6 ideas
18439 | Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly [Quine] |
Full Idea: No two classes have exactly the same members, but two different attributes may be attributes of exactly the same things. Classes are identical when their members are identical. ...On the other hand, attributes have no clear principle of individuation. | |
From: Willard Quine (On the Individuation of Attributes [1975], p.100) |
18442 | You only know an attribute if you know what things have it [Quine] |
Full Idea: May we not say that you know an attribute only insofar as you know what things have it? | |
From: Willard Quine (On the Individuation of Attributes [1975], p.106) | |
A reaction: Simple, and the best defence of class nominalism (a very implausible theory) which I have encountered. Do I have to know all the things? Do I not know 'red' if I don't know tomatoes have it? |
18441 | No entity without identity (which requires a principle of individuation) [Quine] |
Full Idea: We have an acceptable notion of class, or physical object, or attribute, or any other sort of object, only insofar as we have an acceptable principle of individuation for that sort of object. There is no entity without identity. | |
From: Willard Quine (On the Individuation of Attributes [1975], p.102) | |
A reaction: Note that this is his criterion for an 'acceptable' notion. Presumably that is for science. It permits less acceptable notions which don't come up to the standard. And presumably true things can be said about the less acceptable entities. |
18440 | Identity of physical objects is just being coextensive [Quine] |
Full Idea: Physical objects are identical if and only if coextensive. | |
From: Willard Quine (On the Individuation of Attributes [1975], p.101) | |
A reaction: The supposed counterexample to this is the statue and the clay it is made of, which are said to have different modal properties (destroying the statue doesn't destroy the clay). |
19440 | How do you know you have conceived a thing deeply enough to assess its possibility? [Vaidya] |
Full Idea: The main issue with learning possibility from conceivability concerns how we can be confident that we have conceived things to the relevant level of depth required for the scenario to actually be a presentation or manifestation of a genuine possibility. | |
From: Anand Vaidya (The Epistemology of Modality [2015], 1.2.2) | |
A reaction: [He cites Van Inwagen 1998 for this idea] The point is that ignorant imagination can conceive of all sorts of absurd things which are seen to be impossible when enough information is available. We can hardly demand a criterion for this. |
3031 | The greatest good is not the achievement of desire, but to desire what is proper [Menedemus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Hearing someone assert that the greatest good was to succeed in everything that one desires, he said,"It is a much greater good to desire what is proper". | |
From: report of Menedemus (fragments/reports [c.310 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.16.12 |