Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reply to Professor Marcus', 'On the Basis of Morality' and 'Clarification and Defense of Grounding'

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16 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification

10801	Either reference really matters, or we don't need to replace it with substitutions [Quine]
	Full Idea: When we reconstrue quantification in terms of substituted expressions rather than real values, we waive reference. ...but if reference matters, we cannot afford to waive it as a category; and if it does not, we do not need to.
	From: Willard Quine (Reply to Professor Marcus [1962], p.183)
	A reaction: An odd dilemma to pose. Presumably the substitution account is an attempt to explain how language actually works, without mentioning dubious direct ontological commitment in the quantifiers.

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding

17292	Avoid 'in virtue of' for grounding, since it might imply a reflexive relation such as identity [Audi,P]
	Full Idea: We should not use 'in virtue of' where it might express a reflexive relation, such as identity. Since grounding is a relation of determination, and closely linked to the concept of explanation, it is irreflexive and asymmetric.
	From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.2)
	A reaction: E.g. he says someone isn't a bachelor in virtue of being an unmarried man, since a bachelor just is an unmarried man. I can't disagree. 'Determination' looks like the magic word, even if we don't know how it cashes out.

17295	Ground relations depend on the properties [Audi,P]
	Full Idea: On my view, grounding relations depend on the natures of the properties involved in them.
	From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.2)
	A reaction: I'm cautious about this if we don't find out more exactly what properties are (and they had better not just be predicates). Maybe properties are the only apparatus we have here, though I prefer 'powers' for the fundamentals.

17297	A ball's being spherical non-causally determines its power to roll [Audi,P]
	Full Idea: The fact that a given thing is spherical non-causally determines the fact that it has the power to roll.
	From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.3)
	A reaction: Quine won't accept this, because you have added something called a 'power' to the ball (intrinsically, it seems), over and above its observable sphericity. Does being a ball 'determine' that it can't be in two places at once? Order of explanation?

17302	Ground is irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive, non-monotonic etc. [Audi,P]
	Full Idea: The logical principles about grounding include irreflexivity, asymmetry, transitivity, non-monotonicity, and so forth.
	From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.8)
	A reaction: [It can't ground itself, there is no mutual grounding, grounds of grounds ground, and grounding judgements are not fixed]

17303	The best critique of grounding says it is actually either identity or elimination [Audi,P]
	Full Idea: I think the most promising skeptical strategy is to insist on either identity or elimination wherever grounding is alleged to hold.
	From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.9)
	A reaction: This comes after an assessment of the critiques of grounding by Oliver, Hofweber and Daly. So we don't say chemistry grounds biology, we either say biology is chemistry, or that there is no biology. Everything is just simples. Not for me.

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding

17294	Grounding is a singular relation between worldly facts [Audi,P]
	Full Idea: On my view, grounding is a singular relation between facts. ...Facts, on this view, are obtaining states of affairs.
	From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.2)
	A reaction: He rest this claim on his 'worldly' view of facts, Idea 17293. I seem to be agreeing with him. Note that it is not between types of fact, even if there are such general truths, such as in chemistry.

17300	If grounding relates facts, properties must be included, as well as objects [Audi,P]
	Full Idea: Taking facts to be the relata of grounding has the interesting consequence that it does not relate ordinary particulars, objects, considered apart from their properties.
	From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.4)
	A reaction: It will depend on what you mean by properties, and it seems to me that something like 'powers' must be invoked, to get the active character that seems to be involved in grounding.

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation

17296	We must accept grounding, for our important explanations [Audi,P]
	Full Idea: The reason we must countenance grounding is that it is indispensible to certain important explanations.
	From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.3)
	A reaction: I like this a lot. The first given of all philosophy is the drive to exlain. However, we mustn't go inventing features of the world, simply to give us the possibility of explaining it. The objective fact seems to be the without-which-not relation.

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / d. Grounding and reduction

17301	Reduction is just identity, so the two things are the same fact, so reduction isn't grounding [Audi,P]
	Full Idea: I deny that when p grounds q, q thereby reduces to p, and I deny that if q reduces to p, then p grounds q. ...On my view, reduction is nothing other than identity, so p is the same fact as q.
	From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.5)
	A reaction: Very good. I can't disagree with any of it, and it is crystal clear. Philosophical heaven.

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact

17293	Worldly facts are obtaining states of affairs, with constituents; conceptual facts also depend on concepts [Audi,P]
	Full Idea: The 'worldly' view of facts says they are obtaining states of affairs, individuated by their constituents and their combination. On the 'conceptual' view, facts will differ if they pick out an object or property via different concepts.
	From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.2)
	A reaction: Might it be that conceptual differences between facts are supervenient on worldly differences (with the worldly facts in charge)?

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation

17298	Two things being identical (like water and H2O) is not an explanation [Audi,P]
	Full Idea: If there is identity between water and H2O, we have neither the asymmetry nor the irreflexivity that explanations require.
	From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.3)
	A reaction: Once you realise it is H2O, you understand its deeper features, which will open up new explanations. He's right, though.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations

17299	There are plenty of examples of non-causal explanation [Audi,P]
	Full Idea: There are a number of explanations where it seems clear that causation is not involved at all: normative grounded in non-normative, disposition grounded in categorical, aesthetic grounded in non-aesthetic, semantic in social and psychological.
	From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.3)
	A reaction: Apart from dispositions, perhaps, these all seem to be experienced phenomena grounded in the physical world. 'Determination' is the preferred term for non-causal grounding.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics

21375	Reason can be vicious, and great crimes have to be rational [Schopenhauer]
	Full Idea: Reasonable and vicious are quite consistent with each other, in fact, only through their union are great and far-reaching crimes possible.
	From: Arthur Schopenhauer (On the Basis of Morality [1841], p.83), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Against'
	A reaction: This is opposed to Kant, who always looks wildly optimistic in his hope that high rationality entails a morally good will. Good people seem to have a fairly irrational empathy with their fellow citizens.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature

21379	Man's three basic ethical incentives are egoism, malice and compassion [Schopenhauer]
	Full Idea: Man's three fundamental ethical incentives, egoism, malice and compassion, are present in everyone in different and incredibly unequal proportions. In accordance with them, motives will operate on man and actions will ensue.
	From: Arthur Schopenhauer (On the Basis of Morality [1841], p.192), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Egoism'
	A reaction: A well chosen trio. Kant would be shocked that he has left out duty, which is supposed to rise above such feelings.

25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights

21376	Philosophy treats animals as exploitable things, ignoring the significance of their lives [Schopenhauer]
	Full Idea: In philosophical morals animals are mere 'things', mere means to any end whatsoever. ...Shame on such a morality, that fails to recognise the eternal essence that lives in every living thing, and shines forth with inscrutable significance from all eyes.
	From: Arthur Schopenhauer (On the Basis of Morality [1841], p.96), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Against'
	A reaction: Good. I find Kant's theoretical indifference to animals very creepy (despite his kind attitude to them). And I also think the utilitarians are wrong to only value animals for their pain, as if any animal could be shredded for fun, if it felt no pain.