms of love. ...The love of parents for their small children comes closest to offering recognizably pure instances of love. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 2.4) | |
| A reaction: Excellent. Though perhaps a relationships which began romantically might settle into something like the more 'pure' love that he has in mind. Such a relationship must, I trust, be possible between adults. |
| 9239 | I value my children for their sake, but I also value my love for them for its own sake [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: Beside the fact that my children are important to me for their own sakes, there is the additional fact that loving my children is important to me for its own sake. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 2.7) | |
| A reaction: This is at the heart of Frankfurt's thesis, that love is the bedrock of our values in life, and we therefore all need to love in order to generate any values in our life, quite apart from what our love is directed at. Nice thought. |
| 9227 | We might not choose a very moral life, if the character or constitution was deficient [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: People who are scrupulously moral may nonetheless be destined by deficiencies of character or of constitution to lead lives that no reasonable person would freely choose. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 1.2) | |
| A reaction: This fairly firmly refutes any Greek dream that all there is to happiness is leading a virtuous life. Frankfurt is with Aristotle more than with the Stoics. It would be tempting to sacrifice virtue to get a sunny character and good health. |
| 9230 | People want to fulfill their desires, but also for their desires to be sustained [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: Besides wanting to fulfil his desire, the person who cares about what he desires wants something else as well: he wants the desire to be sustained. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 1.6) | |
| A reaction: Plato, in 'Gorgias', makes this fact sound like a nightmare, resembling drug addiction, but in Frankfurt's formulation it looks like a good thing. If you want to make your family happy because you love them, you would dread finding your love had died. |
| 9241 | Loving oneself is not a failing, but is essential to a successful life [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: Far from demonstrating a flaw in character or being a sign of weakness, coming to love oneself is the deepest and most essential - and by no means the most readily attainable - achievement of a serious and successful life. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 2.14) | |
| A reaction: Obviously it will be necessary to dilineate the healthy form of self-love, which Frankfurt attempts to do. Ruthless vanity and self-seeking certainly look like the worst possible weaknesses of character. With that proviso, he is right. |
| 9300 | Boredom is serious, not just uncomfortable; it threatens our psychic survival [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: Boredom is a serious matter. It is not a condition that we seek to avoid just because we do not find it enjoyable. ..It threatens the very continuation of conscious mental life. ..Avoiding bored is a primitive urge for psychic survival. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 2.8) | |
| A reaction: Presumably nihilism will flood into the emptiness created by boredom. Frankfurt will see it as a lack of love for anything in your life, and hence an absence of value. Frankfurt is very good. |
| 9231 | Freedom needs autonomy (rather than causal independence) - embracing our own desires and choices [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: What counts as far as freedom goes is not causal independence, but autonomy. It is a matter of whether we are active rather than passive in our motives and choices, whether those are what we really want, and not alien to us. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 1.8) | |
| A reaction: This is why setting your own targets is excellent, but having targets set for you by authorities is pernicious. These kind of principles need to be clear before any plausible theory of liberalism can be developed. |