7 ideas
14296 | Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine] |
Full Idea: Each disposition, in my view, is a physical state or mechanism. ...In some cases nowadays we understand the physical details and set them forth explicitly in terms of the arrangement and interaction of small bodies. This replaces the old disposition. | |
From: Willard Quine (The Roots of Reference [1990], p.11), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions 01.3 | |
A reaction: A challenge to the dispositions and powers view of nature, one which rests on the 'categorical' structural properties, rather than the 'hypothetical' dispositions. But can we define a mechanism without mentioning its powers? |
14637 | Only individuals have essences, so numbers (as a higher type based on classes) lack them [McMichael] |
Full Idea: Essentialism is not verified by the observation that numbers have interesting essential properties, since they are properties of classes and so are entities of a higher logical type than individuals. | |
From: Alan McMichael (The Epistemology of Essentialist Claims [1986], Intro) | |
A reaction: This relies on a particular view of number (which might be challenged), but is interesting when it comes to abstract entities having essences. Only ur-elements in set theory could have essences, it seems. Why? Rising in type destroys essence? |
14636 | Essences are the interesting necessary properties resulting from a thing's own peculiar nature [McMichael] |
Full Idea: Essentialism says some individuals have certain 'interesting' necessary properties. If it exists, it has that property. The properties are 'interesting' as had in virtue of their own peculiar natures, rather than as general necessary truths. | |
From: Alan McMichael (The Epistemology of Essentialist Claims [1986], Intro) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This is a modern commentator caught between two views. The idea that essence is the non-trivial-necessary properties is standard, but adding their 'peculiar natures' connects him to Aristotle, and Kit Fine's later papers. Good! |
14640 | Maybe essential properties have to be intrinsic, as well as necessary? [McMichael] |
Full Idea: There is a tendency to think of essential properties as having some characteristic in addition to their necessity, such as intrinsicality. | |
From: Alan McMichael (The Epistemology of Essentialist Claims [1986], VIII) | |
A reaction: Personally I am inclined to take this view of all properties, and not just the 'essential' ones. General necessities, relations, categorisations, disjunctions etc. should not be called 'properties', even if they are 'predicates'. Huge confusion results. |
14638 | Essentialism is false, because it implies the existence of necessary singular propositions [McMichael] |
Full Idea: Essentialism entails the existence of necessary singular propositions that are not instances of necessary generalizations. Therefore, since there are no such propositions, essentialism is false. | |
From: Alan McMichael (The Epistemology of Essentialist Claims [1986], I) | |
A reaction: This summarises the attack which McMichael wishes to deal with. I am wickedly tempted to say that essences actually have a contingent existence (or a merely hypothetical dependent necessity), and this objection might be grist for my mill. |
7496 | Rules and duties are based on the will, as that is all we control [Montaigne] |
Full Idea: Since actions and performances are not wholly in our power and since nothing is really in our power but our will - it is on the will that all the rules and duties of Man are based and established. | |
From: Michel de Montaigne (I.7 Our deeds are judged by intention [1580], p.0028) | |
A reaction: This is almost Kant's claim that the only truly good thing is a good will (e.g. Idea 3711). Aristotle disagrees, because a virtuous person should also have good desires. We may will to have good desires, but virtue requires actually having them. |
14639 | Individuals enter into laws only through their general qualities and relations [McMichael] |
Full Idea: Individuals appear to enter into laws only through their general qualities and relations. | |
From: Alan McMichael (The Epistemology of Essentialist Claims [1986], VIII) | |
A reaction: This is a very significant chicken-or-egg issue. The remark seems to offer the vision of pre-existing general laws, which individuals then join (like joining a club). But surely the laws are derived from the individuals? Where else could they come from? |